Three essays on labor markets by Tucker, Lee Chauncey
Boston University
OpenBU http://open.bu.edu
Theses & Dissertations Boston University Theses & Dissertations
2018
Three essays on labor markets
https://hdl.handle.net/2144/33192
Boston University
BOSTON UNIVERSITY
GRADUATE SCHOOL OF ARTS AND SCIENCES
Dissertation
THREE ESSAYS ON LABOR MARKETS
by
LEE TUCKER
B.A., Carleton College, 2006
M.A., Boston University, 2018
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
2018
c© 2018 by
LEE TUCKER
All rights reserved
Approved by
First Reader
M. Daniele Paserman, PhD
Professor of Economics
Second Reader
Johannes F. Schmieder
Associate Professor of Economics
Third Reader
Samuel Bazzi
Assistant Professor of Economics
Acknowledgments
I am grateful to my advisors, Daniele Paserman, Johannes Schmieder, and Samuel
Bazzi. Thank you to Marc Muendler for generously sharing data with me. I would
also like to thank Kevin Cooke, Matthew Gudgeon, Chinhui Juhn, Sara Machado,
Ben Solow, Nicholas Tilipman and Wesley Yin for their helpful comments and assis-
tance, as well as the participants of the Boston University Labor Reading Group, the
Development Reading Group, and graduate seminars.
Finally, thank you to my loving wife Heather, who has helped me through every
challenge and has put up with me through it all.
Lee Tucker
Department of Economics
iv
THREE ESSAYS ON LABOR MARKETS
LEE TUCKER
Boston University, Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, 2018
Major Professor: M. Daniele Paserman, PhD
Professor of Economics
ABSTRACT
The recent proliferation of administrative data sources has made it possible to
examine numerous longstanding questions related to labor market functions. I make
use of these data sources to provide new insights into three such questions; the extent
of firms' market power in labor markets, the nature of gains from workers' skill spe-
cialization, and the role of job search networks in the locational choices of immigrants.
In Chapter 1, I examine labor market monopsony, the extent to which markets de-
viate from perfect competition. Prior literature suggests two methods to estimate the
extent of monopsony: studying the degree to which firms adjust wages in response to
desired changes in employment growth, and measuring the degree to which workers'
voluntary separations are sensitive to their own wages. Existing studies have found
widely varying answers to these two questions in different contexts. I leverage unique
features of Brazilian administrative data to demonstrate that these approaches pro-
vide very different results even on the same sample of employees, and I rule out a
variety of alternative empirical explanations. These results suggest that labor market
monopsony is primarily a function of workers' attachment to their current employers.
In Chapter 2, I study the wage premium associated with skill specialization.
While standard models predict that more technologically-advanced firms will hire
more specialized workers, I show that higher-ability individuals may actually sort
v
into less specialized occupations within firms. I test these predictions by construct-
ing occupation-level measures of skill specialization from the U.S. O*NET database,
matched to Brazilian administrative data. While I find that specialization among pro-
duction skills is associated both with higher wages and with employment at higher-
wage firms, I find no evidence of specialization premia in cognitive skills.
Finally, in Chapter 3 I study the extent to which job search networks influence
new immigrants' decisions to locate in ethnic enclaves. Using detailed data from the
New Immigrant Survey, I show that immigrants to the U.S. who arrive without job
offers are significantly more likely to locate in enclaves, even after accounting for a
wide range of pre-migration and time-invariant characteristics.
vi
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1Chapter 1
Monopsony for Whom? Evidence from
Brazilian Administrative Data
1.1 Introduction
The idea that labor markets may be imperfectly competitivewith large implications
for workers' wagesis an old one (Robinson, 1969). Yet, for many years, monopsony
was generally considered to be irrelevant to the understanding of the broader labor
market.1 Seminal search-based models of the labor market in the style of Burdett and
Mortensen (1998) changed this view. These models showed that the conditions neces-
sary for firms to exert labor market power over employees are both weak and sensible;
the frictions associated with dynamic job search can give firms market power over their
employees, and these same market frictions support the existence of wage dispersion
across firms for otherwise identical workers, even if there are many firms participating
in the labor market.2 Motivated by these findings, a considerable empirical literature
has arisen to support the existence of these job search frictions (Bleakley and Lin,
2012; Kuhn and Mansour, 2014; Gan and Li, 2016; Marinescu and Rathelot, 2016;
Macaluso, 2017). And, accordingly, the term monopsony is now generally applied to
any circumstance in which labor market frictions permit firms to pay employees less
1For example, Manning (2003) points out that textbooks in labor economics typically made little
or no mention of monopsony through at least the late 1990s.
2Recent research has weakened these conditions even further. For example, Card et al. (2017)
show that even a static model with heterogeneous worker preferences over firm-specific amenities is
sufficient to generate monopsonistic behavior.
2than their marginal revenue product.
Monopsony power has wide-ranging implications for the labor market, and it has
been offered as an explanation for numerous well-known labor market puzzles. For
example, it has been cited as a possible explanation for the lack of large disemployment
effects associated with minimum wage increases (Card and Krueger, 2015; Bhaskar
and To, 1999), a potential major contributor to both gender and racial wage gaps
(Manning, 2003; Lang and Lehmann, 2012; Webber, 2013), and an explanation for
why firms invest in their workers' general human capital (Becker, 1962; Acemoglu and
Pischke, 1998; Manning, 2003). Additionally, recent empirical work using matched
employer-employee administrative data suggests that increases in wage dispersion
across firms have been a primary component of rising wage inequality (Card, Heining,
and Kline, 2013; Song et al., 2015; Barth et al., 2016). Since wage dispersion across
firms is typically theoretically motivated by the same frictional forces that motivate
monopsony power, this suggests that firms' labor market power could be increasing
even as technological advances might seem to reduce the frictional costs associated
with job search.
Yet, in spite of the monopsony model's broad interest, the existing empirical
research on the topic has been both limited and puzzlingly inconclusive. In his well-
known work Monopsony in Motion, Manning (2003) suggests two distinct empirical
approaches for recovering the labor supply elasticity faced by firms; a direct approach
of looking at wage setting behavior by firms, and an indirect approach of looking at
workers' job separation behavior. In a simple model of firms' wage setting behavior,
either approach should be able to recover the labor supply elasticity that firms face.
However, in practice, these approaches have reached very different conclusions. Stud-
ies that have looked at job separation behavior have universally found that workers'
job turnover decisions are quite insensitive to their own wages. These results suggest
3that firms hold a high degree of monopsony power over their workers, and that existing
workers' wages may be marked down considerably from what they would be in a com-
petitive market. On the other hand, studies on wage setting are much more limited,
owing to the particular empirical challenges of ruling out selection and simultaneity
concerns. While there is, for example, evidence of considerable firm size wage premia
(Oi and Idson, 1999), the most plausible recent studies have suggested that firms
either increase wages only slightly or not at all in order to attract new workers, con-
sistent with the notion that labor markets are in fact fairly competitive (Schmieder,
2013; Matsudaira, 2014). The large discrepancy between these two approaches has
generally been attributed to the difficulty of addressing the aforementioned empirical
issues of selection and simultaneity in wage setting, or to issues related to external
validity, rather than an indication of a genuine distinction that is not captured by the
underlying model.
In this chapter, I address these selection and simultaneity concerns by leveraging
the comprehensiveness and unique features of employer-employee matched adminis-
trative data from the Brazilian Relação Anual de Informações Sociais (RAIS) pro-
gram. To do so, I first adopt a high-dimensional fixed effects strategy in the style
of Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis (1999). My variant of this specification incorpo-
rates local labor market by time fixed effects along with time-invariant worker and
establishment fixed effects, and the inclusion of these controls rules out labor mar-
ket level variation in occupational wages that might otherwise influence estimates of
the labor supply elasticity. Under the assumptions of well-specified competitive local
labor markets, the inclusion of these local labor market fixed effects is sufficient to
mitigate the potential for over-rejection of the competitive market hypothesis due to
simultaneity.
In response to remaining concerns about market misspecification, establishment-
4specific labor supply shocks, and attenuation bias, I then develop three novel instru-
mental variable strategies based on simultaneous changes in the employment of other
labor inputs within the firm. These strategies are based on the recognition that labor
markets are both local and occupation-specific, and they rely on a similar logic to the
shift-share type instrumental variables that are widely used elsewhere in the eco-
nomics literature to achieve identification from higher-order variation in labor market
conditions (Card, 2001; Autor, Dorn, and Hanson, 2013). My preferred strategy also
takes advantage of a unique feature of the RAIS data that is not present in alternative
data sources that have been used in prior researchthe existence of firm identifiers
nested within establishment identifiers, allowing me to instrument using growth in
only non-local firm labor inputs.
While two-stage least squares analyses using these instruments suggest somewhat
larger wage responses to firm-level labor demand shocks than predicted by OLS, these
estimates still imply that wages for new workers vary only modestly depending on the
rate of establishment level employment growth. Baseline IV specifications imply an
average labor supply elasticity faced by firms of between 15 and 70. Further robustness
check analyses based on different levels of occupational aggregation suggest that these
results are unlikely to be driven by the potential for endogenous substitution across
occupations.
Finally, I use an analogous fixed effects estimation approach to construct estimates
of labor market separation elasticities in a linear probability model, using longitudinal
data on the entire observed labor market histories for the same set of workers that is
used to provide estimates of the wage response at hiring. The detailed information
contained in the RAIS data allow me to look specifically at rates of voluntary sepa-
ration, and to control for differences arising from worker heterogeneity, establishment
heterogeneity, and local labor market conditions in a similar manner to the approach
5used in measuring wage responses. Consistent with existing estimates of the wage
separation elasticity, I find evidence that workers' rates of voluntary separation are
quite insensitive to their own pay, implying an average labor supply elasticity faced by
firms of 0.6 to 0.8. Heterogeneous effects regressions further demonstrate that these
estimates vary along several dimensions of local labor market conditions that would
be predicted to have relevance in search-based models of the labor market. However,
estimates of the wage premia offered to new hires in times of growth do not exhibit
the same heterogeneity.
In short, this chapter confirms the basic finding that estimates of the labor supply
elasticity vary considerably depending on the way in which they are measured. It
also rules out several alternative explanations related to simultaneity, selection, and
external validity. What remains is a puzzle: why do firms behave as if labor markets
are fairly competitive when setting wages, even though workers' separation behavior
implies that firms have substantial market power over their existing workers? And, if
firms have only ex post monopsony power, what features of the labor market permit
this power to develop?
The chapter proceeds as follows: Section 1.2 provides a brief overview of the
existing literature on the topic of monopsony, Section 1.3 describes both of the primary
empirical specifications used in this chapter along with the IV strategies used, Section
1.4 describes the RAIS data along with household survey data used for analyses of
heterogeneous effects, Section 1.5 provides baseline elasticity estimates using both
specifications, Section 1.6 provides a variety of robustness checks of the new worker
wage specification, Section 1.7 reports the results of heterogeneity tests that are
explicitly designed to assess the extent to which reported elasticity estimates vary
in ways that suggest that they are a function of labor market search frictions, and
Section 1.8 concludes the chapter by discussing potential models that may better
6describe the observed discrepancy in elasticity estimates conducted on new hires vs.
existing workers, as well as their implications.
1.2 Background on Empirical Estimation of Monopsony Power
The traditional static model of labor market monopsony is a direct analogue to the
more well-known model of product market monopoly. In this model, monopsonistic
firms' marginal labor costs are higher than the equilibrium wage, because firms are
assumed to be unable to wage discriminate among workers, and so each additional
worker employed serves to increase the market equilibrium wage. Profit-maximizing
monopsonistic firms pay each worker a marked down fraction of their marginal revenue
product MRP (L), where the extent of the markdown is a function of the labor
supply elasticity faced by the firm. In particular, in a standard profit maximization
framework with unit labor costs and labor supply elasticity LSw, the equilibrium wage
paid to each worker will be:
w =
MRP (L)
1 + 1
LSw
(1.1)
The static model of monopsony underscores the potential importance of monop-
sony to labor market outcomes. However, the model also has clear limitations. In
particular, the model does not provide clear insights into how one should go about
estimating LSw, and the methods that it suggests, such as looking at the firm size
wage premium, could plausibly be explained by match premia or other sources of
increasing returns to scale (Kremer and Maskin, 1996; Oi and Idson, 1999).
In response to these limitations, since Manning (2003), most models of labor
market monopsony have focused instead on a simple dynamic framework. Like the
static model, these models begin with the basic assumption that firms set wages in
7order to achieve a desired firm size.3 Most of these models use a simple dynamic
formulation in which the present level of a firm's employment Lt is a function of prior
employment Lt−1, the number of recruits from both employment and unemployment
as a function of the wage offered, and the rate of separations from employment to
other employment or to unemployment as a function of the wage offered. This can
be written as:
Lt (wt, Lt−1) = R (wt) + [1− s (wt)]Lt−1 (1.2)
where R (wt) is the number of recruits to the firm, and s (wt) is the corresponding
separation rate, each of which is a function of the wage offered to all workers.
This equation implies that the overall labor supply elasticity faced by the firm can
be broken into two or more separate elasticities, including an elasticity of new recruits
to the establishment Rw, and an elasticity of job separations from the establishment
Sw. With some straightforward algebra, (1.2) can be written as:
Lw = Rw − SwLt−1
Lt
(1.3)
The recruitment and separation elasticities can in turn be broken out into elasticities
of recruits from employment and non-employment, and a separation elasticity to
employment and non-employment, which may be expected to differ under a Burdett-
Mortensen type model with both individual reservation wages and on-the-job search.
In particular, this allows for additional flexibility in considering the relationships
between each elasticity over the business cycle, at the cost of stronger assumptions
about the nature of on-the-job search.4 However, in empirical practice, most authors
3The theoretical literature generally does not distinguish between establishments and firms. How-
ever, if separate establishments face different local labor markets, then it is potentially more appro-
priate to consider this phenomenon at the establishment level. In the RAIS data, I observe both
establishments and firms, but the unit of observation at which employment growth is measured is
always the establishment.
4Hirsch, Jahn, and Schnabel (2017) provide a useful derivation of the relationship between the
8have chosen to make the simplifying assumption that the aggregate labor market is
in a steady state, with a constant level of unemployment. On net, this implies that
each recruit to a firm occurs one-for-one with a separation from another firm, and so
it follows that Rw = −Sw, and so:
Lw = −
(
1 +
Lt−1
Lt
)
Sw (1.4)
If it is additionally assumed that the firm is at a steady state level of employment,
so that Lt = Lt−1 = L, then the above can be simplified to:
Lw = −2Sw (1.5)
While the steady state assumptions needed to get this particular equation are strong,
Equation 1.5 implies a clear relationship between the elasticity of voluntary sepa-
rations from establishments and the overall labor supply elasticity faced by those
establishments. If the steady state assumptions are relaxed, then the short-run rela-
tionship between the separation elasticity and the overall labor supply elasticity may
differ somewhat, although the scope for such differences is modest. In particular,
if the average existing establishment is growing slowly in size, then the separation
elasticity will actually be closer to the overall labor supply elasticity than would be
observed in a steady state.
In light of this tractable model, since Manning, most empirical tests of monop-
sony have focused solely on estimating job separation elasticities in order to calculate
a single overall labor supply elasticity. That is, these papers test how responsive a
firm's existing workers are to variation in their level of pay. Several of these papers
take advantage of exogenous sources of wage variation from regulatory changes, such
separation elasticity and the overall wage elasticity of the firm's labor supply when the steady state
constraints are relaxed.
9as wage premia offered to teachers in certain schools, or wage differences arising from
differences in job title within a firm (Ransom and Oaxaca, 2010; Falch, 2010; Ran-
som and Sims, 2010). While these papers provide clean identification of separation
behavior, they raise particular concerns about external validity, since they typically
study heavily regulated and/or unionized industries and occupations which are more
likely to have suitably exogenous variation to exploit. More recent work has begun to
take advantage of matched employer-employee administrative data, generally using
high-dimensional fixed effects approaches similar to the one specified in this chapter
(Barth and Dale-Olsen, 2009; Hotchkiss and Quispe-Agnoli, 2009). A handful of pa-
pers have used other approaches to estimate separation elasticities, such as looking
at historical firm-level data or household survey data (Booth and Katic, 2011; Depew
and Sorensen, 2013).
Although their exact estimates vary, these papers universally find evidence that
workers are at best only somewhat responsive to their own wages in deciding whether
to quit their jobs. Labor supply elasticity estimates in the range of 1-4 are most
typical, with a few outliers in either direction. Nevertheless, this literature has sug-
gested that such differences may have quite substantial policy implications, arising
from profit maximization behavior as noted in Equation 1.1. For example, several
papers that have looked at the differences in separation elasticities between men and
women have suggest that large proportions of the gender wage gap may be explained
women's lower wage elasticity of separation (Barth and Dale-Olsen, 2009; Ransom
and Oaxaca, 2010; Hirsch, Schank, and Schnabel, 2010; Webber, 2013), and similar
research suggests that monopsony may also explain much of the wage gap between
documented and undocumented immigrants (Hotchkiss and Quispe-Agnoli, 2009).
A much smaller literature has attempted to isolate the elasticity of the labor supply
by looking at the relationship between changes in establishment-level employment
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and the wages offered to employees. Although this may seem to be a more direct
method of testing for monopsony, and the value of such an approach has been long
acknowledged, few studies exist because of the particular challenges associated with
simultaneity in wage setting. To my knowledge, only three papers have made attempts
to instrument for firm-level labor demand. In his study of the wage premia paid
by new firms, Schmieder (2013) finds evidence that this wage premium is primarily
attributable to the higher growth rate of these firms. Using firm age as an instrument
for growth, he finds evidence of a small upward slope to the labor supply curve; with an
estimated elasticity of approximately 46. Matsudaira (2014) studies a policy change
in California in which new minimum nurse staffing regulations served as an exogenous
shock to firm-level labor demand whose size varied depending on distance from the
new legal threshold. This IV strategy provides no evidence for monopsony power,
and indeed the point estimates suggest that firms that grew faster lowered wages,
though the author suggests that worker selection may be a possible concern. Bellon
(2016) develops an IV strategy using French administrative data that instruments
using exposure to variation in product demand for exporting firms; his estimates
suggest that these firms face a recruitment elasticity of approximately 10, implying
an overall labor supply elasticity that is larger than that. Collectively, while these
studies provide some evidence for imperfect labor markets, they imply that the labor
market is far more competitive than studies of separation behavior would suggest.
A particular contribution of this chapter is to expand the empirical study of im-
perfect labor markets in the context of a developing country with a large informal
sector. Because high-quality employment data in developing economies is scarce, lit-
tle research exists on the extent of monopsony or other labor market frictions in these
contexts. Brummund (2011) estimates the labor supply elasticity for manufacturing
firms in Indonesia utilizing structural methods adapted from the industrial organiza-
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tion literature, and Rivera (2013) looks at worker transition behavior using the same
data source used in this chapter. Satchi and Temple (2009) calibrate a model using
Mexican data which suggests a relationship between formal sector workers' bargaining
power and the size of the informal sector.
This chapter also relies upon, and contributes to two other bodies of literature.
The first is the literature on the use of high-dimensional fixed effects models in eco-
nomics, in particular with respect to the use of more than two classes of such effects to
estimate models that were previously computationally infeasible. While this literature
began with the goal of examining the degree of assortative matching between work-
ers and firms (Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis, 1999; Abowd, Creecy, and Kramarz,
2002; Card, Heining, and Kline, 2013), recent advances in the algorithms available
for use have permitted the consideration of additional dimensions of effects, such as
job title or match effects (Torres et al., 2013). Recent algorithmic improvements have
also substantially reduced the computation time needed to estimate these models
(Correia, 2016). To my knowledge, this is the first paper to use local labor market
fixed effects in conjuction with establishment fixed effects to address potential simul-
taneity issues. The second is the literature on the degree to which human capital is
occupation specific (Gathmann and Schönberg, 2010; Guvenen et al., 2015; Macaluso,
2017). In particular, the heterogeneity tests shown in Section 1.7 are supportive of
the hypothesis that workers consider occupation-level labor market conditions in their
decision of whether or not to leave their employer voluntarily.
1.3 Overview of Empirical Specifications
The goal of this chapter is not only to estimate the elasticity of the labor supply in the
Brazilian context, but also to better understand why estimates of the labor supply
elasticity faced by firms vary so considerably depending on whether they attempt to
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estimate the labor supply directly or via separation behavior. Accordingly, I develop
three basic estimation strategies, each of which is outlined below.
1.3.1 Wage-Setting Specification
The first strategy that I adopt asks the question do establishments offer higher wages
to their new employees when they are growing more quickly? In this section of the
chapter, the basic equation that I estimate is of the form:
logwiomt = αGot,j(i,t) +Xitβ + δj(i,t) + θi + ψomt + iomt (1.6)
where wiomt is the log wage income of worker i, employed in occupation o, in local labor
market region m, and in year t. The explanatory variable of interest, Got,j(i,t), is a
measure of occupation-level employment growth in the establishment at which worker
i is employed at time t, denoted by j (i, t). Xit are time-variant worker characteristics,
δj(i,t) are a full set of establishment fixed effects, θi are worker fixed effects, and ψomt
are fully interacted occupation-region-year fixed effects. Because this specification
regresses log wages on a measure of overall employment growth, the coefficient of
interest, α, can be interpreted here as the inverse of the labor supply elasticity faced
by the firm.5
In keeping with other literature on establishment-level employment changes, I
adopt an occupation-level version of the index of employment change used by Davis,
Haltiwanger, and Schuh (1998), (hereafter referred to as the DHS index) defined as
2× Lt−Lt−1
Lt+Lt−1
. For small changes in employment, this index is approximately equivalent
to a more traditional measure of percentage change. However, the index is also defined
even when prior-period occupation-level employment is zero, and its bounded and
symmetric nature addresses potentially large asymmetries between small employers
5 It must be noted that the estimates provided here do imply some path dependence: a firm that
grows quickly in one period and slowly in the next will be predicted to offer different wages in each
period than a firm that grows consistently over two periods, ceteris paribus.
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who grow or decline by the same amount.
The specification of Equation 1.6 incorporates several types of fixed effects simul-
taneously, and this rules out endogeneity arising from time-invariant employer het-
erogeneity, worker selection, or simultaneity among competitive labor market firms.6
However, it also means that many types of variation in wages do not contribute to
the identification of the parameter of interest α, i.e. the estimated inverse supply
elasticity. These include the variation between establishments in their overall average
wage levels, the variation between individual workers in their overall average observed
wage levels, and the variation in the average wages paid to each occupation in each
local labor market in each year.
What remains are two distinct sources of variation which correspond to different
sources of variation in establishment-occupation employment growth. The first is
variation across time, within occupation, in the growth rate of employment within
particular establishments. If, say, occupation o represents accountants, and estab-
lishment j (i, t) is an outpost of a particular accounting firm, then an estimate of α
will be positive if the firm pays higher wages to new accountants at the time periods
in which its employment of accountants is growing most rapidly. The second source
of variation on which α is identified is simultaneous variation in the growth rate of
different occupations within the same establishment. That is, in the same establish-
ment considered previously, α will also be positive if the wage premium offered to
accountants is greater than the wage premium offered to janitors in the time periods
when the establishment is growing more quickly in its employment of accountants
than janitors, and vice versa. In robustness check regressions presented in Section
1.6, I am also able to individually isolate these two sources of variation.
6 The strategy of incorporating overlapping worker and establishment fixed effects, developed by
Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis (1999) and generally referred to as the AKM model of wage setting,
has a long history in the literature, and is now typical of recent research conducted using matched
employer-employee data.
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Figure 1·1: Potential Simultaneity Bias in a Monopsonistic Firm
Without Local Labor Market Fixed Effects
While the restricted sources of variation used to identify the parameter of interest
α in this specification help to rule out selection concerns, there may still remain
substantial concerns related to simultaneity bias in estimation of firms' labor supply
elasticities. Figure 1·1 illustrates this concern in a standard static model. The firm
shown in this figure possesses monopsony power, as demonstrated by the upward-
sloping labor supply curve that it faces. Our empirical goal is to estimate the elasticity
of this firm-specific labor supply curve. And, if we are able to isolate solely shifts in
firm-specific demand, then it is straightforward to trace out the shape of the firm's
supply curve from equilibrium wages and employment. For example, a shift in firm-
level labor demand from D1 to D2 would yield an estimate of α based on the line
connecting equilibrium points A and B.
However, in practice, isolating firm-specific shifts in demand is difficult to do in
a non-experimental setting for a very simple reason: the labor supply curve faced
by the firm is itself a function of all other firms' labor demand. If, for example,
there exists a positive correlation between shifts in firm-specific labor demand and
the labor demand of other firms in the market (as shown in the figure), then we may
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observe large changes in wages even with little change in overall employment, leading
to upwardly-biased estimates of the labor supply elasticity α. Conversely, a negative
correlation between firm-specific supply and firm-specific demand, such as would be
found if firms adjust to increase their usage of labor inputs when it is least expensive
to do so, would lead to downwardly biased estimates of the firm-specific labor supply
elasticity. The ideal test of monopsony power would identify wage responses to purely
random variation in firms' product demand, which would yield variation in labor
demand that is uncorrelated with local labor market conditions. But, truly exogenous
firm-level instruments for labor demand are rare, and so concern about simultaneity
has been the major impediment to progress on this empirical question.7
To begin to address these simultaneity concerns, the regression specification in
Equation 1.6 incorporates occupation-region-year fixed effects ψomt, which I will here-
after refer to as local labor market fixed effects. Since the administrative data used
in this study provide a comprehensive portrait of the formal sector labor market for
each occupation o, and because they incorporate suitable geographic detail, the local
labor market effects ψomt simply control flexibly for all variation over time in the
average wages paid to new workers locally in that occupation. It is straightforward
to show that if local labor markets are exactly specified by the fixed effects and if
there do not exist establishment-specific labor supply shocks, then the inclusion of
these local labor market fixed effects is itself sufficient to preclude over-rejection of
the competitive labor market hypothesis due to simultaneity.8
7For example, in Monopsony in Motion, Manning opines that [p]rogress seems to be dependent
on finding a good firm-level instrument (Manning, 2003, p. 96).
8In most traditional static models of the labor market, wage dispersion across firms can arise
due to hedonic considerations, but it does not arise as a result of monopsony power. Therefore,
if labor markets are competitive, the imposition of appropriate ψomt fixed effects will ensure that
OLS regressions recover an estimated inverse elasticity of zero in expectation. However, depending
on the exact assumptions made regarding the nature of equilibrium wage dispersion, OLS estimates
could still provide a downwardly biased estimate of the inverse elasticity faced by the firm even if
firm-specific labor supply curves are upward sloping. Such results would imply a more elastic labor
supply than would actually be the case.
16
However, in practice, even the inclusion of local labor market fixed effects may
be insufficient to address all simultaneity issues. For example, occupational labor
markets may exist at a finer level of specificity than can be observed in the data, or
labor market activity may be more localized than is characterized by the fixed effects.
If this is true, then inclusion of coarse fixed effects will fail to root out correlation
between firm-specific demand and market-level supply. There could also simply ex-
ist establishment-specific labor supply shocks that are correlated with establishment
demand shocks. Finally, although it is not a source of simultaneity, there may be
considerable classical measurement error in firms' observed employment growth rates
relative to their desired growth rates at the time of hire, in part because wages and
employment are only measured at the end of each year, rather than at the time of
hire. This could be a source of attenuation bias in OLS estimates.
In response to these concerns, I develop three novel instrumental variables strate-
gies, each of which leverages the comprehensiveness of the administrative data used
here. Each strategy relies on a similar shift-share logic to numerous studies else-
where in the economics literature, and in particular, these instruments rely on the
well-known existence of scale effects in the use of labor inputs. The first strategy
is to instrument for establishment occupational employment growth Got,j(i,t) using
G−ot,j(i,t), or the growth in establishment-level employment in occupations other than
occupation o. The second strategy, which leverages a particular advantage of these
data, is to instrument for employment growth using Got,f(−m,i,t), where f (−m, i, t)
is defined as the firm f of which establishment j (i, t) is a part, excluding any other
local establishments. The third strategy simply combines the features of the first two
strategies, using G−ot,f(−m,i,t) as an instrument, the growth in non-local employment
of other occupations.
Since each of these IV strategies involves using growth in the use of other labor
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inputs as an instrument for growth in employment of one's own occupation in one's
establishment, each of these instruments achieves relevance from the existence of
scale effects in production. That is, in response to firm-level product demand or
productivity shocks, firms scale their overall production up or down. The exclusion
restriction, meanwhile, requires that the extent to which firms scale their production
of other inputs relative to the worker's own input is uncorrelated with omitted firm-
year specific variables that also influence worker's wages. Notice that the inclusion of
establishment and local labor market fixed effects considerably narrows the scope of
potential violations of the exclusion restriction. So, for example, firm-level differences
in the elasticities of substitution across inputs are not a threat to identification, as
long as those firm-level differences are time invariant. Time-variant changes in the
relative usage of inputs due to local aggregate labor supply shocks also do not threaten
identification.
The primary remaining threat to identification is the potential for endogenous
time-varying degrees of input substitution within firms, and there are two primary
ways in which such substitution behavior could arise. The first is if employers switch
production processes in order to substitute workers in supply-elastic occupations for
those in supply-inelastic ones. While, in the short run, the scope of this type of
substitution may be limited, this concern is particularly likely to hold in the long
run as firms are able to adapt their production processes. To the extent that such
substitution is a concern, we should specifically expect it to bias regression estimates
of the inverse elasticity downward, implying a more elastic labor supply curve than
may actually be the case. However, even if such substitution is a concern, to the
extent that my IV estimates capture the overall wage response to changes in product
demand, the estimates reported here may be more reflective of the particular margin
of labor market adjustment that is most relevant to policymakers.
18
The second and more concerning threat to identification from endogenous input
substitution could arise if supply shocks in substitute inputs are correlated with firm-
specific supply or demand shocks for the worker's own occupation. While the inclusion
of local labor market fixed effects narrows the scope of such concerns, it is not im-
plausible that such correlations could exist within local labor markets, especially if
occupations are defined narrowly. It is for this reason that my preferred identification
strategy uses only growth in the employment of non-local labor inputs within the
same firm. Robustness check regressions shown in Section 1.6 further suggest that
this type of endogenous substitution is unlikely to be a substantial source of bias in
my baseline IV estimates.
Finally, it must also be noted that the AKM model implicitly assumes that wages
can be decomposed into additively separable establishment and worker fixed effects.
That is, the model assumes that there are no match effects by which high-wage
workers receive a particular wage premium when they are matched with a high wage
or particularly suitable firm. Several recent papers have examined this assumption
in various contexts, notably by looking for asymmetry in the changes in wages from
workers who move from high-wage firms to low-wage firms. Recent research by Lavetti
and Schmutte (2016) has performed these tests using the same Brazilian RAIS data
that I use in my analysis over the period 2003-2010, and has found little evidence of
match effects. In this chapter, the presence of local labor market fixed effects further
implies that establishment wage premia and any time-specific local labor market wage
premium are additively separable, and that time-invariant individual wage premia are
additively separable from time-variant local labor market fixed effects. That is, high-
wage workers or high-wage firms do not disproportionately benefit from being in a
place where wages are high or low at a given point in time.
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1.3.2 Job Separations Specification
In my second empirical strategy, I ask the same question that has been regularly
asked in the literature to date: how responsive are workers to their own pay in their
decisions to separate from their current firm? To answer this question, I estimate a
linear probability model of the form:
Siomt = α logwiomt +Xitβ + δj(i,t) + θi + ψomt + iomt (1.7)
The binary outcome variable Si,j(i,t),t+1 equals 1 if worker i is reported to have vol-
untarily separated from establishment j(i, t) in the year subsequent to his observation
in period t, and the parameter of interest is the coefficient α, estimated. Since this
specification regresses a binary outcome on a measure of log wages, the separation
elasticity faced by the firm in its choice of wages is calculated as α
S
, where S is the
mean rate of voluntary separation in the sample. If the steady state assumptions and
other assumptions described in Section 1.2 hold, then this number may be multiplied
by −2 to produce an estimate of the overall labor supply elasticity faced by the firm.
As with the wage-setting specification, this specification includes worker fixed effects
δj(i,t) , establishment fixed effects θi, and local labor market fixed effects ψomt.
Although prior research has estimated separation elasticities using overlapping
establishment and worker fixed effects, the inclusion of local labor market fixed effects
again addresses a particular concern with this estimation method. Specifically, overall
local labor market conditions are likely to be positively correlated with both wages
and with the overall probability of voluntary separation. 9 An estimation strategy
that does not address this correlation will produce estimates of the labor separation
9 For example, publicly available data in the U.S. on job quits from JOLTS shows quits to be
highly pro-cyclical.
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elasticity that are biased upward (toward zero), which would imply that the labor
supply to firms is more inelastic than may actually be the case. To date, to my
knowledge, most separation elasticity estimates using matched administrative data
have either made no direct attempt to control for this source of bias, or they have
chosen to instrument for current-period wages using initial-period wages. Since, in this
specification, the introduction of local labor market fixed effects addresses any sources
of variation over time that are local labor market specific, the results shown in this
chapter are robust to business cycle considerations, including local and occupation-
specific business cycle considerations.
A second empirical concern in the estimation of separation elasticities is the ex-
istence of firm-specific wage shocks. If, for example, workers' wages dip in a single
period because of a negative firm-level shock, then those workers may be compara-
tively unlikely to separate voluntarily if they believe that their wages will recover in
the next period, because by separating they forego the opportunity to earn future
wages as a tenured worker within the firm. The presence of such short-term wage
variation is therefore a source of bias toward zero in elasticity estimates relative to
workers' long-run sensitivity to their own wages. I adopt two strategies to address this
concern. The first is to use initial-period worker wages as an instrument for current
period wages, limiting the sample to only individuals who are reported to have more
than one year of tenure. The second is to replace establishment fixed effects δj(i,t) and
local labor market fixed effects ψomt with a full set establishment-occupation-year
fixed effects νomt,j(i,t) . This second strategy has the effect of identifying the separation
elasticity using only variation in wages within establishment-occupation groups, so
estimates of α in this specification are based on workers' sensitivity to their own wage
relative to what their coworkers are paid.
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1.4 Description of Data Sources
In this section of the chapter, I describe the primary source of data for the anal-
yses of this chapter, matched employer-employee data from the Relação Anual de
Informações Sociais (RAIS). I also briefly describe my more limited use of house-
hold survey data from the Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicilios (PNAD).
Additional details regarding my use of household data are contained in the Appendix.
1.4.1 RAIS
In Brazil, all firms that are formally registered must report information on their em-
ployees in each year to the Ministry of Labor for the provision of an annual wage
supplement. This dataset is known as RAIS, and it provides a comprehensive annual
census of formal sector employment in Brazil. This information includes a unique
identifier that is longitudinally consistent, making it possible to track individual work-
ers over time, even as they switch establishments.10 It also contains basic demographic
information on individuals including their age, sex, nationality, contracted hours per
week, and level of education. Job tenure is reported in weeks.
In addition to longitudinal data on workers, the RAIS data include a unique tax
identifier for each establishment. This tax identifier nests within itself a firm code,
so that both firms and establishments can be identified from the data. Addition-
ally, although the units of observation in the RAIS data are person-years, the data
10Brazilian private sector workers who are engaged in formalized private sector employment receive
a unique identification number through the Programade Integração Social (PIS) program. A worker's
PIS identifier is used to identify them at all employers and it does not change. As part of the PIS
program, employers contribute to a special bank account, administered by the government owned
bank Caixa, that is set aside for each employee. The full balance of this account can only be accessed
upon retirement, old age, illness, death, or disability. However, formally registered employees who
meet certain basic criteria are also eligible to receive an Abono Salarial, or annual wage supplement.
The supplement is equivalent to an additional month's pay at the minimum wage level, and it
is prorated for individuals who were not formally employed for the full year. The agency that
administers the Abono Salarial uses the data from RAIS to determine eligibility. Therefore, the
scope for non-compliance in reporting is very low, and the RAIS data provide a comprehensive
census of formal sector employment in each period (PIS - Programa Integração Social | Caixa).
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also contain several establishment-year level variables. These include two measures
of industry classification (CNAE and IBGE), legal classification that indicates gov-
ernment or private ownership, and geographic information at the level of individual
municipalities.11
While other analyses of the labor supply to the firm have utilized matched admin-
istrative data such as IAB data from Germany (Schmieder, 2013; Hirsch, Jahn, and
Schnabel, 2017) and LEHD data from the United States (Webber, 2013), the Brazil-
ian RAIS data have key advantages over these datasets. Most notably, the identity
code for each establishment in RAIS nests within it the identity code of the firm
of which it is a part. This, combined with the detailed geographic data that RAIS
provides, allows me to pursue a novel strategy for isolating firm-level labor demand
shocks by using employment growth in other non-local establishments of the same
firm as an instrument for growth in employment within each establishment.
A second advantage of the RAIS data is that I observe not only each worker's
full employment spell over the period 1995-2014, but at the time of their separation
from a job spell, I observe a code that indicates their reason for separation. Data on
the reasons for job separation are collected because the benefits to which a formally
registered employee is entitled vary depending on the reason for separation. This
allows me to identify voluntary job separations separately from non-voluntary job
separations to construct separation elasticity estimates, and therefore to consider
the ways in which these two primary estimation methods may suggest very different
results, even using the same sample of workers.
The full set of individual job separation codes (both voluntary and involuntary)
11 There are a small number of establishments which report different municipalities for different
individuals within the same establishment. However, over 99% of establishments report a single
municipality for all workers employed for them in each year. Therefore, in calculating establishment-
level and establishment-occupation level indices, I use the modal municipality code reported as a
measure of the establishment's location.
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are shown in Appendix Table A.1. In that table, I also list the unconditional proba-
bility that a worker is reported to have separated with that separation code reported
in the year subsequent to observation, for the longitudinal labor market sample of
workers used to calculate separation elasticities. Notably, only about one in four sep-
arations is reported to be voluntary in nature. This observation is consistent with the
fact that the foregone social welfare benefits from voluntary separation are relatively
large, making it more costly for individuals to voluntarily separate to unemployment
(Rivera, 2013).
A broader feature of the Brazilian context, one which provides both advantages
and disadvantages, is the presence of a large informal sector in Brazil that is not
observed in the RAIS data. On one hand, the presence of comprehensive formal
sector data alongside the informal sector allows me to examine the extent to which
the informal sector influences formal sector labor market responses, as I do in Section
1.7. On the other hand, I cannot infer that an individual who is not observed in the
dataset at any point in time is not employed, as they may have entered informal sector
employment. Similarly, I cannot assume that any establishment that first appears in
the RAIS data in a given year does so because it is a new establishment, unless I also
observe other establishments of the same firm in prior periods. And, as Brazil's labor
market has become increasingly formalized, the composition of the formal sector may
have changed, restricting my ability to identify changing labor market responses over
time. I am able to use household survey data from the PNAD dataset (described
below) to observe the local extent of the informal labor market with some geographic
and occupational specificity.
In order to limit the potential scope of concerns arising from life cycle factors,
gender differences, or other concerns, I limit my sample in the following ways. I
include only men, ages 25-54, who are reported to to have been contracted full-
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time (defined here as 30-50 hours per week), and who are reported to be employed
on December 31st of the year in question. If multiple jobs are reported for one
individual, I include only the highest-paying job in each year.12I drop individuals
whose reported income is zero, and individuals without a reported unique identifier. I
exclude observations from government entities, establishments that are reported to be
state owned, and non-profit entities. And, for my sample of new worker observations,
I include only individuals who are reported by their employer to have less than one
year of tenure at the time of observation. Although I have access to RAIS data
from 1986-2014, the above restrictions also require me to restrict my attention to the
1995-2014 period in which all necessary variables are reported.13
A full sample of the RAIS data, even with the restrictions indicated above, is very
large. Even with the new worker restriction, for example, there are over 120 million
new worker observations over the period 1995-2014. Since the methods used in this
chapter are computationally intensive, I have constructed a random sample of 10%
of Brazilian micro-region codes. The choice to sample at the local labor market level
is deliberate. The high-dimensional fixed effects regressions that I run in this chapter
rely on the the movement of individuals across establishments as they change jobs for
estimation. Individual and establishment fixed effects are estimated simultaneously
on the connected set of individuals. So, a sample constructed at either the individual
12 In my separation elasticity estimates, the measure of separation that I use is based on reported
separations, not on non-observation, so these estimates are not affected by the possibility that one
could hold two jobs continuously while having a different one report the highest income in each year.
My separation estimates should be likewise unaffected by issues related to seasonal separation and
rehiring. Additionally, in wage regressions on the new hire sample, I include linear and quadratic
terms in tenure to address any potential issues related to seasonality in wages. This method of
addressing multiple job holder is also consistent with what has been done in other recent research
using RAIS data (e.g. Helpman et al., 2017).
13 An additional concern with looking at wage setting behavior prior to 1995 is that in the early
1990s, Brazil experienced very high rates of inflation, at times exceeding 1000% per year. In 1994,
the Plano Real sought to reduce inflation, resulting in the adoption of a new currency that was
loosely linked to the U.S. dollar. The use of data from 1995-2014, therefore, explicitly excludes the
period prior to the adoption of the Plano Real.
25
level or at the establishment level would greatly reduce the statistical power of this
estimation method by reducing the precision of all fixed effect estimates. In contrast,
by conducting a sample at the local labor market level, all individuals who do not
relocate across metropolitan areas, or who relocate between labor markets in the
sample, are still observed for the full duration of their formal sector employment.
Figure 1·2: Map of 10% Random Sample of Brazilian Micro-Regions
Notes: 48 sampled Brazilian microcode regions are indicated in green.
Figure 1·2 shows a map of Brazil, in which the 48 local labor market regions
that I have sampled are indicated in green. While a few of these regions in the
sparsely populated Amazon are quite large in geographic area, most are comparatively
compact, and they are concentrated in the Northeastern and Southeastern portions of
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the country in which population is most concentrated. Because the micro-region level
of aggregation maps most closely to the traditional definition of a metropolitan area
based on overlapping patterns of economic activity, this level of aggregation has also
been used by other recent literature looking at regional effects in Brazil (Dix-Carneiro
and Kovak, 2017). Of the 48 microcodes sampled by me, the largest in population
by far is the micro-region containing the city of Belo Horizonte, which as of 2017 is
the 6th largest city and 3rd largest metropolitan area in Brazil (IBGE - Agência de
Notícias).
Figure 1·3: Histogram of DHS Growth Index for New-Worker Sample
Notes: From RAIS new worker sample, 1995-2014, with restrictions as described
in Section 1.4.1. The DHS index is calculated as 2× Lt−Lt−1Lt+Lt−1 for each occupation
employed within each establishment.
Table 1.1 provides some basic summary statistics on the new worker samples
that are used for the analysis of hiring and wages (columns 1 and 2), as well as the
sample that includes those workers' full work histories (column 3). There are 12.4
million observations in the new worker sample, and they span approximately 400,000
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Table 1.1: Summary Statistics for New Worker and Work-History
Samples
New Worker Sample Work-History
Sample
Multi-Region
All Estabs. & Estab. Firms All Estabs.
Observations 12,415,479 4,031,119 30,166,458
Establishments 401,635 88,455 493,446
Firms 309,442 19,053 382,480
Median Estab Size. 96 298 162
Median Estab Occ. Size 16 42 24
December Wage Income 3.159 4.273 4.110
[4.16] [5.84] [6.31]
Age 35.28 35.04 35.25
[7.83] [7.72] [11.49]
Tenure (Years) 0.322 0.345 1.08
[0.267] [0.274] [1.50]
Education
Less than HS 0.526 0.472 0.479
HS Grad 0.396 0.403 0.401
Some College 0.022 0.032 0.025
College Grad 0.055 0.093 0.095
Location
Belo Horizonte 0.541 0.515 0.544
São Luís 0.085 0.088 0.087
Londrina 0.058 0.059 0.057
Bragança Paulista 0.048 0.047 0.044
Others 0.269 0.290 0.267
Occupation
Prof. or Managerial 0.116 0.126 0.142
Techn. or Supervisory 0.147 0.145 0.211
Other White Collar 0.142 0.151 0.148
Skilled Blue Collar 0.450 0.452 0.362
Unskilled Blue Collar 0.145 0.127 0.137
Notes: From RAIS, 1995-2014. New worker sample includes men ages 25-54, with 30-50 hours
contracted per week and less than one year of tenure at a private sector establishment. Work-
History sample includes all RAIS observations 1995-2014 for individuals who are ever included in
the new worker sample. Standard deviations in brackets.
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establishments at just over 300,000 unique firms. About one third of those workers are
employed by one of roughly 19,000 firms that have multiple establishment in different
regions of the country. Several features are of note. Firstly, even though this is the
formal sector, levels of education are low by the standards of the developed world;
more than half of sampled individuals have less than a high school education, and
less than 10% have any education beyond the high school level. Additionally, nearly
60% of the sample is engaged in some form of blue-collar occupation, although the
considerable majority of these occupations are reported to require some degree of
training or skill.14 Finally, as described above, a slight majority of observations in
this sample are from the Belo Horizonte Brazilian micro-region. No other region in
Brazil comprises more than 10% of the sample.
Figure 1·3 shows the distribution of occupation-level employment growth within
the new worker sample, using the DHS index as described in Section 1.3. Unsurpris-
ingly, there are two large spikes in the distribution of this index within the sample.
The first occurs at precisely 0, indicating that these new workers are in establishments
that have undergone a one-for-one replacement of employees within an occupation.
The second spike occurs at an index value of 2, indicating establishments that are
employing individuals within an occupation for the first time. There is of course
no corresponding spike at -2, simply because there are no worker-level observations
within an occupation if an establishment exits employment of that occupation. The
occupation-level growth distribution is otherwise relatively continuous and centered
near 0, with somewhat greater density at small rates of growth than in corresponding
rates of decline.
For all worker-level wage regressions, the dependent variable that I use is log
December wage income, reported as a multiple of the Brazilian minimum wage income
14The division of 343 three-digit CBO occupations into these five broad classifications is from
(Menezes-Filho, Muendler, and Ramey, 2008).
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because the size of the abono salarial is determined by the minimum wage. I use the
same measure of income as an explanatory variable in job separation regressions.
Because all specifications include year fixed effects and I use log wages, results are
invariant to the normalization of wage income used in the data.
For regressions of separation behavior, I simply extend the new worker sample
to include the entire labor market histories for 1995-2014 of the individuals who
ever appear in the original new worker sample. This yields a total of 30.2 million
observations over the 20 year period. Several summary statistics in the full work-
history sample differ from the new worker sample. Reported mean wage incomes
are higher, which is at least in part an expected result of returns to job tenure.
However, more notably, the work-history sample is weighted toward workers with
more education and who are employed in white collar occupations. These distinctions
appear to be a function of the informal sector in Brazil, in which it is likely that there
are comparatively more opportunities for blue-collar employment.
1.4.2 PNAD
Like many middle-income countries in Latin America, Brazil has a large informal
sector labor market in addition to its formal sector. An important question concerns
the extent to which this informal sector influences the competitiveness of formal sector
labor markets. However, the RAIS data only include information on the formal sector.
So, to analyze this question, I incorporate statistics constructed from an annual survey
of Brazilian households, the Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicilios (PNAD).
Among numerous other topics, the PNAD survey asks individuals about the details
of their employment status that includes whether or not they are in possession of a
carteira de trabalho assinada for their primary employment. Only workers in formally-
registered establishments are eligible to receive this document, and issuance of the
document is mandatory for formal-sector workers because the document is used to
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obtain the benefits associated with the PIS program. Thus, I am able to use these
data to construct a measure of the proportion of the labor force that is engaged in
formal sector employment.
As discussed previously, there is ample evidence that the labor market is becoming
increasingly formalized over time in Brazil. According to PNAD microdata, in 1995,
the initial year of this analysis, 29.7% of the labor force reported that they were in
possession of a carteira from a non-government, non-military entity, while another
22.3% reported that they did not have such a contract, 6.9% reported that they
were in government or military employment, and 41.4% were self-employed, employed
in production for own consumption, or otherwise had a status that could not be
determined. By 2014, the final year of this analysis, fully 41.2% of the labor force
reported that they were privately employed and in possession of of a formal sector
contract, with the proportion of the labor force explicitly reporting no contract having
declined to 19.1%, and the balance of the increase in the proportion of formal sector
employment arising from declines in other categories.
There is also clear evidence that informally-employed workers earn considerably
lower salaries, on average, than formally employed ones. Figure 1·4 shows a quantile
plot of monthly income in 1995 for individuals who are reported to be employed in
the private sector with formal contracts, compared against the quantile plot of income
of those who are informally employed. From the graph, it is clear that formal sector
incomes first-order stochastically dominate informal sector incomes. Indeed, in 1995,
more than half of informal sector workers were paid a monthly wage that was at or
below the statutory minimum wage for Brazil, while only about 10% of formal sector
workers reported incomes at or below the minimum wage. This suggests that the
effects of labor market informality on market competitiveness may be expected to be
analogous to the effects that a large stock of unemployed workers would have in search
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Figure 1·4: Quantile Plot of Monthly Incomes for Formal and Informal
Sector Employed (1995)
Notes: Income data from PNAD. Non-public formal workers include all individ-
uals who report employment with a carteira excluding government employees
and military. Informal workers includes workers who report that their employ-
ment is without a carteira, or who report that their employment is production
for own consumption. The red line represents the Brazilian minimum wage for
1995.
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models with equilibrium unemployment such as in Burdett and Mortensen (1998).15
Further details regarding the construction of my measure of labor market formality
are discussed in the Appendix.
1.5 Results of Both Empirical Specifications
1.5.1 Wage-Setting Specification
Table 1.2: Baseline Regression Results: New Worker Wages
All Establishments Multi-Region, Multi-Estab. Firms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS IV: Other
Occs.
IV: Other
Estabs.
IV: Other
Est./Occs.
OLS IV: Other
Occs.
Occ. Growth 0.00494*** 0.0181*** 0.0125*** 0.0627*** 0.00733*** 0.0203***
(0.000358) (0.00234) (0.00147) (0.0167) (0.00148) (0.00362)
Implied Elasticity 202.4 55.2 80.0 15.9 136.4 49.3
[177,236] [44,74] [65,104] [10,33] [98,226] [37,76]
Observations 9,844,518 9,293,995 2,458,636 3,195,334 3,234,340 3,036,790
Adjusted R-squared 0.870 0.905
Estab. FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Occ-Micro-Year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
K-P F Stat 324.5 914.6 152.9 1,414
Notes: From RAIS new worker sample. Dependent variable is log December wages; Occ. Growth
is the occupation-specific DHS index of establishment employment growth from the prior year.
Columns 3 through 6 are restricted to workers in multi-establishment, multi-region firms as in
Column 3. All specifications include education group controls, education group by year controls,
quadratic and cubic age profile terms and month of hire controls. Standard errors in parentheses
are two-way clustered by firm and micro-region. 95% confidence interval for elasticity estimate in
brackets is calculated by the delta method. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 1.2 shows the results of my baseline wage-setting specification, as indicated
by Equation 1.6. Column 1 shows the results for the OLS specification, while columns
2 through 4 show results using the specified IV strategies of using growth in other
occupations within the establishment and growth in employment at other non-local
establishments within the same firm. Because the restriction necessary to produce
the IV specification in columns 3 and 4 exclude both single-establishment firms and
15Menezes-Filho, Muendler, and Ramey (2008) use a selection model to analyze selection into
formal sector status in Brazil using RAIS data. They find suggestive evidence that a larger informal
sector is associated with a larger formal sector wage premium for otherwise comparable workers.
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firms with no non-local establishments, the sample sizes reported for these column are
considerably smaller than the sample sizes reported in columns 1 and 2. Accordingly,
in columns 5 and 6 I reproduce the OLS and own-establishment IV results, restricted
to the same of establishments used in column 3. In all wage regression specification,
time varying worker covariates include four education group indicators, a full set
of education group by year indicators, polynomial terms in (age− 40), linear and
quadratic tenure effects, and a full set of nationality controls. Other than the addition
of nationality and tenure controls, this specification is largely identical to that used in
the recent literature using overlapping establishment and worker fixed effects (Card
et al., 2017).16 Finally, note that in all specifications, standard errors are two-way
clustered at the firm and micro-region levels to ensure that inferences are robust to
within-firm and within-region correlation in the unexplained component of wages.
As indicated by the table, the baseline regression specification implies very small
non-zero inverse elasticity estimates. These are consistent with a labor market that
is not perfectly competitive, but is not strongly monopsonistic either. The OLS
estimates in columns 1 and 4 suggest that a firm seeking to double its employment
level in a particular occupation may be expected to offer a wage premium to new
workers of about 0.5% relative to what they would offer in a period of no employment
growth. This implies a labor supply elasticity to the firm of approximately 200.
As expected, the three IV strategies each provide somewhat larger inverse elasticity
estimates. However, these estimates still imply a labor supply elasticity faced by the
firm at the time of hiring of between 15 and 75, with my preferred specification in
16In particular, the use of quadratic and cubic terms in (age− 40), rather than the more tradi-
tional use of linear terms in age and experience, has been used to address a well-known problem
in identifying worker effects (and in particular, their presumed cohort component) when linear age
effects are included in a regression along with year fixed effects. Instead, in this specification, the
identifying assumption is that the age-wage profile is flat at age 40. Figure A·1 in the Appendix
shows the unadjusted age-wage profile observed in the RAIS data, which supports this assumption
for my sample.
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column 4 implying the most inelastic firm-level labor supply. These estimates are not
infinite. Nonetheless, they are much larger than the range of estimates provided from
most studies of job separation activity, and they are suggestive of a labor market that
is reasonably competitive.
Figure 1·5: Non-parametric OLS Estimation of New Worker Wage
Premia
Notes: From the RAIS new worker sample, 1995-2014. Coefficients and confi-
dence intervals are from an OLS regression with 40 indicator variable indicating
employment growth in each bin of DHS employment growth index of width 0.1.
The omitted category is firms that reported exactly zero growth in occupational
employment. All other covariates are as specified in Column 1 of Table 1.2.
Standard errors for confidence interval construction are clustered by establish-
ment.
One concern in looking at the baseline specification may be that the wage premium
could be highly nonlinear. In particular, the results could be driven by establishments
that are new entrants into a particular occupational market, or solely by establish-
ments that are experiencing rapid growth or decline. Although the DHS index is a
bounded and symmetric index that may in part address these outlier type concerns,
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it may still be beneficial to examine this wage behavior in a non-parametric way.
Because of the size of this dataset, even with my region-level sample I am able to
construct non-parametric OLS estimates of the establishment log wage premia of-
fered to workers at various binned levels of employment growth. These estimates are
presented graphically as Figure 1·5. Each point in this figure represents the point
estimate for a bin of width 0.1 in the DHS measure (approximately 10% growth or
decline for values close to 0), plotted relative to the point of zero growth. As the
figure demonstrates, the pattern of estimated wage premia is relatively linear; if any-
thing, the gradient of wage premia is steepest for small levels of growth or decline.
Non-parametric estimates become more imprecise with greater growth and decline
because comparatively few establishments exhibit such rapid changes in employment,
even at the individual occupation level. However, the largest bin, which is comprised
primarily of new entrants to a particular occupation's labor market, is comparatively
precisely estimated, and the results suggest a wage premium that is consistent with
the broader pattern. Indeed, for no levels of growth or decline is the wage premium
predicted to vary by more than 2% from what would be predicted under zero employ-
ment growth.
Overall, these results are fairly consistent with the exceedingly small literature
that has credibly estimated the labor supply elasticity faced by firms by looking
directly at wage setting, which has estimated the elasticity of the labor supply curve
faced by firms at greater than 10. Later, in Section 1.6, I show these estimates to be
fairly robust to a range of other potential concerns.
1.5.2 Job Separations Specification
As discussed in the introduction to this chapter, most contemporary literature on
firms' monopsony power has not chosen to estimate the elasticity of firms' labor supply
curves directly, primarily because of prior concerns about simultaneity. Instead, most
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papers have built on the aforementioned dynamic model specification of Manning to
estimate the elasticity of workers' separations with respect to their own wage, and
they have then used these estimates to infer the labor supply elasticity faced by firms
under the assumptions of the original model. In this subsection, I conduct my own
analysis of this type, using the regression specification described in Section 1.3.2,
which incorporates local labor market fixed effects into a linear probability model
that is otherwise similar to what has been previously estimated in the literature. The
education indicators, education by year indicators, and nationality indicators are as
specified in the previous section. In place of quadratic and cubic terms in (age− 40),
separations specifications include quadratic and cubic terms in (age− 18), because
18 is the age in the sample at which the mean voluntary separation rate is highest.
In keeping with the typical empirical specifications used in this literature, I omit own
job tenure from the controls used in the baseline separations specification.
Table 1.3: Baseline Results of Separations Specification
(1) (2) (3)
OLS IV: Initial Wage OLS w/Add'l FEs
Log December Earnings -0.0175*** -0.00700** -0.0159***
(0.00140) (0.00282) (0.00157)
Pr(Separation) 0.0507 0.0199 0.0509
Implied Separation Elasticity -0.344 -0.351 -0.312
[-0.291,-0.399] [-0.074,-0.630] -[0.252,-0.372]
Adjusted R-squared 0.198 0.380
Observations 26,313,032 7,638,242 22,380,842
Estab. FEs Yes Yes No
Individual FEs Yes Yes Yes
Occ-Micro-Year FEs Yes Yes No
Occ-Micro-Estab-Year FEs No No Yes
K-P F Stat 1,135
Notes: The outcome in all regressions is a binary indicator of voluntary job separation, and Log
December Wage is the worker's own reported wage. All specifications include education group
controls, education group by year controls, and nationality controls. Column 2 includes only workers
with greater than one year of tenure reported. Standard errors in parentheses are two-way clustered
by firm and micro-region. 95% confidence interval for elasticity estimate in brackets is calculated by
the delta method. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 1.3 shows the baseline results of this specification. Below each specification,
I report both the mean voluntary separation rate in the sample, and the implied
separation elasticity estimate of that regression. Column 1 shows the results of OLS
estimation, while column 2 shows the results from using initial wages as an instrument
for current-period wages, and column 3 shows the results using OLS, but including
establishment-occupation-year fixed effects in place of separate establishment and
occupation-region-year fixed effects. Overall, these results suggest that workers are
indeed highly unresponsive to their own wages in their decisions of whether or not
to separate from their current employment, with estimated separation elasticities of
-0.3 to -0.4. Under the steady state assumption and the model of firm wage setting
described in Section 1.2, these would be presumed to correspond to a labor supply
elasticity to the firm of 0.6 to 0.8, exceedingly far from the estimated elasticities of
15 to 76 estimated by IV regressions that apply the direct wage setting specification.
As with the wage regressions on the new hire sample, the results from Table 1.3
are reasonably consistent with prior estimates in the literature, in spite of the method-
ological improvements made here. If anything, these estimates suggest that Brazilian
workers may be somewhat less responsive to wages in their separation decisions than
workers in the other contexts in which this question has been studied, which tend to
find estimates of the labor supply elasticity from 1 to 5. There are many potential
explanations that one might imagine for why this might be the case in this particular
setting, including numerous explanations regarding the presence of additional labor
market frictions in a developing country context. However, explanations based on the
standard dynamic model presented in Section 1.2 cannot explain the large difference
between estimates produced using these two methods on the same sample of work-
ers, even with relatively large deviations from the steady state assumptions that are
typically imposed.
38
1.6 Robustness Checks
While the results presented in the prior sections of this chapter are strongly suggestive,
there may still be particular questions arising from the specifications used. In this
section of the chapter I discuss and show results for several robustness check strategies
that may address specific concerns along these lines. In the Appendix, I show several
additional robustness check results that may be of interest as well.
1.6.1 Testing for Endogenous Substitution
The results for the IV specifications shown in Table 1.2 identify the elasticity of the
labor supply of each occupation based on two key assumptions:
1. In the presence of firm-level product demand or productivity shocks, there exists
a scale effect such that a priori, the firm desires to increase in the short run its
use of other labor inputs.
2. In the presence of firm-level product demand or productivity shocks, firms do
not endogenously change the extent of their substitution of one labor input for
the other labor inputs that are being used as instruments as a result of any
factor that is not fully captured by the fixed effects included in the empirical
specification.
The first assumption implies the relevance of the IV strategies described here,
and unsurprisingly the input instruments used in this chapter are all quite strong.
However, the second assumption, that patterns of substitution are not endogenous to
time-varying firm-level shocks, could be plausibly violated in some circumstances. For
example, as discussed in Section 1.3.1, if local labor market fixed effects are specified
too finely relative to actual local labor markets, and if occupational inputs within
the same labor market are then included in the growth measure that is used as an
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instrument, then simultaneity bias could arise from a correlation between the labor
demand of one's own firm and the labor demand of other firms within the same local
labor market. In IV strategies 2 and 3, in which I instrument using only non-local
inputs of the same firm, the scope for this type of correlation is greatly reduced, but if
local labor market conditions are strongly correlated with non-local conditions, there
may still be scope for some form of endogenous substitution bias.
A common feature of all these stories is that they require firms to engage in substi-
tution. Yet, many labor inputs are very poor substitutes for one another. Consider,
for example, a hospital that employs doctors, nurse practitioners, and janitors. One
might readily imagine a situation in which, in response to an establishment-specific
supply shock, the firm engages in more or less substitution of nurse practitioners for
doctors at different points in time. However, janitors are almost surely not a substi-
tute for either doctors or nurse practitioners in the production of medical care. So,
while an estimate that uses employment growth of nurse practitioners and janitors
as an instrument for employment growth of doctors might be subject to endogenous
substitution bias, an estimate that uses only employment growth of janitors will not
be subject to the same bias.
It is, of course, not feasible to model the individual production functions of each
firm, and I will not seek to do so. However, I have constructed the following straight-
forward robustness check, based on the simple assumption that short term substi-
tutability across occupations is likely to be strongly correlated with labor market
transition behavior over time.
Let moi = 1 if worker i ever reported employment in occupation o over the full
period observable in the RAIS data, 1986-2014, including the full geographic sample.
Then, for each pair of occupations o and o′, one may construct the following:
Mo,o′ =
∑
i 1(mio∩mio′ )
min{No,No′} (1.8)
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This formula, which I will refer to as the ever-transition probability, is simply the
larger of the two conditional probabilities that, given that a worker is ever observed in
occupation o, they are ever observed in occupation o′, and vice versa. Notably, these
ever-transition probabilities are computed without any assumption that observed em-
ployment in occupations o and o′ occurs in adjacent years, that it occurs in the same
establishment, firm, or location, or that it occurs in any particular order. Using
the larger of the two conditional probabilities addresses situations in which one of
the two occupations under consideration employs many more workers than the other.
With 343 occupations listed in the RAIS dataset, this yields 58,653 occupational pairs
whose ever-transition rates can be calculated and ranked.
Then, let o˜ be the set of occupations such that Mo,o′ < M¯ . So, one may calculate
Go˜,t,,j(i,t) as the growth rate for the set of occupations such that Mo,o′ < M¯ for all
o˜, i.e. the growth rate for the set of pairwise low-transition occupations only. If
substitution bias is leading the IV inverse elasticity estimates shown in Table 1.2 to
be biased downward, then the use of low-transition occupations as an instrument will
recover estimated inverse elasticities that are larger. That is, they will find the labor
supply curve faced by the firm to be more inelastic.
Figure 1·6 shows an ordered scatterplot of ever-transition rates for all 58,653 oc-
cupational pairs, constructed using the entire RAIS dataset from 1986-2014. It is
perhaps unsurprising to see that a relatively small fraction of occupational pairs ex-
hibit high ever-transition rates. In contrast, most occupational pairs have very low
ever-transition rates, and there are many examples in the data of occupational pairs
in which no individuals ever transitioned between the two occupations in nearly 30
years of formal sector observation. The median occupational pair exhibits a transition
rate of approximately 0.003, implying that over this 29 year period, only three in one
thousand individuals who report employment in the smaller of the two occupations in
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Figure 1·6: Ranked Scatterplot of Occupational Pairs by Ever-
Transition Probability
Notes: From RAIS full dataset, 1986-2014. Each pairwise ever-transition prob-
ability is calculated as the probability of an individual ever appearing in RAIS
as employed in one occupation, conditional on them ever reporting employment
in the other occupation. The larger of the two conditional probabilities for
each pair is reported, and same-occupation pairs are excluded. Median pairwise
transition probability is 0.3%.
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the median pair were ever employed in the other occupation. Investigation of individ-
ual pairs, unsurprisingly, also shows that seemingly closely related occupations tend
to rank more highly than seemingly unrelated occupations. For example, economists
are relatively likely to have ever been accountants; this pair is in the 99th percentile,
with an ever-transition probability of approximately 14%. However, economists have
only a median pairwise ever-transition probability of also being mining supervisors
(0.3%), and almost no individuals who are ever economists also report ever being
employed as agricultural machine operators.
Table 1.4: Results of IV Regressions Using Only Growth in Low-
Transition Occupations
Within-Estab. Growth Non-local Firm Growth
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Below
Median
Below 25th
Pctile.
Below
Median
Below 25th
Pctile.
Switchers Switchers Switchers Switchers
Occ. Growth 0.0201*** 0.00880 -.006534 .008618
(0.00475) (0.00900) (0.01644) (0.01432)
Observations 2,221,523 957,926 1,132,760 585,612
Estab. FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Occ-Micro-Year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Num. Clusters 27,759 8,212 26,590 12,832
Kleinbergen-Paap F Stat 857.2 354.3 202.5 106.9
Notes: Each column reports the result of an IV specification in which employment growth in the
worker's own occupation is instrumented for using growth only in low ever-transition occupations
within the worker's same establishment. All other specification details are as in columns 2 and
4 of Table 1.2. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by establishment. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 1.4 shows the results of a regression using an IV specification in which
establishment-level growth in occupation o is instrumented for by growth in occu-
pation o˜o, either within establishment or in non-local establishments of the same
firm. The instrument in column 1 is establishment-level growth in below-median
ever-transition occupations in the same establishment, while the instrument in col-
umn 2 is establishment-level growth in occupations whose ever-transition probabilities
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are below the 25th percentile in the same establishment. In column 3, the instrument
is below-median ever-transition occupational growth in non-local establishments of
the firm, while in column 4 this instrument is again restricted to growth in below
25th percentile occupations within non-local establishments of the same firm. All
other details of these specifications are as in Table 1.2, columns 2 and 4. Notice that
in all columns of this table, the sample size is reduced considerably. This is because
many establishments and firms simply do not employ individuals in occupations that
are sufficiently transition-distant from one another, and so the individuals in these
establishments are dropped. The inverse elasticity estimate shown in the first column
of this table is larger from both of the coefficients from the analogous specifications in
Table 1.2 (columns 2 and 5), but the difference is quite small and is not statistically
distinguishable from those baseline estimates. Attempting to limit the set of low-
transition occupations further, as I do in column 2, provides results with little power
owing to the greatly reduced sample size. Similarly, columns 3 and 4 provide no clear
evidence of endogenous substitution bias. In all, the results shown in this subsection
provide no evidence to suggest that endogenous substitution bias is a major concern
in the baseline estimates.
1.6.2 Additional FEs
As discussed in Section 1.3, the fixed effects specification used for my baseline regres-
sion results provides an estimate of the labor supply elasticity faced by firms that
is identified from two types of variation: simultaneous variation across occupations
within each establishment, and variation over time within occupation-establishment
groups. However, by including either a full set of establishment-occupation fixed ef-
fects or a full set of establishment-year fixed effects, it is possible to isolate each of
these sources of variation. Table 1.5 shows the results of each of these regression
specifications.
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Table 1.5: Baseline Regressions with More Restrictive Fixed Effects
Specifications
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS IV: Other
Occs.
IV: Other
Estabs.
IV: Other
Occs./Estabs.
Panel A: Estab-Occ. FEs
Occ. Growth 0.00458*** 0.0151*** 0.0151*** 0.0573***
(0.000419) (0.00185) (0.00266) (0.0125)
Observations 9,552,645 9,014,500 2,414,326 3,124,873
Adjusted R-squared 0.890
Panel B: Estab-Year FEs
Occ. Growth 0.000921* 0.00184** -0.00179 -0.00373
(0.000472) (0.000693) (0.00185) (0.00278)
Observations 9,235,626 8,945,168 2,337,718 3,048,046
Adjusted R-squared 0.888
Panel C: Occ.-Ind.-Micro-Year FEs
Occ. Growth 0.00490*** 0.0163*** 0.0123*** 0.0556***
(0.000330) (0.00241) (0.00354) (0.0106)
Observations 9,694,195 9,147,793 2,420,991 3,131,404
Adjusted R-squared 0.875
Individual FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: All results are from regressions on the RAIS new worker sample as in columns 1 through
3 of Table 1.2, but with different fixed effects specifications. Panel A replaces establishment FEs
with establishment × occupation ones. Panel B replaces establishment FEs with establishment ×
year ones. Panel C replaces occupation × region × year fixed effects with occupation × industry ×
region × year ones. Standard errors in parentheses are two-way clustered by firm and micro-region.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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The results of these regressions suggest that the baseline elasticity estimates are
driven primarily by variation in wages over time, rather than within-year varia-
tion in the growth rate of different occupations. More specifically, the inclusion
of establishment-occupation fixed effects in Panel A provides estimates that are ex-
tremely similar to the baseline estimates in both OLS and IV specifications. In
contrast, the inclusion of establishment-year fixed effects leads to point estimates
that are both very small and statistically insignificant. This suggests that most of
the variation in wages, at least once local labor market conditions are controlled for,
occurs at the establishment-year level rather than at the establishment-occupation
level. Broad wage-setting policies, such as policies based on rent sharing, could also
be consistent with these findings.
Another, somewhat different concern is that the inclusion of fixed effects at the
occupation × region × year level could be insufficient to address local labor market
heterogeneity if the local labor market conditions faced by a firm who seeks to hire
new workers are driven by time-variant industry-level considerations in addition to
occupation-level considerations. If, for example, it is less costly for firms to attract
workers from their own industry than from other industries, then the wage that firms
choose to offer could depend on the local industry wage premium as well as the local
occupational wage premium. In such a case, failure to control for local industry
conditions could allow for the continued presence of simultaneity.
In Panel C of Table 1.5, I present results in which I replace the occupation ×
region × year fixed effects with occupation × industry × region × year fixed effects.
This specification allows for industry-level conditions to impact firm behavior, and
also flexibly permits interaction between occupation and industry-level labor market
conditions in wage setting. The results are little different from the baseline regression.
This suggests that industry-level conditions may not be a large simultaneity concern
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as long as occupation-level conditions are accounted for.
1.6.3 Using aggregate occupational growth
The approach of this chapter is largely based on the principle that labor market
activities occur primarily at the occupation level. There is ample support for this
assertion in the recent literature on labor market transition behaviors (Gathmann
and Schönberg, 2010; Guvenen et al., 2015; Macaluso, 2017), and it aligns with the
intuitive notion that many occupations are not ready substitutes for one another in
light of their vastly different skillsets. When an establishment seeks to hire new work-
ers with particular skills, it faces the labor market for the occupation that possesses
those skills. Accordingly, the baseline new hire wage regression results shown in Table
1.2 use occupation-level employment growth as the relevant measure of employment
growth, and it uses occupation × region × year local labor market fixed effects as the
measure of local labor market conditions.
However, the limited body of work that has looked at monopsony in wage set-
ting to date has not, in general, taken an occupation-based approach consistently.
In studies where a particular occupation's employment is subject to an exogenous
shock (e.g. Matsudaira, 2014), that shock is typically used as an instrument for an
occupation-level measure of changes in employment. In contrast, strategies that use
firm- or market-level instruments (e.g. Schmieder, 2013; Bellon, 2016) have typically
instrumented for establishment-level changes in employment. Therefore, it may be
particularly useful to understand the extent to which these approaches may be ex-
pected to differ.
In Table 1.6 I present results in which workers' wages are regressed on an establish-
ment wide measure of employment growth. Columns 1 and 3 show OLS regression
results without and with the inclusion of occupation-level local labor market FEs,
while columns 2 and 4 apply the IV strategy of instrumenting for establishment em-
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Table 1.6: Regressions: Aggregate-Level Employment Changes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
IV: OLS IV: OLS
OLS Other Estabs. Multi-Estab. OLS Other Estabs. Multi-Estab.
Estab. Growth 0.0101*** 0.0512*** 0.0136*** 0.0105*** 0.0433*** 0.0133***
(0.00145) (0.0187) (0.00301) (0.00128) (0.0129) (0.00308)
Observations 9,875,692 3,257,557 3,257,557 9,844,518 3,234,340 3,234,340
Adj. R-squared 0.858 0.894 0.870 0.905
Estab. FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Occ-Micro-Year FEs No No No Yes Yes Yes
K-P F Stat 118.3 250.1
Notes: Columns 1 and 3 provide OLS estimates of worker wages on the DHS index of total employment
growth in the worker's own establishment. Columns 2 and 4 provide IV estimates on workers in multi-region,
multi-establishment firms, using the DHS index of total employment growth in non-local establishments as an
instrument for total employment growth in the worker's own establishment. All other specification details are
as in Table 1.2. Standard errors in parentheses are two-way clustered by firm and micro-region. *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1
ployment growth using non-local firm establishment growth of multi-establishment,
multi-region firms, analogously to columns 3 and 4 of Table 1.2. The inverse elasticity
estimates obtained using this approach are within the range of estimates produced by
the occupation-level approach, although they are at the lower end of the range, as is
result from my preferred IV strategy of using non-local growth in other occupations.
Notably, the range of inverse elasticity estimates shown in this table (0.0448 - 0.0525)
is also quite close to the estimated inverse elasticity that Schmieder (2013) obtains
when using establishment age as an instrument for employment growth in Germany
(0.046). These IV estimates would correspond to an overall labor supply elasticity to
the firm in the range of 19 to 23, instead of the 15 to 76 implied by the baseline IV
regression results.
Overall, this table suggests that the key result of the chapterthat differences
between separation elasticity estimates and hiring wage elasticity estimates are not
driven by sample selection or simultaneityis not greatly impacted by whether em-
ployment growth is measured at the occupation level or at the aggregate level. I argue
that as a more direct reflection of labor market behavior, a more occupation-level ap-
proach has much to recommend it. However, occupational data may not be available
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in all datasets, and so it is helpful to know that these results are not primarily driven
by the strategy of using occupations as different labor inputs.
1.7 Analysis of Heterogeneous Effects
Although the baseline elasticity estimates are themselves interesting and suggestive,
there may be particular value in understanding the ways in which these elasticity
estimates vary over well-known demographic groups. The large observed difference
between new hire and separation elasticities underscores this concern; if firms' face
such large differences in labor supply elasticity for new and existing workers, then it is
quite reasonable to expect that these same elasticity estimates will vary in predictable
ways depending on the characteristics of the workers or markets analyzed.
The limited evidence on separation elasticities has suggested that they vary based
on gender, and also over the business cycle.17 Both of the above results can readily
be explained as a function of differences in labor market search frictions. However,
as evidence for the importance of search frictions, these are a fairly indirect test. A
more direct test would consider whether individuals who are observably identical are
more or less sensitive to their own wage depending on a more direct measure of the
the probability of finding equivalent employment in their local labor market, outside
of their own firm. Because of the comprehensiveness of the Brazilian RAIS data, I
am able to construct intuitive measures of this probability, and therefore I am able
construct simple tests of the hypothesis that labor market frictions are an important
determinant of both separation behavior and of firms' wage setting.
The estimates shown in this section are all OLS estimates, and all specifications
include the same combination of worker, establishment, and local labor market fixed
effects as are been used elsewhere in this chapter. While the choice reflects the
17To my knowledge, no research has tested for the existence of heterogeneous effects in wage
setting behavior.
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particular challenge of credible IV estimation with interaction terms, it is not clear
that the use of OLS should have a particular impact on the significance of these
estimates, because the particular sources of simultaneity that IV specifications can
address do not have an obvious correlation with these market-level measures.
The first measure that I construct is a simple measure of local occupation-specific
market size, excluding one's own firm. The specific measure that I adopt here is:
log (Nm,−f,o,t) = log (Nm,o,t −Nm,f,o,t) (1.9)
The estimated interaction term coefficient in this regression specification can be
roughly interpreted as the change in the predicted elasticity (or inverse elasticity)
associated with a doubling of the number of individuals employed in one's own oc-
cupation in the local labor market outside of one's firm. Under the assumption that
potential employment opportunities are closely tied to existing patterns of employ-
ment, this statistic captures the measure of local labor market opportunities that
would be predicted to be most important in a directed search model of the labor
market where the rate of job finding depends on the number of sufficiently suitable
jobs. 18 In such a model, firms face a more elastic labor supply curve when the
ex-firm local labor market is larger, because employees have more opportunities for
ex-firm matches and therefore face lower search costs.
The second measure that I construct is a measure of the relative prevalence of
an occupation in the ex-firm local labor market. The local relative prevalence ratio
for an occupation is simply the proportion of employment outside the firm that is
engaged in the occupation, relative to the proportion of nationwide employment that
18 An even better measure of local labor market conditions would use job vacancy data. However,
I am unaware of any data on job vacancies in Brazil that would be available at a level of geography
or occupational specificity such that they would be usable here.
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is engaged in that occupation. That is:
Prevmo,−ft =
Nm,−fot
Nm,−ft
/
Not
Nt
(1.10)
In a labor market search model with undirected job search (such as a model with
exogenous arrival of random job offers), this measure captures the measure of local
labor market opportunities that would be predicted to be most important, again under
the assumption that potential employment opportunities are closely tied to existing
patterns of employment. In such a model, firms face a more elastic labor supply curve
when the ex-firm local labor market has a high local labor market prevalence of the
occupation in question, because each arrival of a job offer to the worker is more likely
to be of the same occupation and therefore exceed the worker's reservation threshold
for accepting an offer.
The third measure that I construct is the proportion of employed men in each
occupation and state that are employed in the formal sector, defined in PNAD as being
in possession of a carteira de trabalho assinada. As described in the Appendix, formal
sector status can be inferred for most but not all respondents to PNAD. For example,
individuals who report that they are self-employed or employers themselves cannot be
determined to be formally or informally employed. Such individuals are not counted as
employed in the formal sector for the measure constructed here. Additionally, because
changes over time in the degree of formality may pick up the effect of changes in local
labor market conditions, for this specification I use only data on the degree of labor
market formalization prior to the beginning of my analysis, in the period 1992-1995.
Unlike the first two measures that I construct, the theoretically predicted relation-
ship between labor market formality and the labor supply elasticity is not immediately
evident. However, in light of the large differences in wages offered to formal and infor-
mal sector workers (see Figure 1·4), it may be most appropriate to think of informal
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sector workers as in essence underemployed. Given this, one compelling hypothesis
may be that, since firms can readily draw upon the pool of underemployed informal
sector workers, that a larger informal sector makes the supply curve faced by the firm
more elastic. But, even with this simplification, the Burdett and Mortensen (1998)
model that has influenced most contemporary studies of job separation behavior does
not yield such immediate predictions regarding the relationship between equilibrium
unemployment/underemployment and the labor supply elasticity without further as-
sumptions regarding the frictional parameters that characterize the model. Broadly
speaking, the model predicts that labor markets with large informal sectors will have
more elastic labor supply when the arrival rate of formal sector job offers is relatively
low in those markets.19
Table 1.7 shows the results of these heterogeneous effects regressions on the new
worker wage specification, while Table 1.8 shows the same interactions effects as ap-
plied to the separations specification. The two tables provide show markedly different
results. Specifically, there is no evidence here that firms offer larger or smaller wage
premia in relation to growth in response to the local labor market conditions repre-
sented by these measures. All interaction coefficients are very small and statistically
insignificant. In contrast, there is substantial evidence that these workers' degree of
sensitivity to local labor market conditions is related to the conditions in their local
19 More specifically, in the simplest version of the Burdett and Mortensen model, the degree of
wage dispersion depends on two key frictions, the rate of arrival of job offers to the unemployed,
and the rate of arrival of job offers to the employed. Employment to unemployment transitions only
occur because current job matches are destroyed at an exogenous rate. While the exact extent of
wage dispersion (and therefore the supply elasticity) depends on both frictions, the unemployment
rate/underemployment rate depends primarily on the arrival rate of job offers to the unemployed
alone. It can readily be shown that both the unemployment/underemployment rate and the extent of
equilibrium wage dispersion are decreasing functions of the offer arrival rate for unemployed workers,
but the extent of equilibrium wage dispersion is an increasing function of the offer arrival rate for
employed workers. So, an equilibrium in which there is a large informal sector and also lower wage
dispersion is characterized by a low arrival rate of formal sector job offers for informal sector workers,
but also a low arrival rate of new job offers for workers who are currently employed in the formal
sector.
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Table 1.7: Heterogeneous Effects in New Worker Wage Regressions
(1) (2) (3)
Ex-Firm Ex-Firm Local
Occ. Size Occ. Prevalence Occ. Formality
Occ. Growth 0.00751*** 0.00506*** 0.00548***
(0.00166) (0.000457) (0.000708)
Growth × Log Ex-Firm -7.85e-05
(0.000225)
Growth × Prevalence -0.000291
(0.000390)
Growth × Formality -0.00120
(0.00107)
Local Log Occ. Ex-Firm -0.00147**
(0.000729)
Local Occ. Prevalence (Std.) 0.0147*
(0.00782)
Observations 8,203,784 9,844,177 9,152,119
Adjusted R-squared 0.874 0.870 0.870
Estab. FEs Yes Yes Yes
Individual Controls Yes Yes Yes
Individual FEs Yes Yes Yes
Occ-Micro-Year FEs Yes Yes Yes
Num. Clusters 225,262 251,555 246,152
All regressions use the same OLS specification as in column 1 of Table 1.2, but with the additional
interaction terms as shown. Ex-Firm Occ. Size is the log of prior period employment in non-firm
local establishments in the same occupation. Ex-Firm Occ. Prevalence is a standardized ratio of the
proportion of ex-firm employment that is in the same occupation to the ratio of national employment
in that occupation. Local Occ. Formality is the percentage of male employment in the same state
and occupation that reported a formal sector contract in 1992-1995, from PNAD. The own term for
formality is omitted because it is absorbed into local labor market fixed effects. Standard errors in
parentheses are clustered by establishment. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
53
Table 1.8: Heterogeneous Effects in Existing-Worker Separation Re-
gressions
(1) (2) (3)
Ex-Firm Ex-Firm Local
Occ. Size Occ. Prevalence Occ. Formality
Log December Earnings -0.0103*** -0.0175*** -0.0198***
(0.00154) (0.000796) (0.00113)
Earnings × Ex-Firm Occ. -0.000939***
(0.000174)
Earnings × Prevalence -0.00146***
(0.000374)
Earnings × Formality 0.00384***
(0.00136)
Log N Ex-Firm Occ. 0.00211***
(0.000528)
Local Occ. Prevalence (Std.) 0.00222
(0.00310)
Observations 24,570,881 26,312,112 24,559,117
Adjusted R-squared 0.198 0.198 0.200
Estab. FEs Yes Yes Yes
Individual Controls Yes Yes Yes
Individual FEs Yes Yes Yes
Occ-Micro-Year FEs Yes Yes Yes
Num. Clusters 381,869 389,628 381,953
P(Separation) 0.0511 0.0507 0.0504
All regressions use the same OLS specification as in column 1 of Table 1.3, but with the additional
interaction terms as shown. Ex-Firm Occ. Size is the log of prior period employment in non-firm
local establishments in the same occupation. Ex-Firm Occ. Prevalence is a standardized ratio of the
proportion of ex-firm employment that is in the same occupation to the ratio of national employment
in that occupation. Local Occ. Formality is the percentage of male employment in the same state
and occupation that reported a formal sector contract in 1992-1995, from PNAD. The own term for
formality is omitted because it is absorbed into local labor market fixed effects. Standard errors in
parentheses are clustered by establishment. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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labor market.
When workers have more local opportunities for alternative employment in their
current occupation outside of their own firm, they are more willing to voluntarily
separate in response to low pay. This observation holds regardless of whether one
uses the measure that would be considered most relevant in a directed model of
search (the number of ex-firm employed in the occupation) or if one uses the measure
that would be considered most relevant in an undirected model of job search (local ex-
firm occupational prevalence). The magnitude of each of these heterogeneous effects
is quite small, but they are consistent with the notion that search frictions play a role
in these labor market decisions.
Additionally, higher degrees of labor market formality are associated with more
wage-inelastic separation behavior. This finding is consistent with the idea that firms
can more quickly attract workers in markets with a large informal sector. It is also
consistent with a Burdett and Mortensen equilibrium in which the formal sector
job offer arrival rate for informal sector workers is relatively low, and the job offer
arrival rate for workers currently employed in the formal sector is also relatively low.
However, there may be other plausible channels for this finding as well. For example,
formal sector experience could be itself considered a valuable worker trait or a signal of
worker quality, leading formal sector employees in heavily informalized labor markets
to be more sensitive to their own level of pay relative to the labor market. It could also
be the case that formalization is associated with greater dispersion in firm-specific
amenities that might lead individual workers to want to remain with their employer
even if they are comparatively low-paid.
Overall, these findings are quite supportive of the suggestion that separation de-
cisions are a function of workers' search costs. These results also give credence to
the notion that the differences in separation elasticity estimates among demographic
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groups shown elsewhere in the literature (such as between men and women) may
also be a function of differences in search costs. However, while these heterogeneous
effects results should be considered to be suggestive, they are not causal estimates.
Although the fixed effects specifications used in this chapter can address many sources
of variation in the level of wages or the rate of voluntary separation, they do not rule
out alternative explanations for the variation in those estimates across groups. More
restrictive controls, such as including additional dimensions of controls for heteroge-
neous trends across occupation or region, could potentially rule out some of these
alternative explanations. Further research is surely necessary, but the computational
demands of high-dimensional fixed effects methods such as this one do place limits
on the speed of such progress.
An additional relevant concern in the interpretation of these heterogeneity result
may be that the patterns of overlapping fixed effects used in these specifications
are not entirely analogous. Individual effects, establishment effects, and local labor
market effects can explain a much higher proportion of variation in wages than they
can explain variation in voluntary separations. In considering the heterogeneous
effects results on wage setting shown in Table 1.7, it may simply be an issue that
there is comparatively little variation in wages left to exploit.
1.8 Discussion of Alternative Models
As described in the introduction to this chapter, prior results in the monopsony lit-
erature have suggested somewhat dramatically different labor supply elasticities de-
pending on the method used to estimate it. Specifically, while studies that examine
separation behavior have typically suggested that labor markets are highly monop-
sonistic, the few studies that have looked at wage setting on new hires have found, at
best, only very modest evidence of firms' labor market power.
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The results shown in this chapter do not overturn these basic findings. Rather,
by taking advantage of the particular depth and comprehensiveness of data in the
Brazilian setting, the results shown in this chapter rule out several of the various
alternative explanations that have been given for why elasticity estimates might vary
depending on the methodology used. The inclusion of local labor market fixed effects,
along with the new instrumental variables strategies employed by this chapter, help
to rule out concerns about simultaneity in the labor market when looking at wage
setting behavior of establishments. Additionally, by constructing elasticity estimates
using both new hire wages and voluntary separation behavior on an identical sample
of workers, this chapter strongly rules out the notion that external validity or selection
concerns have driven prior results.
The heterogeneous effects results shown in this chapter also provide new insights
into the circumstances in which establishments have the greatest monopsony power
by leveraging the comprehensiveness of the RAIS dataset. Put simply, workers' sepa-
ration decisions are more sensitive to their own wages when they have ample outside
opportunities, as measured both by the number of jobs in their occupation at other lo-
cal firms, and as measured by the relative prevalence of their own occupation in their
local market. Perhaps most interestingly, results also suggest that in a developing
economy setting such as Brazil, the presence of informal labor market opportunities
may influence workers' sensitivity to their own wages. Yet, the evidence does not
suggest that these local labor market conditions influence wage setting behavior on
new hires in the same way.
Taken collectively, these results suggest that the large observed differences be-
tween wage setting decisions by establishments and separation decisions by workers
are in fact indicative of large differences in behavior. Workers, once employed, are
quite insensitive to their own wages in their decision of whether or not to voluntarily
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separate from a firm. However, at best, firms choose to increase wages only modestly
in order to attract new workers.
Both the canonical static model of monopsony and the richer dynamic model of
monopsony used in recent literature imply that each firm faces a single labor supply
curve against a homogeneous labor input that is used in production. While the parsi-
mony of these models is a strength, they may be inadequate to describe the nature of
firms' monopsony power, which varies not only on aggregate local market conditions,
but also on whether these firms are recruiting new workers or compensating existing
workers, and on the characteristics of the workers themselves. The assumption of a
homogeneous labor input is in contrast with the assumptions made in several other
prominent lines of literature in economics, and these alternative models, applied to
wage setting, may provide insight as to why labor markets appear to be fairly com-
petitive for new workers, but much less so for existing workers.
The first potential explanation, one with a long history in labor economics, is the
existence of firm-specific human capital (Becker, 1962). The well-known standard the-
oretical prediction of the Becker model is that firms pay only for firm-specific human
capital, not for human capital whose applicability is general to all firms. While subse-
quent work has shown that firms' monopsony power can incentivize them to invest in
their workers' general human capital training (Acemoglu and Pischke, 1998; Manning,
2003), a lesser-known but equally important implication of the Becker model is that
in the presence of firm-specific human capital, firms must pay workers who acquire
such a wage premium over what they would obtain elsewhere, to disincentivize those
workers from quitting, which would be costly to the firm even if labor markets are
frictionless. In contrast, firms are indifferent regarding turnover of generally trained
employees in the Becker model. This implies a negative relationship between wages
and turnover, as is observed in all studies of job separation behavior, including this
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one. However, it does not also imply that workers' wages in the presence of this re-
lationship are marked down from their marginal revenue product in proportion with
their separation elasticity, as described in Equation 1.1 and as is typically assumed in
recent studies of heterogeneity in separation elasticities. Similarly, this model makes
no assumptions of labor market frictions related to hiring activity, implying that wage
setting for new hires is likely to be comparatively elastic.
Although the firm-specific human capital model can neatly explain the distinction
between estimated new hire wage elasticities and separation elasticities, it is not clear
that the magnitude of the differences observed here can be rationalized by such a
model alone. For example, in Becker's firm specific human capital model, assuming
that firms have knowledge of the probability of circumstances that lead to quits and
layoffs, a separation elasticity of -0.4, as observed in this chapter, would imply that
a firm is willing to pay a 25% wage premium to reduce its probability of voluntary
separation in a given year by 10%, suggesting extremely high turnover costs faced
by the firm, even for low-wage workers. Additionally, the firm-specific human capital
model cannot readily explain the results of heterogeneous effects regressions as shown
in Table 1.8, all of which are supportive of search-based models of labor market
frictions.
A second potential explanation may be the presence of firm-specific amenities that
are ex ante unobservable to workers. If a particular worker cannot observe at the time
of hiring how much he will enjoy a particular work environment or manager, then the
firm that hires him may have a limited ability to hire him at a wage that is below
his marginal revenue product in the presence of competition from other potential
employers. 20 However, firms may be able to infer that workers who have been
20 Acemoglu and Pischke (1998) construct a model of ex post monopsony power in which firms
learn about the ability of workers only after they are hired to incentivize firms' investments in
general human capital training. While a model such as that one in which workers ex ante have more
information than firms may generate several similar predictions to a model in which firms have more
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employed at the same establishment for a long period of time have preferences for
firm-specific amenities and are therefore willing to accept lower wages, giving those
firms more market power and allowing them to pay existing workers less than the value
of their marginal product. Examples of amenities that may be ex ante difficult for
workers to observe might include the quality of or degree of personal compatibility
with one's manager or coworkers, the disutility associated with a new commuting
pattern, the utility or disutility associated with performing job-specific tasks, or the
utility associated with particular details of a job's benefits package.
The policy implications of a model of monopsony based on post-hiring revealed
amenities are considerable. In particular, like the more well-known static hedonic
model of wage setting, this model suggests that much of the wage dispersion observed
across firms is ex-post efficient because it arises as a result of differences in worker
preferences. On the other hand, such a model also implies that public policies that
reduce the degree of firm-specific dispersion in amenities, such as the government
provision of benefits that are otherwise provided heterogeneously by firms, could make
labor markets less monopsonistic, and therefore increase the wages of tenured workers.
Conversely, policies that make firm-specific amenities more observable prior to hiring,
such as rules on the disclosure of benefits, might make workers more responsive to
their own wages in their separation decisions (if searching for amenity-bearing firms
is a source of search costs), but would have a lesser impact on wage dispersion than
would be predicted by the static model relationship of Equation 1.1.
Identifying the most appropriate model of the labor market for studying variation
in firms' monopsony power is a considerable task, and one that goes well beyond the
scope of this chapter. Furthermore, while matched employer-employee administrative
data have significant advantages in their ability to identify the extent of monopsony
information than workers, such a model does not by itself generate the types of heterogeneous effects
results shown in Table 1.8.
60
in the labor market, they lack the kind of detailed within-establishment information
such as individual team assignments, training histories, or establishment-level benefits
information that might be beneficial for studying these questions. Nonetheless, the
evidence presented here makes it clear that while firms may have considerable ex
post monopsony power, they have comparatively little such power ex ante. Given
the wide-ranging implications of monopsony power in labor markets, it is clear that
considerably more work is needed in order to understand where, when, and why this
power is most prevalent.
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Chapter 2
The Division of Labor and the Labor
Market: Are Specialized Worker Skillsets
Valued?
2.1 Introduction
In The Wealth of Nations, Adam Smith famously describes the productivity gains
from specialization in a pin factory. He recounts in detail the manner in which pin-
making tasks can be divided among workers to speed the pin-making process, before
concluding that [t]he division of labour ... so far as it can be introduced, occasions,
in every art, a proportionable increase of the productive powers of labour (Smith
and Nicholson, 1887). This example has long been cited to describe a world in which
economic growth leads to ever-increased specialization, limited only by the extent of
the market.
Yet, Smith does not describe the exact mechanisms by which specialization may be
valuable. In a pin factory, it may be reasonable to believe that specialization directly
increases the productivity of individual steps, each of which has a well-defined output.
Specialization could also reduce the time spent transitioning between steps. However,
there are many contexts, particularly in highly-skilled production activites, where the
scope for these sources of gains from specialization is less clear.
This chapter considers another possibility: that gains from specialization exist
because human capital is in part task-specific. That is, if specialization allows
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workers to narrow the breadth of their knowledge and instead increase the depth
of their knowledge, then specialization could be a source of increasing returns to
scale. While these returns to scale may be limited by forces other than the extent
of the market,1 they still provide an incentive for tasks to be allocated to workers in
non-overlapping way so that they may specialize to the greatest feasible extent.
If specialization is a primary source of increasing returns to scale, then we might
also reasonably expect that individuals in more specialized occupations will earn
higher wages. But why exactly might this be the case, and are there instances in
which specialization may actually not be valued? To answer these questions, I turn
to the seminal model of specialization and occupational choice of Becker and Murphy
(1992). This model relies on the notion that for individuals who specialize, a portion
of the human capital that each employee develops is task-specific, and so their overall
stock of human capital is multidimensional. The skills associated with human capital
may be developed broadly, or they may be developed deeply, but expanding one's
skillset in either direction is costly because individuals have limited time to allocate
between production and human capital acquisition. I demonstrate that when labor
markets are imperfectly competitive, otherwise-identical workers who are specialized
in their observable skillsets earn more than workers who are less specialized, because
the feasible extent of specialization is increasing in the quality of the firm's production
technology. In other words, specialized workers earn more because they work for more
productive firms. However, since this model assumes that all workers are identical, it
does not make predictions about the wage premia associated with more specialized
workers within each firm.
1A substantial theoretical literature has sought to consider potential limits to the degree of
specialization other than the extent of the market. These papers have focused on such issues as
market power (Baumgardner, 1988), coordination and/or communication costs (Becker and Murphy,
1992; Dessein and Santos, 2006), decision implementation costs (Radner and Zandt, 1995), and
institutional quality (Costinot, 2009).
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In response to this limitation, I extend the model to introduce heterogeous under-
lying ability of employeesdefined here as the amount of task-specific human capital
that can be acquired in a period of time. Because there is no inherent division of
high-ability or low-ability tasks in the model, each firm has the unrestricted abil-
ity to assign tasks to different types of workers in order to maximize profits. In this
simple framework, I find that the positive association between ability and specializa-
tion within firms need not hold at all. Rather, the extent to which high-ability and
low ability workers are more or less specialized depends on the elasticity of substi-
tution between productive tasks. If, for example, tasks are perfect complements in
production, then high-ability workers within a firm will actually be less specialized
than lower ability workers, and specialization within firms will be associated with
lower wages, not higher ones. Put more succinctly, the observable wage premia to
specialized workers don't just depend on the productivity of the firm they work for;
they also depend on the trade-offs that firms face in employing workers of different
quality.
Testing the theoretical predictions of this model requires information about the
human capital composition of different occupations, which I am able to construct from
the U.S. Department of Labor's O*NET database. The O*NET database provides
information on the level of usage of 35 different skills for each of over 900 occupa-
tions, and from these data, I construct measures of skill concentration, using the Gini
coefficient of reported skill usage as a baseline measure of specialization. However, it
also requires matched employer-employee data in order to distinguish between inter-
firm and intra-firm wage patterns. Suitable administrative data are not available for
the United States, since U.S. administrative data source do not include data on em-
ployees' occupations. So, I turn to detailed matched employer-employee data from
the Brazilian Relação Anual de Informações Sociais (RAIS) dataset, using existing
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corcordances to match Brazilian occupations to Census occupations as reported in
O*NET. To my knowledge, this is the first paper to construct occupation-level mea-
sures of skill specialization, and therefore to attempt to test the gains from special-
ization empirically. While I do not have access to exogenous variation in occupation
or in individual human capital, I am able to use broader occupational group fixed
effects and other measures of observed ability to compare the wages of individuals
who choose among related occupations.
Surprisingly, when I first regress log wages on occupation-level aggregate mean
skill level and degree of specialization in a standard Mincer-style specification, I find
no evidence of wage premia associated with specialization either within or across
firms. These results are robust to the inclusion of a variety of detailed individual and
establishment level controls chosen carefully to mitigate concerns regarding omitted
sources of occupation-level differences. Robustness checks constructed using the U.S.
Current Population Survey (CPS) provide similar results. In short, these results
suggest that while skill is valuable, the extent to which occupations are specialized
in their skill usage is not associated with either higher or lower wages. Indeed, these
initial results provide no empirical evidence for gains from specialization at all, and
they are fundamentally in contrast to the predictions of the Becker and Murphy
model.
One concern is that the model may simply be too simple to characterize all pro-
duction activities well for all types of workers, or that specialization may only be
valuable among some skills but not among others for particular types of workers. To
address this possibility, I adopt a method of a method of agglomerative hierarchical
clustering from the machine learning literature, allowing me to classify the 35 skills
listed in O*NET based on the patterns of correlation in the levels of each skill re-
ported across occupations. I demonstrate that observable skills can be readily divided
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into two basic categories, which I refer to as Production skills and Cognitive skills,
with occupations that require high levels of skill in one group typically requiring low
levels of skill in the other. Perhaps unsurprisingly, these skill groups also map closely
to the divide between blue-collar and white-collar occupations.
When I regress log wages on the mean skill level and the degree of specialization
within each group, I find much more evidence to support the notion that there are
gains from specialization, but only among Production skills. In my preferred baseline
specifications, a one standard-deviation increase in the Gini coefficient of produc-
tion skills is associated with a 4-6% increase in earnings, even after controlling for a
variety of individual characteristics, after controlling for occupations' mean level of
skill, and after using fixed effects to control flexibly for differences in broader occupa-
tional categories. When I incorporate establishment fixed effects, I find evidence that
specialization within production skills is associated with wage premia even within
establishments, though the results are somewhat smaller than would be suggested
by looking across firms. Results limited to blue-collar workers (who tend to be rela-
tively more skilled in production skills) suggest even larger benefits to specialization
in production skills than the baseline results would suggest. Conversely, specializa-
tion in one's cognitive skillset is not associated with higher wages either within or
across firms, either for all workers or for white collar workers specifically. Again, these
results are largely supported by robustness checks using the CPS.
Finally, since the Becker and Murphy model predicts that gains from specialization
arise primarily from sorting of specialized individuals to highly productive firms, I
construct a more direct test of sorting patterns using a two-step procedure based on
the computational method of of Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis (1999) (AKM). In the
first stage of this procedure, I identify both individual worker and establishment fixed
effects for approximately 95% of the worker-level observations in my baseline wage
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sample. Under the assumptions of the baseline model, the estimated establishment
fixed effects identify the firm-level component of wages and are closely related to total
factor productivity differences across firms. In the second step, I then regress these
firm fixed effects on the occupation-level measures of skill content associated with
each individual's occupation. While I find that individuals in occupations with more
specialized production skillsets work at higher wage firms, as predicted by the model,
I also find that employment at a high-wage firm is associated with employment in an
occupation with a broader cognitive skillset. Again, these results do not appear to
be driven by differences in observable worker characteristics, worker mean reported
skill levels, or broader occupational controls.
These results strongly suggest that while this standard model of specialization
may accurately describe the role of specialization in production for blue-collar workers
and their skillsets, it does not effectively characterize the relationship between skill
specialization and wages well for white-collar workers or the cognitive skills which
they tend to possess. Moreover, the evidence provides little to support the notion
that there are gains from specialization within one's cognitive skills at all.
The chapter proceeds as follows: Section 2.2 provides a brief theoretical and em-
pirical overview, Section 2.3 develops the modified Becker and Murphy model and
outlines its empirical predictions, Section 2.4 describes the empirical specifications
in use to look at both worker wage premia and worker sorting, Section 2.5 describes
briefly the datasets and methods that are used, Section 2.6 provides regression results
on both worker wage premia and on worker sorting, and Section 2.7 concludes the
chapter.
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2.2 Theoretical and Empirical Background
In considering the relationship between human capital acquisition and the gains from
specialization, we typically wish to focus on the gains from specialization in produc-
tion within firms, rather than across firms. While the traditional Ricardian frame-
work of gains from trade based on comparative advantage characterizes potential
gains from specialization at the firm level (i.e. in the scope of production), as well
as specialization across countries or within households, it does not translate natu-
rally to characterizing the gains from task specialization among workers within firms.
That is, Ricardian comparative advantage alone does not explain why, say, some firms
that perform construction work choose to hire plumbers and electricians, while oth-
ers choose to hire more general handymen. For this, more detailed models of firms'
production structure and the trade-offs involved are needed. So, models of the gains
from specialization in production within firms generally require three basic features:
1. A source of increasing returns to scale in production. This source may take many
different forms, such as input complementaries, increased leverage of compara-
tive advantage by workers, or task-specific hunan capital. However, if there are
no increasing returns to scale, then there is in general no reason for anyone to
prefer a multi-worker firm (in which specialization is feasible) to a single-worker
firm in which within-firm specialization is infeasible by definition.
2. A countervailing force that bounds increasing returns to scale. Examples in
the theoretical literature abound, including coordination, communication, and
enforcement costs (Becker and Murphy, 1992; Costinot, 2009), adaptation costs
(Dessein and Santos, 2006) market power of workers (Baumgardner, 1988),
and capital market imperfections (Fishman and Simhon, 2002). Absent any
other such force, the only feasible equilibrium is monopoly within each product
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market, i.e. the degree of specializiation being limited by the extent of the
market.
3. A reason for the firm or for individuals within the firm to prefer some degree of
specialization in their productive activities to simply involving all individuals
in all aspects of production. This may be the same as the source of increas-
ing returns to scale itself (e.g. higher productivity arising from specialization
or increased focus on one's comparative advantage), or it may be a result of
features of the countervailing force (e.g. reduced coordinaton costs through
specialization).
There are likely numerous ways to construct a model that embodies all three
of these features. However, and importantly, none of these requirements explicitly
demands that what we typically think of as human capital play any role in special-
ization at all. For example, we might expect plumbers and electricians to be more
productive than handymen simply because the former spend less time transitioning
between tasks, gathering different sets of tools, or hauling a wide range of needed
supplies. While these explanation imply gains from specialization, they also imply
that if two equally able workers who are involved in two different portions of the
production process, reassigning the tasks of each worker to the other is likely to be
costless. On the other hand, it could also be the case that specialized workers are
able to develop some form of task-specific human capital. In this case, reassigning the
tasks of workers once human capital is acquired might greatly reduce productivity.
There is reason to suspect that this latter skill-based notion of gains from special-
ization is important. Firstly, a growing empirical literature supports the notion that
human capital is a composition of skills, and that occupations are often distingished
by the particular combination of skills that they require and tasks that they perform
rather than by the presence of unique skills (Poletaev and Robinson, 2008; Peri and
69
Sparber, 2009; Kambourov and Manovskii, 2009; Deming, 2015). Additionally, recent
evidence suggests that individuals' labor market success depends in part on the ex-
tent to which their prior experiences or initial aptitude are similar to those of the job
they seek or the market in which they participate (Gathmann and Schönberg, 2010;
Guvenen et al., 2015; Macaluso, 2017). While many of these papers have consid-
ered either the role of strength in particular skill dimensions or of distance across all
skill dimensions. However, to my knowledge, this chapter is the first that has looked
specifically at the extent to which occupational skills are concentrated or dispersed.
Perhaps the theoretical model that most neatly presents these underlying features
necessary to look at skill specialization is the model of Becker and Murphy (1992).
In this model, each firm's production process consists of a unit measure of unique
tasks, and so a worker who is specialized uses their time to perform only a subset
of tasks, spending a greater fraction of their time on each. Becker and Murphy do
not explicity define the notion of task-specific human capital in their paper, but the
notion is implicit in the fact that workers increase their productivity only by spending
a portion of their time engaging in a task-specific skill investment.
While the Becker and Murphy model is tractable and provides clear predictions,
it also has notable shortcomings from the perspective of any empirical analysis. Most
notably, the model does not explicitly define the notion of an occupation; if an occupa-
tion is a collection of tasks, then there may be infinitely many occupational definitions
corresponding to different collections of these tasks. That is, a firm which needs both
electrical work and plumbing work to be performed might hire an electrician and a
plumber, or it might hire a handyman with some lesser skill in each of these tasks.
Since most empirical analyses of workers' skills are based on the skill content of their
occupations, the lack of a clear mapping to occupations is unintuitive. Additionally,
there is no explicit notion of occupational choice in this model; task assignment is
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implicitly the same thing as occupational choice, and since the model is static, task
assignment and human capital acquisition occur simultaneously. Furthermore, the
model implies a one-to-one mapping between production tasks and skills, with little
possibility for the existence of skills which are useful in multiple tasks. Finally, the
Becker and Murphy model of specialization makes the clear predicition that no two
workers will perform the same task within the same firm, and this is seemingly at
odds with the observation that many firms report having numerous employees who
are engaged in the same occupation.
Nonetheless, as a stylized model of the gains from specialization, this model is at-
tractive in that it generates clear empirical predictions solely from differences in firms'
production technologies and without imposing particular notions of comparative ad-
vantage. Accordingly, I present a modified version of this model in the next Section,
in order to provide key testable predictions regarding the relationship between skill
specialization and wages.
2.3 Theoretical Model
Below, I briefly present a slightly modified version of the original Becker and Murphy
model. Relative to the original, I relax the assumption of Leontief production by firms
to a more general CES formulation. I also explicitly assume that labor markets are
imperfectly competitive in the style of Card et al. (2017). In general, the assumption
of imperfectly competitive labor markets is necessary ensure that the compensation of
otherwise-identical individuals varies across firms in a manner that is correlated with
the degree of specialization. More specifically, the formulation shown in this chapter
is able to generate the type of linearly separable log wage empirical specification
used in Section 2.6.4. All other assumptions and predictions are as in the original
paper, including the initial assumption that all employees are identical. Later, in
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Subsection 2.3.2, I relax the assumption of identical workers to model the introduction
of heterogeneous ability.
2.3.1 Basic Model Setup
A single final consumption is produced in a competitive product market and sold
at a unit price P . Each firm produces this final consumption good by applying
a firm-specific technology parameter Af to a unit measure of intermediate goods
(also referred to as tasks), indexed by s, with a constant elasticity of substitution
among intermediate goods. These intermediate goods are produced by contracting
with individual laborers, referred to as employees. The firm is also subject to a
coordination cost C(n) that is increasing and convex in n, the number of workers
employed by the firm. Then, each firm's production function is:
Yf = Af
 1∫
0
xηfsds

1
η
− C(n) (2.1)
where 1
1−η represents the elasticity of substitution between any two intermediate goods
inputs in final goods production, and n is the number of employees of the firm. For
readability, I will now omit the subscripts f, as it suffices to focus on a single firm
in this model. And, I will rule out the case of perfect substitutes by assuming that
η < 1.2
Each employee (i.e. each intermediate goods producer), has one unit of time which
they devote solely to labor market activities associated with particular task inputs.
This unit of time is spent either working (Tw) or investing time to learn the productive
2Because of increasing returns to specialization, when all inputs are perfect substitutes, then
any equilibrium in which workers perform a non-zero measure of tasks or in which firms use a
non-zero measure of task inputs is suboptimal. To avoid complications, I will restrict attention to
circumstances where η is low enough relative to the extent of gains from specialization that the
representative firm always finds it optimal to use the full measure of task inputs in production. That
is, I assume that η < 11+θ , where θ > 0 is as indicated in (2.6).
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skills specifically associated with tasks performed in production (Th). There is a one-
to-one mapping between tasks performed and observable skills acquired. And, since
it cannot be optimal for an employee to spend time learning skills that they will not
use in production, I refer to the skills acquired as task-specific human capital.3
Then, for each intermediate good s and for each employee i:
Ti(s) = Tih(s) + Tiw (s) (2.2)∑
s
Ti(s) = 1 (2.3)
As in Becker and Murphy, I will for now assume that all workers are ex ante
identical. That is, prior to workers' investment decisions, all workers are equally
adept at performing all tasks. Individuals' productivity differences across different
inputs arise only because these individuals rationally choose to spend time learning
the skills corresponding only to the production tasks that they perform. Productive
output of worker i in intermediate good s depends on the worker's efficiency E(s) and
on the time spent working in production of good s. In turn, the worker's efficiency
is a function of both exogneously determined general human capital H and of time
spent investing in task-specific human capital HT (s). That is:
Yi (s) =Ei (s)Tiw (s) (2.4)
Ei (s) =dH
γHiT (s) (2.5)
HiT (s) =T
θ
ih (s) (2.6)
3Although the setup of this model appears to imply that task-specific human capital is acquired
on the job, it need not be the case. For example, if individuals learn task-specific skills through
higher education, attendance at trade school, etc., then they forego the opportunity to produce
during the time that they are on the job. The model as written does not permit discounting based
on the fact that skills must generally be acquired before they are used to produce, but this extension
can be added.
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Here, the parameter γ > 0 determines the value of general human capital investment,
while the parameter θ > 0 determines how large the productivity gains are from
investing time in task-specific human capital, and d is a general productivity shifter.
Importantly, the assumption that θ > 0 implies that there are increasing returns to
time spent on individual production tasks as long as the employee spends some time
in human capital investment. Since individuals have a finite allotment of time that
must be split between skill investment and production, these increasing returns are
bounded by individual workers' limited time. All individuals will allocate a portion
of their time to task-specific human capital acquisition in this formulation, because
otherwise they can produce nothing.4 And, finally, I assume that each employee's
output is observable and contractible, so that the managers of firms can always enforce
an allocation of workers' time across the tasks that they are assigned in order to
maximize the employee's overall output.
Proposition 1. For any given task, if an employee chooses to invest in task-specific
human capital, then they spend a fraction θ
1+θ
of their time in that task on human
capital investment, and a fraction 1
1+θ
of their time in production.
Proof. Substitute (2.2) and (2.5) into (2.4) and take the first order condition with
respect to Tih (s) to show that Tih (s) = θ1+θTi (s) and therefore that Tiw (s) =
1
1+θ
Ti (s).
This first proposition implies a constant ratio of task-specific human capital invest-
ment to task-specific work that depends only on the productivity of those task-specific
human capital investments. It also implies, by substituting these ratios back into (2.5)
and (2.4), that conditional on choosing to invest in task-specific human capital, the
marginal product of the employee's time spent on any task s will be:
4This assumption can be relaxed. For example, if we redefine Ei (s) = dH
γ(1 + HiT (s)), then
employees may choose to produce in autarky without specializing unless θ and A are high enough
and C (n∗) is low enough at equilibrium firm employment n∗ to allow i to produce at least dHγ
by optimally specializing. However, for simplicity, I will use the same formulation as Becker and
Murphy here.
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Yi(s) = dH
γθθ (1 + θ)−(θ+1) Ti(s)θ+1 (2.7)
∂Y (s)
∂Ti
= dHγ
(
θ
1 + θ
)θ
Ti (s)
θ (2.8)
Taking the derivative of (2.8), it is also straightforward to show that as long
as employees are willing to engage in task-specific human capital investment, each
individual has increasing returns to time spent on each task. This follows directly
from the assumption that θ > 0.
Proposition 2. Any employee who is engaged in task-specific human capital invest-
ment will be the only employee engaged in the production of that intermediate good
for the firm.
Proof. See Appendix B.1.
Proposition 3. If η < 1
1+θ
, then for each intermediate good that they produce, em-
ployees who invest in task-specific human capital will devote an equal fraction of time.
That is, Ti (s) =
1
|sif | for all s ∈ {sif}, where {sif} is the set of intermediate goods
that employee i produces at firm f and |sif | is its measure. And, since all employees
are identical, 1|sif | = n
∗
f for all employees within each firm.
Proof. See Appendix B.2.
Proposition 2 implies that there is no overlap among the tasks performed by any
two workers. So, the level of output of intermediate production task s that is produced
by the firm, xs, is equal to the output of that task for the worker who produces it,
Yi(s). Proposition 3 implies further that an employee who invests in task-specific
human capital for any task will always invest equally across all of the tasks that they
perform, since it is always preferable to reallocate time from tasks with lower marginal
product of time to tasks with a higher marginal product of time as long as tasks are
not strong gross substitutes. Together, these propositions imply that xs = xi for all
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tasks s performed by worker i, and therefore that the total output of each worker i
is simply xi · |si|.
The combined effect of these two propositions is that each employee's output can
be characterized solely as a function of the shared parameters θ, d, H, and γ, as well
as the optimally chosen firm size n∗, a function of both Af and of C(n). That is,
substituting n∗f for Ti (s), it is the case that:
Yif = dθ
θ (1 + θ)−(1+θ)Hγ
(
n∗f
)θ
(2.9)
Plugging (2.9) into (2.1) yields the following equation for firm output:
Yf = Afdθ
θ (1 + θ)−(1+θ)Hγn1+θ − C(n) (2.10)
While this completes the setup of the basic Becker and Murphy model, and it is
sufficient to show that more specialized workers will be more productive, it is not
quite sufficient to demonstrate that wages will vary with the extent of specialization.5
For this, we need labor markets to be imperfect, so that wages vary across firms
with marginal product, instead of (as might otherwise be assumed) ex-ante identical
workers earning identical wages across firms regardless of specialization because of
Bertrand wage competition.
So, assume that labor markets are imperfectly competitive in the manner of Card
et al. (2017). In this model, each employee receives utility from the combination
of wages and amenities that each firm provides, with heterogenous preferences over
firm-specific amenities. That is, each individual's indirect utility takes the form:
uif = β log (wif − b) + af + if (2.11)
5Becker and Murphy themselves do not consider the wage implications of their model, though it is
straightforward to show that with perfectly competitive labor markets or Bertrand wage competition,
workers' wages do not vary with their degree of specialization. The model shown in this paper nests
this perfectly competitive solution in the limit.
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where β > 0, b is a common outside option, af is the utility from exogenous firm-
specific amenities that are valued equally by all individuals and are costless to pro-
duce, and if is an individual preference drawn from an independent Type I extreme
value distribution and is unobservable to the firm. Firms post wages in order to at-
tract employees, and so each firm f chooses its wage to maximize profits by solving:
max
wf
P · Yf (n (wf ))− wfn (wf ) (2.12)
where the observability of individual workers' output, the lack of utility or disutility
in particular task assignments, and the constraint that n (wf ) = 1|sf | ensure that Yf
is as in (2.10).6
Since workers choose a firm freely based both on posted wages as well as their
amenity preferences, and because of the functional form assumption on if , the prob-
ability in equilibrium that an individual chooses a particular firm is represented by
a logit choice probability (McFadden, 1973). With a large number of firms, this is
closely approximated by an exponential probability. So, as in Card et al. (2017), each
firm faces an upwardly sloping labor supply curve that depends on the offered wage:
lnn (wf ) = ln (Nλ) + β ln (wf − b) + af (2.13)
where N is the total number of workers in the labor market and λ is a constant that
is common to the supply curve of all firms. By calculating the elasticity of this labor
supply with respect to wage and plugging it into the first order condition of (2.12)
with respect to wages, it can be shown that the equilibrium wage offered by each firm
6As in Card et al. (2017), I assume here that firms choose wages directly, but they choose
employment levels only indirectly through posted wages. Since there is no uncertainty in this model,
such a formulation is consistent with a standard cost minimization problem in which firms offer the
lowest wage that is needed to achieve a desired level of output.
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is discounted from its employees' marginal revenue product according to the function:
wif =
1
1 + β
b+
β
1 + β
AfP
(
d
(
θ
1 + θ
)θ
Hγnθ − C ′ (n∗f)
)
(2.14)
Notice that if employees care only about their wage (i.e. as β → ∞), the wage that
is paid to each worker approaches their marginal revenue product. Alternatively, if
employees care only about their amenities, then the wage that is paid to each worker
approaches their outside option b. And, since the degree of skill specialization among
workers in a firm is positively related to its employees' marginal product, greater
specialization is predicted to be associated with higher wages in equilibrium.
2.3.2 Heterogeneous Ability
Up to this point, we have assumed that all workers are identical. This implies that
there is no absolute or comparative advantage in this model whatsoever. While this
assumption is attractive for its simplicity, it is also quite unrealistic. In particular,
much of the human capital literature is based on the idea that individuals are hetero-
geneous, either in their exogenously determined productivity, their cost of education,
or both.
In this subsection, I relax the assumption of identical workers by allowing for
different workers to have heterogeneous ability in learning task-specific skills. That
is, some workers can learn more in the same amount of time than others, giving them
absolute advantage in all tasks, but no comparative advantage in any particular tasks.
For tractability, assume that there are only two types of individuals, i ∈ {H,L}, and
that type H workers learn more effectively than type L workers, so that θH > θL.
Since the proof of Proposition 1 does not depend on other workers, it still follows
that if worker i learns task-specific human capital for a given task, they allocate θi
1+θi
of their task-specific time to investment and 1
1+θi
of their time to work. Similarly,
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Propositions 2 and 3 also hold, so workers will always divide their time equally among
the tasks that they perform, and specialized workers will be non-overlapping in the
tasks that they perform. This implies that the unit interval of production tasks can be
divided into two subsets of tasks, performed by type H and L workers, respectively,
with an equal level of output of each task within each subset, and with total output
of each worker of each type as Yi = xi |si|.
So, letting s be the interval of tasks assigned to the set of type L workers employed,
the firm's production function can simply be written as:
Y = A (sxηL + (1− s)xηH)
1
η − C (n) (2.15)
Notice, however, that unlike in most standard CES formulations, the task share
parameter s is not fixed. Rather, it is chosen by the firm, along with individual worker
shares of each type |si| and wages of each worker type, in order to maximize profits,
subject to the constraint that
∑
i ni |si| = 1. That is, the firm now solves:
max
s,wH ,wL
PY (s, nH (wH) , nL (wL))− wH · nH (wH)− wL · nL (wL) (2.16)
where Y is as in (2.15). As in the baseline model, I assume that each individual's
indirect utility takes the form of (2.11); this implies that each firm faces an upwardly
sloping labor supply curve for each type of worker as in (2.13). The labor supply to
the firm is a functiion of posted wages, but it does not depend on task assignment,
and therefore it is not a function of s.
Before proceeding with the maximization problem, notice that modifying (2.9) to
reflect the fact that n∗L =
s
|sL| yields the following equation for the output of each
employee of each type:
Yi = dH
γθθii (1 + θi)
−(1+θi) |si|−θi (2.17)
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Then, taking the ratio YH
/
YL from (2.17), letting θL = θ and θH = κθ for some
κ > 1, and substituting in that Yi = xi |si| to solve for the ratio of intermediate good
output levels xH
xL
yields:
xH
xL
= φ
|sL|θ+1
|sH |κθ+1
(2.18)
where φ = κκθθθ(κ−1) (1+θ)
1+θ
(1+κθ)1+κθ
is a constant function of parameters θ and κ that is
less than one and decreasing in both its arguments.
Since xi is strictly increasing in the time that a worker of type i spends developing
task-specific human capital, equation (2.18) indicates the implicit ratio between the
breadth and depth of each type's skill development, which arises because of the limited
time that each type of worker faces, and because of the difference in the productivity
of each type.7
To proceed with the maximization problem, I restrict my attention to interior
cases in which the firm hires one or more workers of each type and chooses s ∈ (0, 1).8
This implies that the first order conditions of (2.16) must hold simultaneously. Taking
the first derivative of (2.16) with respect to s implies that Ys = 0, where Ys is the
first derivative of output with respect to s. That is, as long as ∂ni
∂s
= 0 for i ∈ {H,L},
the firm chooses s to maximize its output conditional on the number of employees it
hires. So, taking the derivative of (2.15) with respect to s, plugging in (2.17) and its
derivative and simplifying yields the following equilibrium relationship that is solely
a function of exogenous parameters and that must hold in any equilibrium where the
7In particular, this equation also makes it clear that type H workers are always more productive
than type L workers. To see this, set |sL| = |sH |=|s|. Then xH
/
xL = φ |s|θ(1−κ), which is greater
than 1 as long as κ > 1 and θ > 0.
8 I do not rule out the existence of non-interior cases in which the firm employs only typeH or type
L workers, but the empirical conclusions of this paper with respect to intra-firm wage differentials
are of interest only when firms employ workers of both types. Future revisions of this paper will
include a charactertization of interior and non-interior solutions to the firm's maximization problem
with two types of workers.
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firm employs and assigns tasks to both types:
xH
xL
=
(
η (θ + 1)− 1
η (κθ + 1)− 1
) 1
η
(2.19)
For η < 1
κθ+1
, this optimal ratio is strictly increasing in η and greater than 1,
with limη→−∞ xHxL = 1. In other words, given any feasible productivity parameters κ
and θ, there exists a unique optimal ratio in the depth of skill that is developed by
the two types. When production tasks are perfect complements, the depth of each
worker's task-specific human capital acquisition is identical. On the other hand, if
production tasks are more substitutable, then the depth of high-type workers' task-
specific human capital acquisition will be greater relative to that of low-type workers
within the firm. Intuitively, the equilibrium ratio of skill depth does not depend on
the firm's levels of employment or on relative wages precisely because the firm has
the ability to adjust the scope of tasks that are performed by each of type of worker
by varying s. That is, the firm is able to achieve exactly the ratios of skill depth and
breadth that maximize output given the trade-off between imperfectly substitutable
inputs and gains from skill specialization. Notice, however, that if inputs are too
substitutable (i.e. if η > 1
κθ+1
), this equilibrium relationship breaks down.
Furthermore, there is a unique relationship between the productivity parameters,
the elasticity of substitution, and the optimal breadth of tasks performed by workers
of each type. This can be shown by equating the right-hand rides of (2.18) and (2.19).
Doing this, and letting |sH | = γ |sL| so that the value of γ represents the task and
skill breadth of high-ability workers relative to that of low-ability workers, it can be
shown with some algebra that:
γ =
(
|sL|θ(1−κ) φ
(
η (θ + 1)− 1
η (κθ + 1)− 1
)− 1
η
) 1
κθ+1
(2.20)
Depending on the various parameter values and on the optimal value of |sL|, the
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value of γ may be greater than or less than one, indicating that type H workers
perform either a narrower or a broader set of tasks. However, it is straightforward to
verify that if tasks are even moderately gross complements, that unless |sL| is very
large (that is, unless coordination costs are high enough that the optimal firm size is
very small) or θ and κ are very small, γ will be greater than 1.9 And, from (2.19),
the difference in skill depth between type H and type L workers declines with η as
well. In other words, the more complemetary production tasks are, the greater the
extent to which high-ability workers develop a broader, less specialized skillset than
low-ability workers within the same firm. In the extreme case of perfect complements,
any equilibrium where γ > 1 is sufficient to ensure that high-ability workers hold less
specialized skills than low-ability workers under any sensible metric.
Figure 2·1 provides a stylized example of a firm that employs both high and low
ability workers in production. Each rectangle in the interval [0, s¯) represents the task
breadth and output of a low-ability worker, while each rectangle in the interval [s¯, 1]
represents the task breadth and output of a high-ability worker. These depths and
breadths are also directly reflective of the extent of each worker's task-specific human
capital. Although the heights of each set of rectangles are a function of the optimal
firm size, as shown in (2.19), the ratio between the heights of each set of rectangles is
a function solely of underlying parameters and the elasticity of substitution between
production tasks, and this ratio is achieved by the firm by adjusting the value of s¯,
which dictates the proportion of tasks that is performed by each type of worker.
9While (2.20) is a nonlinear function of parameters κ, θ, and η and of equilibrium employment
of type L workers which determines |sL|, it is possible to verify numerically that both γ > 1 and
γ < 1 are possible. For example, with η = −1 (i.e. an elasticity of substitution across inputs of 12 ),
θ = 1 and κ = 2 it is straightforward to verify that γ < 1 only if |sL| > 49 . So, given these parameter
values, any firm that would hire three or more workers if only type L workers were available to it
will choose to assign a broader set of tasks to any type H workers that it hires. In contrast, with
η = −9 (i.e. an elasticity of substitution across inputs of 110 ), even a two-person firm that hires one
worker of each type will choose to assign tasks such that γ > 1 when θ = 1 and κ = 2, and any firm
that would hire three or more low-type workers (i.e. with |sL| ≤ 13 ) will assign tasks such that γ > 1
for any κ > 1 when θ = 1.
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Figure 2·1: Stylized Example of a Firm Employing High and Low
Ability Workers
2.3.3 Summary of Empirical Predictions
The Becker and Murphy model provides a rich framework for considering the sources
of wage premia associated with specialization. Since this chapter focuses on the
potential wage premia associated with specialization, I will focus on two key empirical
predictions:
1. Across firms, those firms with access to more productive technology (or lower
coordination costs) will employ more specialized workers. If workers' wages
vary with their productivity because of imperfectly competitive labor markets,
then we will observe that more specialized workers earn higher wages than less
specialized workers. The observed specialization premium across firms will also
be observable as a firm size wage premium, because the degree of within-firm
specialization is limited by the extent of the firm.
2. Within firms, high ability workers may be more or less specialized than low
ability workers. In particular, the extent of relative specialization or non-
specialization depends on the extent to which individual task inputs are com-
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plementary in production. Again, in the presence of imperfect labor markets
such that workers' wages vary with their productivity, specialization may be
associated with either a positive or a negative wage premium relative to other
employees within the same firm.
Finally, a quick note on general human capital as it pertains to this model. Al-
though general human capital is treated as an exogenous productivity shifter here,
its existence (and observability) is actually very important for empirical estimation.
To see why, consider what would be measured in the data if general human capital
were unobserved. Although there would be variation in the observable concentration
of skills (i.e. skill specialization), and although this would still be a reflection of un-
derlying productivity differences across firms, the degree of skill specialization would
also be perfectly positively collinear with the overall observed depth of skill.
Of course, in practice, we expect (and observe) that there is distinct variation
between the average level of an individual's skill usage and the concentration of their
skills. The extent of an individual's general human capital might vary because of their
institutional environment, because of the role of ability in acquiring general human
capital, or for other reasons. These differences also influence wages, and in In fact, in
the O*NET data used in this chapter, the mean level of skill reported for an occupa-
tion tends to be negatively correlated with its concentration, not positively. However,
for these reasons, in all empirical specifications presented in this chapter, I include
controls for the mean level of skill reported alongside measures of the concentration
of those skills.
In the sections that follow, I take these key empirical predictions to the data, con-
sidering both inter-firm and intra-firm wage patterns as they relate to the observable
degree of specialization.
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2.4 Empirical Specification
2.4.1 Wage Premia
The basic model described in Section 2.3 provides two key testable implications, which
are the subject of the empirical analysis of this chapter:
1. Workers who are more specialized in their skillsets will sort to higher-wage firms
and will earn higher wages across firms.
2. Workers in who are more specialized in their skillsets will not necessarily earn
higher wages within firms, as high-ability individuals may actually be less spe-
cialized than low-ability individuals within firms.
In order to look at wage premia, we can look directly at the association between wages
and occupation level measures of skill and specialization. Accordingly, my baseline
empirical specification is:
ln(wiot) = α + β0µo + β1Go + γXiot + it (2.21)
where the values of µ andG are standardized measures of the mean skill percentile and
Gini of skills of each individual's occupation o and Xit are standard individual-level
covariates such as age, education, and experience. To examine specifically within-
establishment wage patterns, I also include establishment-level fixed effects in certain
specifications. The estimated value of β1 reflects the predicted wage premium as-
sociated with a one standard deviation increase in the degree of specialization of
occupational skills, holding constant both the level of skill and differences in wages
arising from observable compositional differences in the individuals choosing each
occupation.
Two natural concerns arise from a specification such as this. The first is that with
a time-invariant occupation-level measure of skill content, there may be correlated
85
occupation-level considerations that might lead specific occupations to have higher
or lower wages than would be predicted by their skill content and specialization. In
particular, hedonic considerations may lead some occupations to be paid more than
others, as may policies such as licensing or unionization that restrict labor supply to
certain occupations or influence workers' bargaining power. While the nature of the
O*NET data limits what can be done to remedy this concern, in most specifications I
include broader occupational group fixed effects, so that workers' wages are compared
only to those in similar occupations.
A second, more challenging concern arises from the fact that these predictions are
arrived at via a highly stylized model that is intentionally agnostic to the actual con-
tent of workers' skills and tasks. It suggests that workers lack sources of comparative
advantage, and that all production activities are simply represented as a slice of a
unit interval. While these abstractions allow the model to provide useful insights, it
is not ex ante obvious that an empiricial specification that measures skill breadth or
depth across all skills is appropriate.
In particular, the model suggests that wage premia associated with specializa-
tion are observable because of the process by which firms assign different workers to
different production tasks in a single labor market. Yet in the real world, different
occupations may exist in very different labor markets, and skills that are valued in
some of these markets may be of little or no use in others. For example, a measure
of specialization that includes skills that are clearly not in the scope of white collar
employment will be an imprecise measure of those occupations' specialization. The
same is true for blue-collar skills among white-collar workers.
To address this particular concern, in most regression specifications, I replace the
scalars µo and Go with vectors that measure mean skill and the concentration of skills
within two specific subsets of skills observed in O*NET, which I term Production
86
skills and Cognitive skills. These skill subsets are determined via an agglomerative
hierarchical clustering procedure, and their definitions map closely to the skills used
most heavily in white-collar versus blue-collar occupations. Further details of the
procedure by which these skills groups are determined are provided in Section 2.5.4.
2.4.2 Worker Sorting
The second key set of predictions of the model in Section 2.3 relate to the sorting of
workers. In particular, while substitutability considerations may lead firms to assign
higher-ability workers to less specialized occupations within firms, we should still
expect that highly specialized workers will be consistently sorted into more productive
firms. This prediction is a direct implication of the notion that specialization is
valuable. And, if labor markets are imperfect, this implies that highly specialized
workers will also be sorted into high-wage firms as well.
To investigate this further, I turn to the method of multidimensional fixed effects
initially proposed by (Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis, 1999), and commonly known
as the AKM method. This method has been widely adopted in the recent literature
on sorting between workers and firms, in particular on the contribution of sorting
of workers to increased inequality over time. For my analysis, I will not consider
changes over time, because of the selection issues described in Section 2.5.2. Instead,
I will construct a simple two-step procedure to establish the extent to which sorting
to high-wage firms is associated with different, potentially correlated characteristics.
The method begins with the assumption that log wages can be decomposed into
additive worker and establishment fixed effects, once life-cycle considerations are flex-
ibly controlled for.10 The baseline model of skill specialization described in Section
10The standard methodology in recent practice controls for the age profile of earnings using higher-
order polynomials in age, interacted with indicators for educational attainment groups. For a more
complete overview of the methodology used, see (Card et al., 2017). In my analysis, I adopt the
same first-stage methodology characterized in that paper, and used in Card, Heining, and Kline
(2013).
87
2.3 meets this criterion, because firms offer wages that are a fraction of their marginal
product of labor in response to taste-based heterogeneity in firm-specific amenities.
So, I can run regressions of the form:
ln(wit) = α0 + δi + ψJ(i,t) + γ0Xit + it (2.22)
The function J(i, t) indicates the identity of the establishment at which worker i is
employed at time t. The values of Xit include year indicators as well as higher-order
polynomial terms in age and potential labor force experience. Under the assumptions
specified above, both establishment and worker fixed effects are identified using this
method. In particular, the model implies that the establishment wage premium iden-
tified by each establishment fixed effect is an increasing function of the associated
firm's level of technology.
Then, in the second step, I run regressions of the form:
ψJ(i,t) = α1 + β0µo + β1Go + γ1X˜it + it (2.23)
In this step, the values of X˜it include similar individual-level covariates as in my base-
line wage regressions. By regressing the identified establishment fixed effect against
individual level covariates, I can test for worker sorting along multiple dimensions
simultaneously, and can therefore determine the extent to which worker sorting pat-
terns are related to the observed degree of skill specialization, while also controlling
for sorting that is driven by observable education or other correlated factors.11As
noted in the previous subsection, µo and Go can be either scalar values, or a vector
of values for the mean skill and Gini of skills within subsets of the overall set of ob-
11Another method of examining the degree of worker sorting is the method of Kremer and Maskin
(1996). While that method provides certain advantages, such as the ability to examine changes in
the degree of sorting across time, it is limited to examining a single dimension of sorting. In contrast,
the two-step AKM method allows me to consider sorting along multiple dimensions simultaneously,
to ensure that the sorting I observe is not driven by other correlated factors.
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servable skills. If, as predicted, high-wage firms employ more specialized workers, we
should expect that β1 > 0.
A key feature of the AKM method is that establishment and worker fixed effects
are identified simultaneously using the connected set of individuals and establishments
in the data. Establishments that only ever employ a single worker are dropped, as are
establishments who never have at least one employee transition to another employer.
Identification of establishment fixed effects comes in particular from individuals who
are observed repeatedly in the sample at different employers at different points in time.
However, since I am able to incorporate approximately 95% of observations from the
analysis of wage premia using this method, these results can still be interpreted to
measure sorting patterns across the aggregate labor market.
2.4.3 Occupation Switchers
A final prediction of the theoretical model relates specifically to the source of any wage
premia associated with specialization. That is, the degree to which workers are able
to specialize is limited by the extent to which firms can accommodate specialization
in production, and this is in turn a function of those firms' production technologies.
Similarly, when workers of different ability levels take more or less specialized em-
ployment within firms, their degree of specialization is a reflection of their underlying
productive capacity. In other words, the model suggests that any wage premium
associated with specialization is either a reflection of an individual characteristic or a
firm characteristic, not a function of the occupation itself. Once these time-invariant
individual and firm characteristics are accounted for, there should be no discernable
wage patterns associated with the degree of workers' specialization at any point in
time.
To consider this prediction, I seek to look specifically at individuals who are ob-
served repeatedly in different occupations with different skill usage. So, instead of the
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two-step AKM procedure described above, I run a single-step regression that includes
individual and establishment fixed effects along with the measures of mean skill and
the concentration of skills as before:
ln(wiot) = α + β0µo + β1Go + δi + ψJ(i,t) + βXit + it (2.24)
In this specification, the values of β0 and β1 represent the average net increase or
decrease in wage associated with a one standard derivation change in the level of skill
usage and the degree of skill specialization, respectively. And, the prediction of the
model is that each of these should be zero, because all relevant determinants of em-
ployees' wages are still captured by the combination of individual and establishment
fixed effects.
2.5 Data Sources and Measurement
In this section, I characterize the various data sources and data methods used for
my analysis. These include descriptions of my primary data sources, the O*NET
database and the Brazilian RAIS matched employer-employee dataset, as well as the
U.S. Current Population Survey data used for robustness checks and the hierarchical
clustering method used to classify occupational skills.
2.5.1 O*NET
The O*NET database is a standard source of information on occupational content
from the United States that has been used throughout recent literature on the skill
content of occupations. It replaces the Dictionary of Occupational Titles, which also
has a long history of application in the literature on occupations.
For each of 963 SOC-classified occupations, responses are collected from a random
sample of incumbent workers in each occupation, which are selected from a random
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sample of businesses. The O*NET database is regularly updated as individual occu-
pations are periodically re-surveyed over time; the analyses presented in this chapter
use version 21.0 of the O*NET database, released in August 2016 (O*NET Resource
Center - O*NET 21.0 Production Database).
For each of 35 skills, respondents are asked What level of [skill name] is needed
to perform your current job, and are asked to respond on a 1-7 categorical scale.12 I
henceforth refer to this question as the Level Question. If respondents have previ-
ously responded that this skill is not important to the performance of their current
job, then they are directed not to respond to the Level Question, and their response is
coded as 0. Publicly available data report the mean response to each Level Question
for each occupation, but not the individual workers' responses.13
Figure 2·2 shows the distribution of raw scores for each of the 35 skills defined
in the O*NET database. The extent of each box marks the 25th and 75th per-
centile of occupation-level mean responses to the Level question; the median reported
occupation-level mean is also marked. It is clear from this figure that both median
scores and the distribution of scores differ considerably among different skills in the
data. While most occupations report relatively low raw scores in such skills as Pro-
gramming, in other skills such as Reading Comprehension, a majority of occupations
report comparatively high scores. Although these distributions may appear to be
12The publicly available O*NET dataset includes mean response data on several dimensions of
occupational heterogeneity, including Abilities, Tasks, and Knowledge, as well as Skills. In practice,
prior research has often used data from several of these questionnaires, aggregating responses from
specific questions that are argued to reflect specific types of skill content (Autor, Levy, and Murnane,
2003; Autor, 2013). Because this chapter seeks to consider the overall breadth of a workers skills, I
have opted to use only responses to the O*NET Skill questionnaire, and to include all 35 skills in
my measures.
13To encourage consistent response patterns, the O*NET Skill questionnaire frames certain cat-
egorical choices using descriptions of what that level represents. For example, a 2 in Reading
Comprehension may represent a level of skill needed to Read step-by-step instructions for complet-
ing a form, while a response of 6 may represent a level needed to Read a scientific journal article
describing surgical procedures. Because this scale has no cardinal content, I convert all raw score
data to percentile form as described below.
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Figure 2·2: Boxplot of Raw Score Data for Each of 35 Skills in O*NET
Database
Notes: From O*NET, matched to Brazilian CBO occupational codes. Boxes
represent the 25th, 50th, and 75th percentiles of occupation-level responses.
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suggestive of the relative scarcity or abundance of different skills, it is important to
recognize that raw responses to the Level question have no inherent cardinal meaning.
To address this issue, I adopt a variant of the strategy suggested by Autor (2013).
I convert all Level question raw scores to percentiles of the overall occupational distri-
bution. This conversion ensures that my measures of occupational skill measure skill
relative to the set of other occupations, rather than in absolute terms. Implicitly, this
also weights each skill equally in all aggregate skill calculations, rather than weighting
most highly the skills for which the mean raw response is greatest.
Figure 2·3: Reported Skill Percentiles of Economists (SOC 19-
3011.00)
Notes: From O*NET. Percentiles are reported relative to all other occupations
in the database.
As an example, Figure 2·3 graphs the average skill percentiles reported by Economists
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(SOC 19-3011.00). As shown, Economists are not only relatively skilled, but their
skills are relatively broad; they report skill levels that are at or above the 80th per-
centile of occupations sampled in 13 of 35 skills reported.14
Figure 2·4: Stylized Example Of Gini Coefficient for Two Occupations
As my primary measures of skill depth and specialization, I construct occupation-
level means and Gini coefficients. Although the Gini coefficient is most well known
for its use in analyzing income inequality, it is suitable as a measure of dispersion in
this case in part because its calculation is invariant to the mean skill percentile. If one
14An inherent limitation of these data, and of any similar data, are that the initial list of 35 skills
is chosen by O*NET. An implicit and untestable assumption of this analysis is that the skills listed
are of similar breadth, an in particular that they are of similar costliness to acquire. My main results
focus not on the aggregate level of skill, but on the distribution of a worker's skills, controlling for
his/her aggregate level of skill. This may make them less sensitive to definitional considerations.
The robustness results included in the Appendix also suggest that results are not especially sensitive
to the level of skill aggregation considered, or to the use of the raw scores themselves.
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controls for the mean skill percentile, then a high Gini coefficient will be associated
with a specialized skillset, while a low Gini coefficient will be associated with a broader
skillset. A stylized graphical representation of a highly specialized occupation and a
highly unspecialized occupation are shown in Figure 2·4.15
In principle, one can construct a mean and/or a Gini coefficient for any level of
skill disaggregation, with the obvious limiting case being that the Gini coefficient is
mechanically 0 within a set consisting of a single skill. For my primary specifications
in this chapter, I construct means and Gini coefficients within two main clusters
of skills that I observe in the data; I term these Production skills (8 skills) and
Cognitive skills (27 skills). The procedure by which these skill clusters were classified
is described below in Section 2.5.4. I also show results based on the construction of a
single mean and Gini that incorporates the full set of 35 skills. However, the strength
of the division between Production and Cognitive skills observed in the data, as well
as the robustness of my main results to alternative specifications, suggests that the
Gini coefficient of all skills may be a poor measure of overall specialization within the
skillsets that are most relevant to workers in blue-collar and white-collar occupations,
respectively.
2.5.2 RAIS
Brazilian matched employer-employee data comes from the Relação Anual de Infor-
mações Sociais (RAIS) dataset. In Brazil, all firms that are formally registered are
required to report information on their employees in each year to the Ministry of
Labor. This information is used for the provision of an annual wage supplement, as
15The Gini coefficient is always bounded below by zero, regardless of the mean skill percentile.
However, because the distribution of skill percentiles is bounded, an increase in the mean skill
percentile mechanically reduces the upper bound of the range of feasible Gini coefficients. This is
a feature of all measures of dispersion that involve a bounded scale and a finite set of observations
(skills). In Table 2.10, I include a robustness check in which I rescale the Gini coefficient by dividing
it by its maximum feasible value given its mean. Use of this alternative index does not substantially
change the main results of the chapter.
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well as a variety of government social programs. The dataset contains both a unique
tax identifier for each establishment and a unique identifier for each worker, allowing
individuals to be tracked over time as they change employers.16 The dataset con-
tains standard demographic data on workers, such as education, age, and nationality,
and as well as information on workers' job tenure and geography. The dataset also
contains data on the industry subsector of establishments at several levels of classi-
fication, and the completeness of the data allows me to construct indices regarding
the overall size, employment composition, and mean wages of each establishment.
The use of these administrative data provide several advantages over using non-
administrative data from the United States. 17 Most immediately, I am able to isolate
strictly within-establishment variation in wages by incorporating a full set of estab-
lishment fixed effects. Secondly, there is some limited evidence that self-reported oc-
cupations systematically inflate their occupation to higher-skilled and higher-paying
occupations than the ones whose tasks they perform as measured by administra-
tive data (Fisher and Houseworth, 2012), which may pose problems for inference of
occupation-level differences in wage patterns.
On the other hand, using administrative data from another country, and in par-
ticular from a developing country, has some disadvantages as well. An important
one is that Brazil and the United States code occupations using different systems.
In order to map data on the skill content of occupations to Brazilian administrative
data, I use existing occupational concordances. The O*NET-SOC 2010 codes used in
O*NET are converted to SOC-2000 occupational codes, and then from there to ISCO-
16Although individuals may be tracked across employers with this dataset, and although this
feature is key to the estimation method used in Section 2.6.4, there are limitations in utilizing the
longitudinal component of these data because Brazil is a country with a large informal sector. Since
I do not observe informally employed individuals in these data, I cannot rule out the role of selection
into formal sector status. Therefore, all results should be interpreted as indicative of wage patterns
among formal sector employees only.
17As noted in Section 2.5.3, I will make use of the U.S. Current Population Survey (CPS) for some
robustness checks.
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88 international occupational codes using a publicly available concordance provided
by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.18 Finally, ISCO-88 codes are matched to
343 Brazilian CBO-94 occupational codes using a cordorance produced by Muendler
et al. (2004). In instances where a single CBO-94 occupation is mapped to multiple
ISCO-88 occupations, or where a single ISCO-88 occupation is mapped to multiple
SOC-2000 occupations, the percentile ranks assigned to each skill for the destination
occupation are calculated as the mean of the percentile ranks assigned to that skill
in the source occupations, weighted by U.S. occupational employment as reported in
the 2015 Occupational Employment Statistics (OES).
Table 2.1: Establishments and Firms By Year In RAIS
Establishments Firms
Mean Size Mean Size
Year Total % New All New Firms % New All New
1995 1,553,659 17.1% 15.3 5.9 1,111,225 16.0% 21.4 5.9
1996 1,613,040 15.8% 14.8 5.3 1,155,703 15.2% 20.6 4.4
1997 1,732,791 17.9% 13.9 4.9 1,263,130 18.4% 19.1 4.4
1998 1,795,798 15.6% 13.6 5.3 1,322,233 15.7% 18.5 4.5
1999 1,863,882 15.2% 13.4 6.0 1,380,148 16.3% 18.1 5.8
2000 1,960,164 15.3% 13.4 5.6 1,461,419 15.4% 17.9 4.8
2001 2,040,808 14.5% 13.3 5.5 1,534,079 15.2% 17.7 4.9
2002 2,142,673 14.3% 20.0 8.9 1,617,713 14.5% 26.5 8.3
2003 2,211,471 13.3% 20.3 10.9 1,673,334 13.4% 26.8 10.9
2004 2,312,940 13.5% 20.8 9.3 1,757,949 13.5% 27.4 8.7
2005 2,412,482 13.3% 21.3 9.0 1,844,068 13.4% 27.9 8.1
2006 2,504,328 12.6% 21.9 9.8 1,928,786 13.0% 28.4 8.7
2007 2,588,073 12.6% 22.7 9.8 2,000,869 13.1% 29.4 8.6
2008 2,712,953 13.5% 22.7 7.6 2,105,641 13.6% 29.2 5.8
2009 2,836,138 13.4% 21.8 6.8 2,213,446 13.9% 27.9 5.0
2010 2,997,673 14.0% 22.5 6.8 2,362,035 14.9% 28.6 5.1
2011 3,144,426 13.9% 22.3 6.6 2,489,955 14.9% 28.2 5.1
2012 3,263,226 12.7% 21.8 6.5 2,603,549 13.2% 27.4 4.5
2013 3,386,424 12.7% 21.1 6.3 2,710,094 13.0% 26.4 4.0
2014 3,210,927 11.8% 21.4 6.2 2,581,144 12.3% 26.7 4.1
From RAIS. New establishments/firms are those that are not previously observed in RAIS since
1986. All employee counts are as of December 31st of that year.
A second disadvantage of using Brazilian data relates to the existence of a large
informal sector in Brazil, and to patterns of formalization over time. I cannot rule
out that changing patterns of wages or of sorting over time are the result of changing
18This concordance appears to be no longer publicly available online, but it is available from the
author upon request.
97
patterns of formalization over time. As Table 2.1 shows, there has been a large
increase in the number of establishments reporting to RAIS over time. While newly-
formalized establishments are smaller than the overall average, the U-shaped time
trend of mean new establishment size suggests that there may be no clear criterion for
distinguishing genuinely new establishments from existing ones that are only newly
formalized. Additionally, when individuals leave their current employer, a sizeable
proportion of individuals leave the RAIS dataset, and it is likely that many of them
seek employnment in the informal sector. Selection into formal-sector status may be
a concern for those who remain in the dataset. For this reason, I have opted not to
include any analyses of wage patterns over time, or any analyses that rely on patterns
of employer or occupational change. In future research, I hope to incorporate these
sources of variation.
For all worker-level wage regressions, the dependent variable that I use is log an-
nual wages, reported as a multiple of the Brazilian monthly minimum wage. Because
all specifications include year fixed effects and I use log wages, results are invariant
to this normalization. I focus on the period 1995-2014 in my individual-level re-
gressions for two reasons. The first is that improved data availability allows me to
exclude workers who are not in private-sector establishments. The second reason is
that prior to 1994, Brazil experienced very high rates of inflation. In 1994, the Plano
Real sought to reduce inflation, resulting in the adoption of a new currency that was
loosely linked to the U.S. dollar. The use of data from 1995-2014, therefore, explicitly
excludes the period prior to the adoption of the Plano Real. There is evidence in the
data that the value of the Brazilian minimum wage increased over this time period
relative to median formal-sector wages. However, the distribution of wages does not
suggest that the minimum wage was strongly binding over this period for my sample
of workers used here.19
19Specifically, in all years, less than 5% of individuals whose wage is reported report that they
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I exclude observations with no worker identifier, observations with zero wages,
observations in the public and non-profit sectors, and observations in which the worker
was not employed at the end of the year. When a worker was reported to hold
multiple jobs, I include only the highest-paying job. Additionally, for all worker-
level specifications, I restrict the sample to include only males aged 25-54 who are
reported to be full-time workers and to have one or more years of tenure.20The tenure
restriction ensures that the annual earnings measure reflects earnings received by a
worker over the course of an entire year.
2.5.3 Current Population Survey (CPS)
A key empirical prediction of this model is that while there may observed wage pre-
mia associated with occupation-level skill specialization, these premia will be observed
primarily across firms. Within firms, we may actually expect to observe lower wages
associated with greater skill specialization, particularly if production inputs are gross
complements. In order to distinguish between within-firm and across-firm wage pat-
terns, I make use of matched employer-employee administrative data as described in
the previous subsection.
Nonetheless, the use of Brazilian administrative data for this analysis presents
potential empirical concerns related to the matching of occupations internationally.
In particular, matching occupations in this way is likely to introduce measurement
error in my skill content measures. Although I have no particular reason to suspect
that any measurement error in skills from this matching process is non-random in any
particular way, this concern is at a minimum a potential source of attenuation bias
in wage premium estimates. Additionally, we may simply be concerned about the
extent to which wage premium patterns in a middle-income country are applicable to
were paid at or close to the minimum wage.
20Full-time workers are defined as reported contracted hours of 30-50 hours per week.
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a developed economy.
For these reasons, I perform robustness checks using publicly available survey data
from the Current Population Survey's Merged Outgoing Rotation Groups Sample
(CPS MORG), This dataset contains self-reported information from a random sample
of the U.S. civilian noninstitutional population on earnings and occupation as well
as education, race, age, and other individual covariates. The CPS also contains data
on industry, but no other establishment-level observable characteristics, nor does it
contain establishment or firm identifiers.
I construct the CPS robustness check dataset using the 2012-2015 CPS MORG.
All regressions include men, ages 25-54, who report that they are employed full-time,
and who report an occupation. The dependent variable in all wage regressions is log of
weekly earnings. In the CPS MORG files provided publicly by the NBER, occupation
is reported using the 2010 Census occupational codes. I map SOC occupations to
these codes using a concordance provided by the U.S. Census Bureau (Industry and
Occupation Code Lists & Crosswalks).
2.5.4 Hierarchical Clustering
As noted in Section 2.4.1, a key empirical concern when measuring occupational
specialization is that different occupations may exist in very different labor markets.
Skills that are used and valued in some of these markets may be of little or no use
in others. For example, O*NET reports that all Economists surveyed reported that
skills such as Equipment Maintenance and Installation were not important to their
job. If a measure of specialization incorporates skills that are clearly not in the scope
of comparable alternative employement within the same labor market, it will be at
best an imprecise measure of specialization. The distinction between traditionally
white-collar and blue-collar occupations may be only one example of different
labor markets that might value and employ very different skills.
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However, this observation presents a dilemma. It is impractical and problematic
to regress wages on all 35 skills individually. Firstly, some skills may be highly
correlated within the occupational distribution, which will make any estimates of
those skills' association with wages highly imprecise. Secondly, using only occupation-
level variation in skill content, it is impossible to construct a comprehensive set of
interactions among skills because there are limited degrees of freedom. A better
strategy may be to classify skills into broad groups that reflect a division among
skills that are most directly used in production activities and skills that are not. But,
it is important that such a classification is not performed in an ad hoc manner.
To accomplish this task, I classify skills using a method of agglomerative hierar-
chical clustering. The hierarchical clustering method provides several benefits over
other, similar methods.21Most importantly for the purposes of this chapter, it pro-
vides a classification of the set of skills that is transparent and readily interpretable.22
Unlike some alternative measures, it does not require specifying the number of desired
clusters in advance. And, by classifying skills into discrete clusters, the clustering al-
gorithm allows me to construct measures of skill specialization within each cluster
while also controlling for the mean level of skill within each cluster.
The procedure begins by constructing a 35 × 35 matrix of pairwise correlations
21For an overview of the hierarchical clustering method as compared to alternative methods, see
Hastie, Tibshirani, and Friedman (2011). Although, to my knowledge, the hierarchical clustering
method has been little-used in Economics to date, it is most similar in effect to the k-means clus-
tering procedure, which has been used in some contexts. Unlike k-means clustering, hierarchical
clustering does not require specifying the number of clusters in advance, and it is not susceptible to
misclassification in the presence of multiple local minima.
22For example, principal component analysis (PCA) and factor analysis are two methods that
have a history of use in Economics. Although PCA will by definition capture variation in the
skill data more parsimoniously than a clustering algorithm, it does so at a substantial cost in
interpretability, because it characterizes component vectors that may place either positive or negative
weights on certain skills. In a principal component analysis of the O*NET skill data, the first two
components correspond closely to the classifications of Cognitive and Production skills that I report.
The correlation between each occupation's score in the first component and its mean Cognitive skill
measure is 0.99, while the correlation between each occupation's score in the second component
and its mean Production skill measure is 0.85. Together, these two principal components explain
approximately 70% of the variation in skills in the O*NET database.
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between each of the 35 skills in the O*NET database, where element [i, j] repre-
sents the correlation between skills i and j across the set of occupations reported
in O*NET. This correlation matrix is then used as a measure of skill dissimilarity.23
The algorithm then begins by considering each of the 35 skills reported in O*NET
as a distinct cluster. From there, the algorithm proceeds iteratively to agglomerate
clusters as follows:
1. Identify the two remaining clusters with the highest mean pairwise correlation;
2. Classify the members of these two clusters as belonging to a single cluster;
3. Repeat steps 1 and 2 until only a single cluster remains.
Because the algorithm can be observed in every iteration, the algorithm can be used
to separate the set of skills into any desired number of clusters.
Figure 2·5 provides a visual representation of the skill clusters generated by the
hierarchical clustering algorithm in the form of a cluster dendrogram (tree diagram).
Two key stylized facts emerge from this analysis. Firstly, many skills, such as Reading
Comprehension and Writing, are very highly correlated across occupations. This is
broadly consistent with the theoretical model presented in this chapter; if individual
workers were highly specialized among these skills, then we would expect the correla-
tion between any two skills to be relatively low. These high correlations also suggest
that an empirical strategy that includes all 35 skills separately is likely to face severe
multicollinearity issues.
Secondly, and more importantly, not all skills are highly correlated with one an-
other. Rather, there exist two distinct groups of skills in the O*NET dataset. The first
23The use of alternative distance metrics, such as the cosine angle of separation used by Gathmann
and Schönberg (2010), does not alter the classification of skills into the two primary clusters that are
analyzed in this chapter. However, the use of the correlation matrix allows for a more straightforward
interpretation of the algorithm's results; the value at which any two clusters are merged is the mean
pairwise correlation of the elements of each cluster.
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Figure 2·5: Results of Agglomerative Hierarchical Clustering Algo-
rithm on O*NET Skill Measures
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group consists of 8 different skills, which I term Production skills. These skills include
Equipment Maintenance, Equipment Selection, Installation, Operation and Control,
Operation Monitoring, Quality Control Analysis, Repairing, and Troubleshooting.
Each of these skills is broadly associated with production activities, and in particular
the descriptions given for each of these skills generally references regular interaction
with equipment or machines used in production.
The second cluster of skills, which I term Cognitive skills, includes 27 skills.24
These skills cover a wide range, and they include both skills that may have a rela-
tively intuitive and explicit definition (Programming, Mathematics) and skills whose
definition may be more amorphous (Active Learning, Social Perceptiveness). Because
many of these skills are highly correlated across the occupational distribution, I have
opted not to disaggregate skills further. However, in principle it may be feasible to
do so for future research.
The division of skills into these two primary clusters is highly robust to specifica-
tion of the clustering procedure. In fact, within the Production skill cluster, 100% of
the pairwise correlations are positive, and similarly, 100% of the pairwise correlations
in the Cognitive cluster are positive. However, over 80% of the pairwise correlations
across clusters are negative; occupations tend to report that they are relatively skilled
in one cluster, and relatively less skilled in the other. Returning to Figure 2·3, it is
clear that Economists also exhibit this pattern.
Figure 2·6 plots each occupation's mean skill intensity in each of the two groups,
24O*NET has also constructed a division of skills into six primary groups (Skills Search). To the
best of my knowledge, this classification has been constructed manually. All 8 of the skills that
I define as Production skills are classified as Technical skills by O*NET. Of the 27 skills that I
define as Cognitive skills, three are classified by O*NET as Technical skills (Technology Design,
Programming, and Operations Analysis), while the remaining skills are separated among Basic
skills (10 skills), Complex Problem Solving skills (1 skill), Resource Management skills(4 skills),
Social skills (6 skills), and Systems Skills (3 skills). In the Appendix, I reconstruct the baseline
regressions of this chapter using each of those categories as a single Cognitive skill in the calculation
of the Gini coefficient to address any concern that my results may arise from the greater number of
skills in the Cognitive cluster.
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Figure 2·6: Scatterplot of Mean Production Skills vs. Mean Cognitive
Skills By Occupation
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with Cognitive skills on the horizontal axis and Production skills on the vertical
axis. Occupations markers denote one of five main occupational groupings generated
by to which the occupation belongs (as in Menezes-Filho, Muendler, and Ramey,
2008). Here again there is evidence of a division among occupations; relatively few
occupations report similar levels of mean skill intensity for both Production Skills and
Cognitive skills. Furthermore, the division of occupations into Production-intensive
and Cognitively-intensive maps closely, though imperfectly, to the division of blue-
collar and white-collar occupations. For this reason, I perform several robustness
checks to my main specifications, separating blue-collar and white-collar occupations
to ensure that my primary results related to Cognitive and Production skill content
are not being driven by occupational groups with low average levels of skills in those
groups.
Figure 2·7 plots each occupation's Gini coefficient of Cognitive Skills against its
Gini coefficient of Production skills. Again, there is a clear division among blue-
collar and white-collar workers. However, here we can observe another interesting,
though perhaps unsurprising pattern; occupations tend to have a higher measured
concentration of skills, i.e. to be more specialized, within the class of skills (Cogni-
tive or Production) in which they are less skilled on average. Some portion of this
relationshipthough not allis related to the mechanical upper bound that a high
mean skill percentile places on the Gini coefficient. In the Appendix, I include these
same measures for alternative indices.
2.5.5 Comparison of Specialization Measures with Other Skill Measures
While the notion of labor specialization is not new, to date it has not been an area of
focus in the empirical analysis of occupational skill content. Instead, numerous other
papers have examined labor market changes along specific dimensions of skill by con-
structing alternative measures that encapsulate these dimensions. Perhaps the most
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Figure 2·7: Scatterplot of Gini Coefficient of Production Skills vs.
Cognitive Skills By Occupation
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well-known of these are the series of measures constructed and analyzed in several
papers by David Autor and coauthors (Autor, Levy, and Murnane, 2003; Autor and
Dorn, 2013). In particular, Autor, Levy, and Murnane (2003) use the Dictionary of
Occupation Titles (the precursor to O*NET) to examine changes in aggregate occu-
pational structure over time that may be associated with technological change. In
particular, since routine tasks are argued to be more suspectible to automation, the
authors construct measures of routine and non-routine task content. In Autor and
Dorn (2013), the authors introduce an additional, similar measure, which they term
the Routine Task Index (RTI). This index is a composition of three separate measures
of task content: Routine, Manual, and Abstract tasks.
Table 2.2: Comparison of Autor and Dorn Skill Measures with Spe-
cialization measures
(1) (2) (3) (4)
RTI Routine Manual Abstract
Mean of Cognitive Skills -0.349*** -0.217** -0.198** 0.904***
(0.0973) (0.0903) (0.0992) (0.0625)
Mean of Production Skills 0.111 0.540*** 0.159 -0.0354
(0.117) (0.109) (0.120) (0.0754)
Gini of Cognitive Skills 0.0233 -0.112 -0.0950 0.125**
(0.0929) (0.0862) (0.0947) (0.0597)
Gini of Production Skills 0.373*** 0.0834 -0.152 0.0232
(0.118) (0.109) (0.120) (0.0757)
Observations 438 438 438 438
R-squared 0.156 0.270 0.135 0.661
Each dependent variable is the indicated measure of Autor and Dorn (2013), standardized across
Census occupations. Each explanatory variable is a standardized measure of mean skill or special-
ization from O*NET. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 2.2 provides the results of regressions of standardized values of the four
measures (RTI plus its three task components) considered in Autor and Dorn (2013)
on standardized values of the mean skill and concentration measures constructed in
this chapter. In all specifications, the unweighted regression is conducted on the 438
three-digit Census occupations that I am able to match between the authors' mea-
sure and my own. Since all observations are also standardized, the coefficients can
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be interpreted as the predicted standardized change in each of my measures given a
one standard deviation change in the indicated measure from Autor and Dorn, ceteris
paribus. Columns 1 and 2 of the table shows that both of the measures of routine
occupational task content are associated with lower levels of Cognitive skill usage in
employment, with somewhat higher levels of Production skill, and with more special-
ization within Production skills. In comparison, Column 3 shows that occupations
that are high in non-routine manual task content, while also comparatively strong
in Production skills, are not associated with specialized Production skillsets. The
literature on technological change suggests that routine manual tasks may be most
readily automated, and the finding that routine occupations are both comparatively
non-cognitive and comparatively skill specialized is consistent with this suggestion.
Furthermore, since Autor and Dorn have previously shown that routine occupations
tend have higher average wages than non-routine manual occupations, these correla-
tions would be very consistent with an empirical finding that greater specialization
in Production skills is associated with higher wages. Finally, Column 4 shows that
the Autor-Dorn abstract task measure is strongly associated with higher usage of
Cognitive skills, and also with higher concentration within the set of those skills that
are used.
2.6 Results
2.6.1 Summary of RAIS Data
Before proceeding with the regression analysis, it is useful to understand how and
why individuals with more or less specialized skillsets differ. Table 2.3 summarizes
these differences within the sample of matched employer-employee data from RAIS.
Columns 1 and 3 of this table represent individuals whose occupations are Most
Specialized and Least Specialized, respectively, in that the Gini coefficient of their
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Table 2.3: Summary Stats for Individuals in Most/Least Skill-
Specialized Occupations
Most Avg. Least
Specialized Specialization Specialized Total
Mean Skill Pctile. 0.217 0.347 0.598 0.363
(0.0575) (0.110) (0.115) (0.149)
Mean Gini of Skills 0.513 0.318 0.156 0.325
(0.0467) (0.0673) (0.0307) (0.115)
Earnings/MW 2.866 6.282 12.99 6.721
(2.956) (8.319) (13.92) (9.265)
Age 38.71 38.77 39.45 38.85
(8.068) (7.903) (7.730) (7.908)
Tenure 2.164 2.331 2.713 2.360
(1.201) (1.333) (1.583) (1.362)
Contracted Hours 43.44 42.74 42.18 42.77
(1.854) (3.105) (3.038) (2.959)
Primary/Middle School 0.776 0.488 0.225 0.494
(0.417) (0.500) (0.417) (0.500)
High School 0.209 0.389 0.397 0.363
(0.407) (0.487) (0.489) (0.481)
Some College 0.00603 0.0360 0.0770 0.0373
(0.0775) (0.186) (0.267) (0.189)
College Graduate 0.00730 0.0864 0.301 0.105
(0.0851) (0.281) (0.459) (0.307)
Median Estab. Size 190 157 326 182
Mean Estab. Size 1227.5 1196.6 1819.4 1290.3
(2998.5) (3090.9) (4312.0) (3287.4)
Log Mean Estab. Earnings 0.947 1.362 1.742 1.353
(0.652) (0.808) (0.886) (0.827)
Observations 9,460,483 43,728,192 8,873,158 62,061,833
From a 100% sample of eligible person-years from RAIS, 1995-2014. Mean coefficients
are reported, with standard deviations in parentheses. Most specialized occupations are
1+ standard deviations above the sample mean. Least specialized occupations are 1+
standard deviations below the sample mean.
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skills as reported in O*NET is at least one standard deviation above (or one standard
deviation below) the sample mean. Column 2 represents all other individuals in the
sample, and column 4 shows overall averages for the sample.
The first and most immediate observation from the Table is the there is a clear
negative relationship between workers' mean skill percentile and the Gini coefficient
of their occupation's skills as indicated by O*NET. That is, the most skilled workers
also appear to have broader skillsets that are less concentrated in a few skills; that
is, they are less specialized. Some of this relationship is likely attributable to the
inherent relationship between any measure of dispersion, such as the Gini coefficient,
and the mean of a bounded scale with a finite sample size.
The second observation, which is again fundamentally at odds with the baseline
model, is that workers with the least specialized skillsets have much higher earnings
and higher educational attainment than workers with more specialized ones. They
have much higher rates of educational attainment, and they disproportionately work
at larger establishments that pay higher wages on average. These last two findings
are especially of note; if specialization is valuable, then larger establishments and
establishments that pay higher wages should be in theory prefer to hire workers
in more specialized occupations. 25 Taken collectively, these results are broadly
inconsistent on their face with the notion that workers in specialized occupations
will have higher wages. They also underscore the extent to which, in any regression
analysis using these data, it is important to account for other observable differences,
including in particular differences in the mean level of worker skill.
As previously noted in Sections 2.4.1 and 2.5.4, a significant empirical concern
is that skill specialization should ideally be measured against the set of skills that
are used within the similar occupations in the same overall labor market. Measuring
25In the model presented in this chapter, as in other models of specialization, firm size, technology,
and the feasible extent of specialization are directly related. There is also empirical evidence that
larger establishments pay higher wages on average (Brown and Medoff, 1989; Oi and Idson, 1999).
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Table 2.4: Summary Stats for Individals in Most/Least Production-
Specialized Blue-Collar Occupations
Most Avg. Least
Specialized Specialization Specialized Total
Mean Cognitive Skill Pctile. 0.188 0.206 0.309 0.211
(0.103) (0.0874) (0.106) (0.0945)
Mean Production Skill Pctile. 0.420 0.697 0.852 0.677
(0.123) (0.121) (0.0582) (0.154)
Mean Gini of Cognitive Skills 0.342 0.266 0.261 0.274
(0.0807) (0.0737) (0.0965) (0.0799)
Mean Gini of Production Skills 0.223 0.0846 0.0277 0.0962
(0.0708) (0.0387) (0.00408) (0.0632)
Earnings/MW 3.723 4.401 5.946 4.426
(3.622) (4.872) (5.465) (4.813)
Age 37.74 39.26 38.31 39.03
(7.921) (7.939) (7.791) (7.944)
Tenure 2.182 2.234 2.438 2.242
(1.177) (1.239) (1.360) (1.242)
Contracted Hours 43.42 43.25 43.07 43.26
(1.919) (2.157) (2.159) (2.134)
Primary or Middle School 0.689 0.686 0.575 0.679
(0.463) (0.464) (0.494) (0.467)
High School 0.294 0.291 0.393 0.298
(0.456) (0.454) (0.488) (0.457)
Some College 0.00824 0.00944 0.0138 0.00959
(0.0904) (0.0967) (0.117) (0.0975)
College Graduate 0.00883 0.0123 0.0185 0.0123
(0.0935) (0.110) (0.135) (0.110)
Median Estab. Size 224 160 296 198
Mean Estab. Size 1126.6 1272.3 1854.8 1294.2
(2436.2) (3001.7) (4022.6) (3026.8)
Log Mean Estab. Earnings 1.090 1.197 1.517 1.206
(0.655) (0.742) (0.767) (0.740)
Observations 4,532,260 19,415,254 7,387,316 31,334,830
From a 100% sample of eligible person-years from RAIS, 1995-2014. Mean coefficients are reported,
with standard deviations in parentheses. Most specialized occupations are 1+ standard deviations
above the sample mean. Least specialized occupations are 1+ standard deviations below the sample
mean.
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Table 2.5: Summary Stats for Individals in Most/Least Cognitively-
Specialized White-Collar Occupations
Most Avg. Least
Specialized Specialization Specialized Total
Mean Cognitive Skill Pctile. 0.143 0.441 0.744 0.451
(0.0470) (0.160) (0.0739) (0.201)
Mean Production Skill Pctile. 0.199 0.264 0.364 0.270
(0.0577) (0.216) (0.152) (0.203)
Mean Gini of Cognitive Skills 0.376 0.168 0.0790 0.177
(0.0917) (0.0430) (0.0138) (0.0854)
Mean Gini of Production Skills 0.432 0.322 0.154 0.312
(0.112) (0.157) (0.0988) (0.162)
Earnings/MW 3.337 8.568 16.56 9.061
(3.214) (11.07) (16.04) (11.79)
Age 38.27 38.55 39.79 38.68
(7.900) (7.882) (7.650) (7.867)
Tenure 2.223 2.469 2.758 2.481
(1.234) (1.460) (1.605) (1.465)
Contracted Hours 43.06 42.18 42.15 42.26
(2.454) (3.724) (2.939) (3.541)
Primary or Middle School 0.536 0.306 0.130 0.306
(0.499) (0.461) (0.336) (0.461)
High School 0.415 0.456 0.262 0.428
(0.493) (0.498) (0.440) (0.495)
Some College 0.0158 0.0677 0.0895 0.0655
(0.125) (0.251) (0.285) (0.247)
College Graduate 0.0334 0.170 0.517 0.200
(0.180) (0.375) (0.500) (0.400)
Median Estab. Size 94 143 466 166
Mean Estab. Size 777.2 1268.6 1790.2 1286.5
(2390.5) (3345.7) (5037.0) (3533.4)
Log Estab. Mean Earnings 1.072 1.498 1.872 1.504
(0.601) (0.887) (0.874) (0.882)
Observations 3,067,132 23,970,793 3,689,078 30,727,003
From a 100% sample of eligible person-years from RAIS, 1995-2014. Mean coefficients are reported,
with standard deviations in parentheses. Most specialized occupations are 1+ standard deviations
above the sample mean. Least specialized occupations are 1+ standard deviations below the sample
mean.
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specialization against a set of skills that are not in general used by similar occupations
may make any estimates imprecise. The unexpected patterns observed in Table 2.3
suggest that this particular concern may be relevant in this context. As detailed in
Section 2.5.4, patterns of occupational skill usage in the O*NET data support the
division of occupational skills into two primary groups, Production and Cognitive
skills, and the relative usage of these skill groups maps closely to the divide between
blue-collar and white-collar occupations.
For this reason, in Tables 2.4 and 2.5, I provide summary statistics on two subsets
of the RAIS sample, along measures of these two different types of specialization.
Table 2.4 divides blue-collar workers by their degree of specialization in Production
skills, while Table 2.5 divies white-collar workers by their degree of specialization in
Cognitive skills. These tables demonstrate that the key patterns observed in Table
2.3 are observed within each group, and are not driven by the inclusion of both
white collar and blue collar workers in the sample. In both tables, there remains
a negative relationship between mean skill percentile and the Gini of skills. And,
in both tables, as before, less specialized workers earn more than more specialized
workers do. Finally, in both tables, less specialized workers work at larger firms which
pay higher wages. Noticably, each of these results is considerably more pronounced
among white-collar workers than among blue-collar workers. However, each of these
results still runs counter to the predictions of the baseline model.
2.6.2 Wage Premia in RAIS
Table 2.6 presents baseline results with all skills incorporated into a single measure
of specialization. In Table 2.7, Cognitive and Production skills are incorporated sep-
arately against the entire sample. Column 1 of each table shows results with no other
covariates included except for year effects, while column 2 incorporates incorporates
standard individual-level covariates, including educational group and nationality con-
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Table 2.6: Baseline Regressions: All Skills
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log Log Log Log Log Log
Earnings Earnings Earnings Earnings Earnings Earnings
Mean Skill Pctile. 0.376*** 0.245*** 0.0916*** 0.0804*** 0.0886*** 0.0769***
(0.0589) (0.0321) (0.0308) (0.0192) (0.0172) (0.0135)
Gini of All Skills -0.0664 0.0211 0.00635 -0.00239 0.0201 0.00519
(0.0648) (0.0408) (0.0243) (0.0185) (0.0174) (0.0132)
Observations 59,803,061 59,696,420 59,696,420 59,696,420 59,200,644 59,696,420
Adjusted R-squared 0.306 0.518 0.575 0.658 0.683 0.819
Individual Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Occupational Controls None None Two-digit Two-digit Two-digit Two-digit
Employer Controls None None None Subsector Sub.+Controls Estab. FEs
Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered by CBO occupation. From a 100% sample of eligible
worker-year observations from RAIS. All specifications include year controls. Individual controls include linear
and quadratic terms in age, potential experience, and job tenure, four educational indicators, and nationality
indicators. Unreported establishment controls include log establishment size and proportions of workers in
each of five occupation categories eight age groups and four educational categories excluding the individual.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 2.7: Baseline Regressions: Cognitive and Production Skills
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log Log Log Log Log Log
Earnings Earnings Earnings Earnings Earnings Earnings
Mean Cognitive Skills 0.395*** 0.176*** 0.0732** 0.0773*** 0.0718*** 0.0822***
(0.0473) (0.0287) (0.0322) (0.0217) (0.0184) (0.0155)
Mean Production Skills 0.228** 0.228*** 0.0877** 0.0880*** 0.0961*** 0.0594***
(0.0912) (0.0487) (0.0379) (0.0235) (0.0215) (0.0179)
Gini Cognitive Skills -0.0691 -0.0563* -0.00806 0.0125 0.0270 0.0238
(0.0513) (0.0305) (0.0319) (0.0217) (0.0198) (0.0165)
Gini Production Skills 0.145** 0.0967*** 0.0586* 0.0585*** 0.0607*** 0.0417**
(0.0728) (0.0363) (0.0322) (0.0223) (0.0217) (0.0165)
Observations 59,803,061 59,696,420 59,696,420 59,696,420 59,200,644 59,696,420
Adjusted R-squared 0.318 0.525 0.575 0.659 0.684 0.820
Individual Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Occupational Controls None None Two-digit Two-digit Two-digit Two-digit
Employer Controls None None None Subsector Sub.+Controls Estab. FEs
Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered by CBO occupation. From a 100% sample of eligible
worker-year observations from RAIS. All specifications include year controls. Individual controls include linear
and quadratic terms in age, potential experience, and job tenure, four educational indicators, and nationality
indicators. Unreported establishment controls include log establishment size and proportions of workers in
each of five occupation categories eight age groups and four educational categories excluding the individual.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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trols, linear and quadratic terms in age, experience, job and tenure. In column 3, I
incorporate 85 detailed two-digit occupational group fixed effects, which control flex-
ibly for any other characteristics of occupational groups that may be associated with
higher or lower wages, such as hedonic factors, policies that constrain labor supply,
etc. In columns 4 and 5 I add approximately 600 subsector controls based on the
Brazilian Classificação Nacional de Atividades Econômicas (CNAE) classification26 ,
followed by establishment-level controls for the proportions of establishment employ-
ment in each of the four primary educational groups and five aggregate occupational
groups. All establishment-level controls exclude the individual in question (single-
employee establishments are therefore dropped from column 5). Finally, in column
6 I add a full-set of establishment fixed effects, of which there are approximately 1.9
million. These results, as with all individual-level regression results that I present in
this chapter, are clustered at level of the 343 individual CBO occupational codes on
which my occupational-level measures vary, making them robust to arbitrary serial
correlation within individual occupations. Additionally, all results are reported as
standardized coefficients. Therefore, all results can be interpreted as the percentage
effect on wages of a one standard deviation increase in the covariate of interest.
The results of both Table 2.6 and Table 2.7 show, firstly, that individuals in occu-
pations that are more skilled, as characterized by O*NET, do in fact earn significantly
higher wages. This is unsurpising, although it validates the use of O*NET data as a
measure of occupation-level differences in skill. However, Table 2.7 also shows that
specialization among Production skills is associated with higher earnings, even after
controlling for these differences in mean skill. The results are large; Column 3 shows
that a one standard deviation increase in the Gini of production skills is associated
with nearly 6% higher earnings, even after controlling for mean levels of skill, and
26The Brazilian CNAE subsector classification is somewhat comparable in number and scope to
the U.S. NAICS classifications.
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controlling flexibly for omitted factors that may affect broader occupational groups.
Even once a full set of establishment fixed effects are included, Column 6 shows that
the wage premium associated with specialization is estimated to be approximately
4%. In contrast, the degree of specialization in Cognitive skills does not appear to
be associated with a significant wage premium. And, when these two groups of skill
are aggregated together as in Table 2.6, there appear to be no significant relationship
between the degree of specialization and wages at all once mean skill and worker
characteristics are accounted for.
Additionally, the results of Columns 1 through 6 of Table 2.7 show an interesting
pattern. In particular, the wage premium associated with specialization in Produc-
tion skills appears to be somewhat larger when incorporating variation both across
occupational groups and across establishments, as in columns 1 and 2. However, the
estimated wage premium shown in Column 3 and that of Column 6 are little differ-
ent; this suggest that intra-firm wage premium associated with specialization is not
substantially different from the inter-firm premium. Among Cognitive skills, with-
out occupational group controls, point estimates would suggest that specialization is
actually associated with lower wages. Yet, once establishment characteristics or es-
tablishment fixed effects are incorporated, the sign of these estimates change. Because
of the limited statistical power of these methods with occupation-level clustering, I
cannot statistically reject the hypothesis that both within-firm and across-firm mea-
sures of the wage premia associated with specialization are identical. However, such
results could be consistent with unspecialized Cognitively-skilled workers being sorted
into high-wage establishments, as will be examined in the next section.
One concern with running the baseline regressions on the entire sample is, as with
the summary statistics, that we may be concerned that our estimates of the gains
or lack of gains from specialization could be driven by individuals who are not, in
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Table 2.8: Baseline Regressions: White-Collar and Blue-Collar Work-
ers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log Log Log Log Log Log
Earnings Earnings Earnings Earnings Earnings Earnings
White-Collar Workers Only
Mean Cognitive Skills 0.406*** 0.176*** 0.0740** 0.0316 0.0405* 0.0515**
(0.0828) (0.0386) (0.0334) (0.0234) (0.0225) (0.0205)
Mean Production Skills 0.296** 0.241*** 0.100*** 0.0845*** 0.0752*** 0.0536**
(0.148) (0.0699) (0.0354) (0.0225) (0.0235) (0.0214)
Gini Cognitive Skills 0.0135 -0.0240 0.0327 -0.0259 -0.00623 -0.0199
(0.108) (0.0394) (0.0479) (0.0285) (0.0262) (0.0255)
Gini Production Skills 0.118 0.0752* 0.0400 0.0491** 0.0492** 0.0407***
(0.105) (0.0437) (0.0318) (0.0202) (0.0205) (0.0154)
Observations 29,930,497 29,846,739 29,846,739 29,846,739 29,625,422 29,846,739
Adjusted R-squared 0.308 0.561 0.597 0.674 0.698 0.830
Blue-Collar Workers Only
Mean Cognitive Skills 0.106 0.0295 0.00262 0.00817 0.0210 0.0408
(0.0937) (0.0706) (0.0710) (0.0460) (0.0435) (0.0390)
Mean Production Skills 0.499*** 0.424*** 0.216** 0.254*** 0.226*** 0.163***
(0.135) (0.104) (0.103) (0.0567) (0.0572) (0.0510)
Gini Cognitive Skills -0.110** -0.0771* -0.0177 0.0359 0.0412* 0.0419*
(0.0547) (0.0432) (0.0421) (0.0250) (0.0241) (0.0217)
Gini Production Skills 0.347** 0.300** 0.300*** 0.250*** 0.209*** 0.143**
(0.170) (0.133) (0.114) (0.0765) (0.0776) (0.0713)
Observations 29,872,564 29,849,681 29,849,681 29,849,681 29,575,222 29,849,681
Adjusted R-squared 0.241 0.382 0.461 0.582 0.614 0.796
Individual Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Occupational Controls None None Two-digit Two-digit Two-digit Two-digit
Employer Controls None None None Subsector Sub.+Controls Estab. FEs
Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered by CBO occupation. From a 100% sample of eligible
worker-year observations from RAIS. All specifications include year controls. Individual controls include linear
and quadratic terms in age, potential experience, and job tenure, four educational indicators, and nationality
indicators. Unreported establishment controls include log establishment size and proportions of workers in
each of five occupation categories eight age groups and four educational categories excluding the individual.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.9: Baseline Regressions: Excluding Small Establishments
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log Log Log Log Log Log
Earnings Earnings Earnings Earnings Earnings Earnings
Estab. Size 10 or More
Mean Cognitive Skills 0.410*** 0.192*** 0.0909*** 0.0880*** 0.0724*** 0.0832***
(0.0495) (0.0280) (0.0307) (0.0194) (0.0181) (0.0159)
Mean Production Skills 0.185** 0.197*** 0.0797** 0.0866*** 0.101*** 0.0600***
(0.0752) (0.0365) (0.0359) (0.0228) (0.0214) (0.0180)
Gini Cognitive Skills -0.0542 -0.0438 0.00676 0.0192 0.0274 0.0230
(0.0514) (0.0281) (0.0313) (0.0212) (0.0200) (0.0169)
Gini Production Skills 0.106 0.0696** 0.0537* 0.0564** 0.0617*** 0.0415**
(0.0666) (0.0308) (0.0310) (0.0221) (0.0215) (0.0166)
Observations 53,074,217 52,986,576 52,986,576 52,986,576 52,986,576 52,986,576
Adjusted R-squared 0.345 0.546 0.588 0.660 0.679 0.807
Estab. Size 50 or More
Mean Cognitive Skills 0.444*** 0.217*** 0.0913*** 0.0921*** 0.0732*** 0.0851***
(0.0580) (0.0319) (0.0288) (0.0193) (0.0187) (0.0173)
Mean Production Skills 0.135** 0.161*** 0.0766** 0.0861*** 0.102*** 0.0619***
(0.0625) (0.0324) (0.0338) (0.0225) (0.0216) (0.0187)
Gini Cognitive Skills -0.0326 -0.0272 0.0136 0.0251 0.0305 0.0244
(0.0595) (0.0326) (0.0311) (0.0215) (0.0209) (0.0182)
Gini Production Skills 0.0468 0.0311 0.0510* 0.0539** 0.0590*** 0.0392**
(0.0686) (0.0340) (0.0292) (0.0226) (0.0218) (0.0170)
Observations 40,576,414 40,505,591 40,505,591 40,505,591 40,505,591 40,505,591
Adjusted R-squared 0.373 0.564 0.605 0.669 0.682 0.794
Individual Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Occupational Controls None None Two-digit Two-digit Two-digit Two-digit
Employer Controls None None None Subsector Sub.+Controls Estab. FEs
Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered by CBO occupation. From a 100% sample of eligible
worker-year observations from RAIS. All specifications include year controls. Individual controls include linear
and quadratic terms in age, potential experience, and job tenure, four educational indicators, and nationality
indicators. Unreported establishment controls include log establishment size and proportions of workers in
each of five occupation categories eight age groups and four educational categories excluding the individual.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
general, skilled in similar things. So, in Table 2.8, I show in two panels the results
of running the regressions separately on white collar and blue collar workers. The
results for blue-collar workers again show clear evidence of the value of specialization
in Production. In fact, the estimated wage premium associated with a one standard
deviation increase in the Gini of production skills is estimated at 14-30%. However,
among white-collar workers, there remains no evidence that specialization in Cognitive
skills is valuable.
An additional concern, particularly in looking at the lack of wage premia associ-
ated with specialization in Cognitive skills, may be that specialization patterns are
particularly driven by small firms. As characterized in the model, individuals in many
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small firms may be expected to perform a relatively broad set of tasks, and there-
fore may be unable to developed specialized skills. In larger firms, we might expect
that the extent of specialization is less constrained, leading to little value placed on
skill specialization. Table 2.9 show regression results excluding any establishments
with less than 10 workers in the sample (Panel A), and with less than 50 workers in
the sample (Panel B). Note that although a majority of establishments are excluded
from each of these subsamples, most individuals remain in both samples, as most
formal sector workers in Brazil are employed in larger establishments. Regardless,
these results do not suggest that either the estimated wage premium for Produc-
tion skill specialization or the lack of an estimated wage premium for Cognitive skill
specialization are driven primarily by small establishments.
Finally, one may be concerned that the results are driven either by collinearity
between the mean percentile of each set of skills and the Gini coefficient, or by the
manner in which raw scores from O*NET have been converted to percentiles. So,
table 2.10 shows results from two alternative measures. In Panel A, the Gini co-
efficient for each occupation and each skill group has been rescaled. Because the
distribution of skill percentiles is bounded, an increase in the mean skill percentile
mechanically reduces the upper bound of the range of feasible Gini coefficients. So, for
each occupation and each skill group, the upper bound of feasible Gini coefficients is
calculated, and the true Gini coefficient is divided by this measure. In Panel B, I use
the standard (un-rescaled) Gini coefficent measure, but I calculate both means and
Gini coefficients on the raw O*NET scores, rather than on the data that have been
converted to percentiles of the occupational distribution. Again, the basic conclusions
of the baseline results are largely reaffirmed.
In the Appendix, I provide regression results based on two alternative index mea-
sures of specialization; the Theil index and the standard deviation of reported skills.
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Table 2.10: Baseline Regressions: Alternative Skill Measures
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log Log Log Log Log Log
Earnings Earnings Earnings Earnings Earnings Earnings
Rescaled Gini Measure
Mean Cognitive 0.444*** 0.216*** 0.0652** 0.0576*** 0.0445*** 0.0601***
(0.0273) (0.0193) (0.0255) (0.0179) (0.0158) (0.0137)
Mean Production 0.134** 0.166*** 0.0639** 0.0641*** 0.0679*** 0.0409***
(0.0541) (0.0292) (0.0301) (0.0149) (0.0131) (0.0123)
Rescaled Gini -0.0323 -0.0260 -0.00999 -0.00473 0.00353 0.00285
Cognitive (0.0341) (0.0193) (0.0195) (0.0130) (0.0124) (0.0105)
Rescaled Gini 0.0662* 0.0457** 0.0458** 0.0457*** 0.0430*** 0.0311***
Production (0.0352) (0.0190) (0.0209) (0.0130) (0.0127) (0.0103)
Observations 59,803,061 59,696,420 59,696,420 59,696,420 59,200,644 59,696,420
Adjusted R-squared 0.316 0.524 0.575 0.659 0.684 0.820
Using Raw O*NET Scores
Mean Cognitive 0.465*** 0.192*** 0.101** 0.0155 -0.00493 0.0112
(Raw Measure) (0.0719) (0.0428) (0.0514) (0.0354) (0.0325) (0.0216)
Mean Production 0.206*** 0.207*** 0.133** 0.112*** 0.119*** 0.0762***
(Raw Measure) (0.0590) (0.0355) (0.0532) (0.0304) (0.0298) (0.0223)
Gini Cognitive 0.0271 -0.0216 0.0423 -0.0416 -0.0490** -0.0495***
(Raw Measure) (0.0836) (0.0499) (0.0454) (0.0270) (0.0245) (0.0173)
Gini Production 0.120 0.0874* 0.0802* 0.0795*** 0.0834*** 0.0641***
(Raw Measure) (0.0860) (0.0454) (0.0473) (0.0306) (0.0305) (0.0221)
Observations 59,803,061 59,696,420 59,696,420 59,696,420 59,200,644 59,696,420
Adjusted R-squared 0.322 0.525 0.575 0.659 0.684 0.820
Individual Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Occupational Controls None None Two-digit Two-digit Two-digit Two-digit
Employer Controls None None None Subsector Sub.+Controls Estab. FEs
Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered by CBO occupation. From a 100% sample of eligible
worker-year observations from RAIS. All specifications include year controls. Individual controls include linear
and quadratic terms in age, potential experience, and job tenure, four educational indicators, and nationality
indicators. Unreported establishment controls include log establishment size and proportions of workers in
each of five occupation categories eight age groups and four educational categories excluding the individual.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.11: CPS Regressions: All Skills
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Log Wkly. Earn. Log Wkly. Earn. Log Wkly. Earn. Log Wkly. Earn. Log Wkly. Earn.
Mean Skill Pctile. 0.305*** 0.178*** 0.120*** 0.107*** 0.106***
(0.0338) (0.0237) (0.0198) (0.0146) (0.0130)
Gini of All Skills 0.0348 0.0119 0.00939 0.00402 0.00412
(0.0322) (0.0229) (0.0180) (0.0135) (0.0121)
Observations 173,126 173,126 173,126 173,126 173,126
Adjusted R-squared 0.188 0.300 0.321 0.338 0.345
Individual Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Occ. Group Controls No No Yes Yes Yes
Industry Controls None None None Aggregate Detailed
Num. Clusters 467 467 467 467 467
Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered by Census occupation. From the unweighted CPS Merged
Outgoing Rotation Groups 2012-2015. Individual Controls include quadratic terms in age and experience, race
indicators, and educational group indicators. All specifications include year controls. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1
The Theil index is a popular form of generalized entropy index that, like the Gini co-
efficient, is frequently used to measure inequality. The standard deviation measures
variation in the depth of skills, and it has a monotonic relationship with the Gini
coefficient with a fixed mean on a bounded scale such as the one used here. These
results suggest similar magnitudes for wage premia as the Gini coefficient measure
of specialization. They also provide some stronger suggestive evidence that within
establishments, specialization in Cognitive skills is associated with higher wages event
though it is not associated with higher wages across establishments.
2.6.3 Wage Premia in CPS
As noted in Section 2.5.3, even though the use of RAIS data from Brazil allows me
to look at the wage premia associated with specialization both within and across
firms, the use of these data comes with additional limitations and empirical concerns.
Therefore, in this subsection, I replicate the key baseline regressions of the previous
subsection using the CPS Merged Outgoing Rotation Groups (MORG) from 2012-
2015.
Tables 2.11 and 2.12 provide results for the specialization wage premia across all
skills and within the two dimensions of Cognitive and Production skills, respectively.
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Table 2.12: CPS Regressions: Cognitive and Production Skills
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Log Wkly. Earn. Log Wkly. Earn. Log Wkly. Earn. Log Wkly. Earn. Log Wkly. Earn.
Mean Cognitive Skills 0.223*** 0.118*** 0.0761*** 0.0856*** 0.0851***
(0.0358) (0.0255) (0.0207) (0.0158) (0.0140)
Mean Production Skills 0.0155 0.0621** 0.0117 0.00981 0.00301
(0.0279) (0.0267) (0.0230) (0.0181) (0.0169)
Gini Cognitive Skills -0.0724** -0.0636*** -0.0584*** -0.0377*** -0.0392***
(0.0281) (0.0195) (0.0170) (0.0128) (0.0111)
Gini Production Skills 0.00659 0.0188 0.0209 0.0144 0.0124
(0.0337) (0.0294) (0.0183) (0.0148) (0.0131)
Observations 173,126 173,126 173,126 173,126 173,126
Adjusted R-squared 0.204 0.302 0.322 0.339 0.346
Individual Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Occ. Group Controls No No Yes Yes Yes
Industry Controls None None None Aggregate Detailed
Num. Clusters 467 467 467 467 467
Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered by Census occupation. From the unweighted CPS Merged
Outgoing Rotation Groups 2012-2015. Individual Controls include quadratic terms in age and experience, race
indicators, and educational group indicators. All specifications include year controls. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1
These results correspond to Tables 2.6 and 2.7. As before, when looking at all skills
simultaneously, there is no evidence that specialization is associated with either higher
or lower wages once an occupation's mean level of reported skill is taken into account.
However, once Production and Cognitive skills are separated, there is evidence of
wage differences associated with specialization in each. The results of Table 2.12,
however, are not entirely congruent with the results found when looking at RAIS as
in Table 2.7. Specifically, there is no clear evidence of a wage premium associated
with specialization within Production skills in these results. And, there appears to
be a wage penalty associated with specialization within Cognitive skills, a finding
which is only consistent with the RAIS regressions before the inclusion of broader
occupational group fixed effects.
Table 2.13 breaks out the sample into blue-collar and white-collar occupations, as
in Table 2.8, and sheds insight into the discrepancy from the baseline regressions. Just
as was observed in the Brazilian context, among blue-collar occupations, there are
large observed wage premia associated with specialization among Production skills.
This is coupled, however, with a finding that specialization within Cognitive skills is
associated with a wage penalty for these workers. Among white-collar workers, while
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Table 2.13: CPS Regressions: White-Collar and Blue-Collar Workers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Log Wkly. Earn. Log Wkly. Earn. Log Wkly. Earn. Log Wkly. Earn. Log Wkly. Earn.
White-Collar Workers Only
Mean Cognitive Skills 0.265*** 0.148*** 0.128*** 0.133*** 0.123***
(0.0543) (0.0379) (0.0294) (0.0220) (0.0189)
Mean Production Skills -0.0420 0.0297 -0.0245 -0.0125 -0.0168
(0.0308) (0.0332) (0.0290) (0.0238) (0.0220)
Gini Cognitive Skills -0.0817 -0.0604* -0.000651 0.0156 0.00143
(0.0525) (0.0356) (0.0270) (0.0185) (0.0171)
Gini Production Skills -0.0170 0.00730 -0.0103 -0.00604 -0.00584
(0.0323) (0.0306) (0.0195) (0.0170) (0.0147)
Observations 110,718 110,718 110,718 110,718 110,718
Adjusted R-squared 0.167 0.289 0.313 0.327 0.334
Num. Clusters 301 301 301 301 301
Blue-Collar Workers Only
Mean Cognitive Skills 0.0708* 0.0428 0.0118 0.0517** 0.0523**
(0.0424) (0.0379) (0.0390) (0.0247) (0.0240)
Mean Production Skills 0.135*** 0.0928** 0.121*** 0.0730** 0.0711**
(0.0488) (0.0404) (0.0413) (0.0309) (0.0289)
Gini Cognitive Skills -0.118*** -0.101*** -0.104*** -0.0661*** -0.0561***
(0.0246) (0.0203) (0.0209) (0.0137) (0.0126)
Gini Production Skills 0.158*** 0.0949* 0.140*** 0.0775** 0.0775**
(0.0598) (0.0501) (0.0528) (0.0388) (0.0348)
Observations 62,408 62,408 62,408 62,408 62,408
Adjusted R-squared 0.097 0.163 0.173 0.201 0.212
Num. Clusters 166 166 166 166 166
Individual Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Occ. Group Controls No No Yes Yes Yes
Industry Controls None None None Aggregate Detailed
Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered by Census occupation. From the unweighted CPS Merged
Outgoing Rotation Groups 2012-2015. Individual Controls include quadratic terms in age and experience, race
indicators, and educational group indicators. All specifications include year controls. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1
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Cognitive skills appear to be valued, there is no clear evidence of wage differences
associated with specialization within either group of skills. Overall, these finding are
fairly consistent with those obtained via RAIS.
In summary, while there are some inconsistencies between the regression results
produced using the CPS and those produced using the RAIS data, these data continue
to strongly support the notion that for blue-collar workers in particular, there is a
sizeable wage premium associated with being specialized within one's Production
skills. However, there remains weak evidence for any wage premium associated with
specialization among white-collar workers who use primarily Cognitive skills.
2.6.4 Sorting and Occupational Switchers
The baseline results presented in the previous suggestion provide considerable evi-
dence that specialization in one's set of Productions skills is valuable. This supports
for a key prediction of the theoretical model of specialization based on underlying
ability. However, the lack of clear evidence in support of the value of specialization
among Cognitive skills raises questions as well. Although a lack of a wage premium
associated with specialization of Cognitive skills could, for example, be the result
of measurement error, or a lack of variation in skillsets within detailed occupational
categories. However, the pattern of the results is also suggestive in particular that
less specialized workers may be sorted into high-wage firms. Such a finding is at odds
with the theoretical model of Section 2.3, which clearly suggests that more specialized
workers will be located in more productive and higher-paying firms, because of the
fundamental trade-off between the increasing returns to scale implied by specializa-
tion and the existence of coordination costs or other convex costs that limit the scope
of that specialization.
To investigate this further, in this subsection, I examine patterns of worker sorting
directly. As described in Section 2.4.2, I do so by constructing a two-step procedure
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based on the overlapping high-dimensional fixed effect methods of (Abowd, Kramarz,
and Margolis, 1999). In the first step, I regress workers log wages on a full set of
establishment and individual fixed effects along with individual covariates to account
for life-cycle wage patterns. Then, I regress the estimated establishment fixed effects
on the measures of mean skill and of skill specialization to determine the extent to
which specialized workers are sorted into higher-wage firms, net of other observable
characteristics.
Figure 2·8: Scatterplot of Mean AKM Establishment and Person FEs
by Occupation
The initial AKM paper, along with many follow-up studies, have sought to analyze
the extent of sorting between high-wage workers and high-wage firms in general, rather
than along particular particular dimensions of workers' observable characteristics.
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That is, they consider the correlation between estimated establishment effects and
worker effects across the entire sample. This pattern of sorting can also be observed
occupation-by-occupation. Figure 2·8 shows a scatterplot of the mean establishment
FE and the mean worker FE identified by the AKM procedure for each occupation. As
can be seen from the plot, there is evidence of positive assortative matching between
workers and firms. The overall correlation between worker and establishment fixed
effects is approximately 0.134. This is somewhat lower than the correlations found,
for example, by Card et. al in West Germany over the same period (Card, Heining,
and Kline, 2013), and slightly lower than the correlations of approximately 0.16 found
between observable worker characteristic effects and establishment fixed effects in the
Brazilian data for 1990 and 1997 in Menezes-Filho, Muendler, and Ramey (2008).
Table 2.14: Regression of AKM Establishment Fixed Effects on Skill
Measures
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Estab. FE Estab. FE Estab. FE Estab. FE
Mean Cognitive Skills 0.0748*** 0.00327 -0.0338 -0.0547**
(0.0279) (0.0501) (0.0344) (0.0266)
Mean Production Skills 0.168*** 0.239*** 0.188*** 0.0472
(0.0583) (0.0591) (0.0422) (0.0300)
Gini Cognitive Skills -0.0776** -0.0738** -0.0628** -0.0546**
(0.0364) (0.0347) (0.0278) (0.0228)
Gini Production Skills 0.117*** 0.130*** 0.0848*** 0.0316*
(0.0439) (0.0399) (0.0268) (0.0178)
Observations 56,499,238 56,499,238 56,433,558 56,433,558
Adjusted R-squared 0.096 0.104 0.219 0.314
Occupation Controls None Aggregate Aggregate Two-Digit
Individual Controls No No Yes Yes
Notes: Robust standard errors are clustered by CBO occupation. From a 100%
sample of eligible worker-year observations from RAIS. All specification include year
controls. Individual controls include linear and quadratic terms in age, potential
experience, and job tenure as well as education level and nationality indicators. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 2.14 presents the results from the second stage of the procedure outlined
above. As can be seen from the table, workers who have specialized Production
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skillsets are more likely to be found at high-wage establishments, which are presumed
to firms with access to better production technologies. While the inclusion of rich
individual covariates and two-digit occupational indicators attenuates this finding
somewhat, these findings are very consistent with the predictions of the standard
model, and with the findings of the previous subsection. However, the same pattern
does not hold among Cognitive skills. Rather, high-wage establishments appear to
employ individuals in occupations that possess broad Cognitive skillsets. Again,
this finding is robust to the inclusion of controls based on differences in observable
individual characteristics, to the mean levels of skill in each skill cluster, and to the
inclusion of broader occupational indicators.
Table 2.15: Skill Measure Wage Premia Identified from Occupation
Switchers
(1) (2)
Log Log
Earnings Earnings
Mean Cognitive Skills 0.0448*** 0.0441***
(0.00452) (0.00451)
Mean Production Skills 0.00570 0.00587
(0.00474) (0.00475)
Gini Cognitive Skills -0.000141 -0.000243
(0.00581) (0.00588)
Gini Production Skills -0.00394 -0.00371
(0.00428) (0.00434)
Observations 56,434,639 56,367,869
Adjusted R-squared 0.931 0.931
Individual Controls No Yes
Notes: Robust standard errors are clustered by CBO occupation. From a 100% sam-
ple of eligible worker-year observations from RAIS. All specification include individual
and establishment fixed effects, education group by year fixed effects and quadratic
and cubic terms in age - 40. Individual controls include linear and quadratic terms
in potential experience, and job tenure. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Finally, in order to understand the mechanisms by which specialization and wages
are related further, I run a single-step AKM regression in which I include establish-
ment and worker fixed effects simultaneously, along with the occupational content
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measures as above. Rather than measuring worker sorting, this measures the extent
to which the worker and establishment fixed effects are able to capture the sources of
wage patterns associated with skill specialization in full. Table 2.15 shows the results
of these regressions, both with only a limited set of life-cycle and educational controls
included as in the standard AKM specification, and with additional tenure and expe-
rience controls included in Column 2. The results show that, as predicted, occupation
switchers' wages do not appear to be increased or reduced when they switch from an
occupation that is less skill specialized to one that is more skill specialized, and vice
versa. Rather, these findings are consistent with the sources of wage premia from
specialization being either firm-level technology or individual-level ability.
2.7 Conclusion
When Adam Smith wrote his famous chapter regarding a pin factory, it seems ev-
ident that he was thinking of the gains from specialization in traditional manufac-
turing and other similar activities. And, the evidence presented here suggests that
specialization of skills in production is indeed valuable. A one standard deviation in-
crease in an occupation's Gini coefficient of Production skills is associated with 4-6%
higher earnings, even after controlling for observable individual-level differences, con-
trolling for variation across occupational categories, and after controlling flexibly for
establishment-level differences. The evidence also suggests that the earnings premium
from being in a production skill-specialized occupation is even larger for blue-collar
workers. These findings are consistent with the predictions of the simple model of
occupational choice which I also present in this chapter.
But, the evidence presented here also suggests that our existing models of spe-
cialization may be too limited to account for the role that cognitive skills play in
production. Not only is there an absence of clear evidence that specialization in cog-
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nitive skills is compensated, but patterns of worker sorting suggest that workers in
occupations with broader cognitive skillsets are more likely to be located in higher-
paying firms. Even if cognitive skills are highly complementary in production, which
might lead to within-firm sorting of high-ability workers to broad cognitive skillsets,
the Becker and Murphy model suggests that higher-wage firms should employ more
specialized workers, but they do not.
Perhaps this empirical finding is unsurprising. Many types of labor that most
people would consider to be highly skilled are not particularly specialized in their
skillsets. Managers and CEOs who oversee broad swathes of production activity may
immediately come to mind as requiring broad skills. However, many other types of
labor are similarly highly skilled, yet incompletely specialized. Consider, for example,
economists. A typical Economics department may have researchers in different fields,
but it does not have one person who takes all the first-order conditions, one person
who does all of the writing, or one person who gives all of the presentations. Indeed, as
of 2012, the median number of authors on a published Economics paper was only 2.3
(Card and DellaVigna, 2013). Furthermore, according to the U.S. O*NET database,
Economists have very broad skillsets; of 35 skills about which they were surveyed,
Economists reported on average that 18 were Important or Very Important to
the performance of their job. The economists surveyed by O*NET report that their
job requires levels of skill that are above the 80th percentile of the occupational
distribution in 13 of 35 skills measured (O*NET Resource Center - O*NET 21.0
Production Database). None of these observations map neatly to a model in which
gains from specialization induce firms to hire workers that specialize to the maximum
feasible extent.
How, then, should we think of the role of specialization among workers who use
primarily cognitive skills? Perhaps broad cognitive skillsets among supervisory work-
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ers reduce coordination costs. Or, perhaps broad cognitive skillsets allow workers to
solve difficult problems or to discover firm-specific innovations. The theoretical liter-
ature has presented a range of models that consider knowledge hierarchies, outside
innovators, and other mechanisms that could have relevance for the observations of
this chapter (Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg, 2006; Dessein and Santos, 2006; Legros,
Newman, and Proto, 2013). But, absent empirical measures of specialization of the
type developed in this chapter, there has to date been very little scope to test these
models.
In interpreting these results, it is also important to have a careful understanding
of their limitations. The O*NET data used in this chapter cannot, for example,
be used to track the skill content of individuals, only occupations. Although I am
able to include broader occupational group fixed effects, I cannot rule out the role of
hedonic differences or other correlated supply-side factors that might influence overall
wage patterns. Because the wage premia from specialization are intimately tied with
worker sorting across firms, an ideal test of the model's predictions would require
exogenous variation in total factor productivity that is not factor-augmenting, and
this seems unlikely to find. Finally, although the Brazilian data used in this chapter
are detailed administrative data which confer many benefits, the existence of a large
informal sector in Brazil poses problems for any attempt to analyze changes across
firms over time, and measurement error associated with mapping occupational codes
may be a source of considerable attenuation bias.
Nonetheless, taken collectively, these results suggest that there is much more work
to be done to understand the role of occupational skills within firms. Although
one-dimensional models of human capital may be tractable and very useful in many
contexts, they also have significant limitations. Additional research using models that
consider human capital as a multidimensional object may yet provide considerable
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insights into the complex relationship between skills, specialization, and productivity.
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Chapter 3
The Impact of Having a Job at Migration on
Settlement Decisions: Ethnic Enclaves as
Job Search Networks
3.1 Introduction
Ethnic enclaves are a persistent phenomenon in America and around the world. They
persist over long periods of time, in spite of freedom of movement. They also persist
in spite of observational evidence which suggests that residents of ethnic enclaves
have worse labor market outcomes than non-residents. There is no guarantee that
this observational evidence reflects any causal relationship between enclaves and im-
migrant outcomes, but it does suggest that enclaves are properly seen as a sorting
phenomenon: Low-skilled new immigrants cluster in enclaves, while highly-skilled
new immigrants more frequently choose to locate in areas where their ethnic group
does not constitute a large proportion of the population. Since contemporary debates
in immigration policy have focused heavily on issues relating to immigrant selection
and immigrant networks, there may be great value in understanding the causes of
this sorting within destination countries.
The persistence of enclaves suggests that new immigrants are responding to so-
cioeconomic incentives when they choose where to locate. Yet, it remains difficult to
separate among the plausible causes of enclave formation. Theoretical justifications
for enclaves include discrimination, human capital externalities, and private bene-
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fits from avoiding assimilation (Edin, Fredriksson, and Åslund, 2003; Lazear, 1999;
Cutler, Glaeser, and Vigdor, 2008). However, one of the most compelling hypothe-
ses is that immigrants sort themselves to take advantage of network effects in the
labor market. According to this line of reasoning, immigrants locate in enclaves so
that they can use local networks to learn about and apply for jobs. This hypothesis
is supported by several papers that suggest the existence of immigrant job search
networks, particularly among refugees whose initial locations are randomly assigned
Edin, Fredriksson, and Åslund (2003), Munshi (2003), and Beaman (2011). Yet, little
empirical research exists to support the notion that individuals actually choose where
to live with potential job search benefits in mind. Similarly, existing research cannot
tell us whether the seeming patterns of negative selection in enclave residence are
related to the fact that lower-skilled individuals may benefit disproportionately from
any job search networks that exist.
In this chapter, I seek to determine whether immigrants' locational choices respond
to potential job search networks by exploiting a simple discontinuity: immigrants
who already have a job have little immediate need for the benefits of such a network.
That is, I examine whether immigrants, and highly-skilled immigrants in particular,
who have a job offer at the time of migration make different locational decisions than
immigrants who do not already have a job offer. If new immigrants who arrive without
a job offer are taking advantage of ethnic enclave networks for job search, then they
will be more likely to locate in areas where the density of other individuals in the
network is high. Meanwhile, immigrants who arrive with job offers may benefit less
from these networks, and so these immigrants will be less likely to locate in enclave
areas. I demonstrate these predictions with a simple theoretical model of job search
that may occur both before and after migration.
For my empirical analysis, I use geographic data from the New Immigrant Survey
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(Jasso et al., 2006), matched to aggregate data from the U.S. Census at the ZIP
code level. The New Immigrant Survey (NIS) provides a cross-sectional survey of
approximately 8,500 new legal immigrants to the United States, and it is designed to
be a representative sample of all new legal immigrants. In addition to asking about
employment at the time of migration, it also provides a detailed retrospective survey
of pre-migration characteristics that allow me to control for selection on a broad range
of observable attributes. Importantly, the NIS includes data on pre-migration salary,
hours, occupation and industry that may control for selection on these attributes
without the reverse causality issues that would be present if post-migration controls
were used in their place.
My empirical analysis shows that immigrants who migrate with a job offer are
significantly less likely to locate in neighborhoods with a high proportion of individ-
uals in their language group. Even within a given metropolitan area, my analysis
suggests that immigrants who migrate with a job offer locate in less ethnically-dense
neighborhoods than those who migrate without a job offer. This result is robust
to the inclusion of a variety of covariates, and also to several different methods of
defining ethnic groups based on languages spoken at home. In keeping with the pre-
dictions of my theoretical model, this suggests that immigrants who arrive without
job offers make a trade off between the job-search benefits of enclave membership and
commuting costs.
While there do appear to be labor market benefits of locating in an ethnic enclave
area, the benefits of this decision need not be homogeneous. Indeed, my model allows
for rich selection behavior in locational decisions. Based on plausible assumptions
about the nature of commuting costs and the job-matching function, I show that the
job search benefits to higher-skilled immigrants of enclave residence may be lower
than the job search benefits to lower-skilled immigrants. This would imply that upon
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receiving a job offer, high-skilled immigrants' locational decisions are impacted less
than low-skilled immigrants' locational decisions. To test this hypothesis, I examine
whether the impact of a pre-migration job offer is heterogeneous across the distri-
bution of observable skills. However, my analysis fails to find significant evidence of
heterogeneous effects, either on education or on other observable characteristics.
Also in keeping with the broader literature on selection in migration, my model
suggests that immigrants who arrive with a job offer may be observably different from
immigrants who do not arrive with a job offer. I find strong empirical evidence of
this assertion. Immigrants who arrive with a job offer are more highly educated than
immigrants who do not arrive with one, and they are considerably more highly paid
both before and after migration. These differences suggest that selection on unob-
servables may be a concern. Any unobservable characteristics that are be correlated
with the decision to locate in an ethnic enclave may bias regression results if they are
also correlated with the probability of receiving a pre-migration job offer. As a ro-
bustness check, I perform an analysis using a kernel-based propensity score matching
method. This analysis may be more robust to any potential impact of unobservables,
as long as the correlation between unobservable characteristics and the probability of
receiving a job offer is locally close to 0. The propensity score analysis is suggestive
of a treatment effect; the magnitude of the estimated average treatment effect is sim-
ilar to the results from OLS and probit regression, though the reduced power of this
method means that these results are only marginally significant.
This chapter proceeds in sections as follows. Section 3.2 provides an overview of
literature related to migration, and in particular to the role of ethnic enclaves. Next,
Section 3.3 introduces a simple theoretical model that supports my hypotheses. This
model illustrates that there is an inherent trade-off for new, unemployed immigrants
in choosing where to locate that does not exist for immigrants who arrive with a job
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offer. It also provides a framework for incorporating ethnic enclaves into the broader
literature on the selection of immigrants. Then, section 3.4 provides an empirical
framework that allows me to test a key prediction of the theoretical model, that
new immigrants who have jobs at the time of migration will be less likely to locate
in ethnic enclaves that immigrants who do not have jobs at the time of migration.
Section 3.5 describes the New Immigrant Survey and Census data that I use in this
chapter, as well as the additional information that I intend to use once I have been
granted access to the Restricted Use version of the Survey. Section 3.6 provides and
discusses my main results, and section 3.7 provides a range of robustness checks,
include a propensity score analysis. Finally, Section 3.8 concludes the chapter.
3.2 Overview of the Literature
Migration is an issue of considerable policy interest, and so there exists a large mi-
gration literature. Most of the literature focuses broadly on the issue of selection
into migration, or on the impact of migration on native workers throughout the skill
distribution (Borjas, 1987; Card, 2001; Borjas and Friedberg, 2009; Peri and Sparber,
2009). Many of these studies attempt to instrument for endogenous labor market
sorting, typically under the assumption that migration patterns are persistent over
time (Card, 2001). However, for this very reason, most of this literature can say little
about the nature of this endogenous sorting, or about what mechanisms might cause
migrants to sort in a persistent fashion. Apart from broad policies that encourage or
discourage migration, there exist many related policy questions that may benefit from
an understanding of these mechanisms. For example, to fully understand the impacts
of U.S. policies that encourage family reunification, urban planning policies, or wel-
fare programs, it is important to understand the nature of migrant social networks,
particularly as they relate to ethnic enclaves.
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There is evidence that network effects do matter for job search among the general
population. The best such evidence comes from Bayer, Ross, and Topa (2008). These
authors found that an urban resident is more likely to work with a resident of his/her
own city block than on neighboring blocks. Since travelling a single city block to a
job presumably imposes only very small commuting costs, this is supposed to identify
potential network effects. Not only does the study find evidence of such a pattern,
but it finds that this effect is stronger when residents have similar socio-economic
characteristics. This supports the notion that ethnic enclaves form to take advantage
of network effects, and it additionally suggests that enclaves may matter at a very
localized level.
Among the immigrant population, Goel and Lang (2016) has proposed a theo-
retical model in which immigrants take advantage of their ethnic networks to reduce
job search costs. Looking at a survey of new immigrants to Canada, they test the
predictions of this model empirically by looking at whether new immigrants claim
to have a friend or relative in the country at the time of immigration. They also
use geographic measures of immigrant density to define ethnic enclaves. This model
and results suggest that residents of ethnic enclaves may benefit from the more rapid
arrival of job offers, even when the distribution of potential job offers to be received
does not change. These predictions are consistent with my hypothesis. However, this
theoretical model is based on a population of homogeneous immigrants, and so it is
unable to make predictions about effects across different levels of worker skill.
There is also evidence that network effects matter in other decisions that migrants
make. For example, Bertrand, Luttmer, and Mullainathan (2000) uses Census data
to look at whether network effects matter in the application for welfare benefits. As
in this chapter, they group migrants by common language, and they exploit variation
in the density of migrants to conclude that network effects cause members of language
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groups with high existing welfare use to be more likely to apply for welfare benefits
themselves. Furtado and Theodoropoulos (2012) uses a similar method to look at
the take-up of disability programs. Similarly, research by Patel and Vella (2012)
shows that the occupational choices of immigrant groups tend to be persistent over
time. The authors show not only that new immigrants tend to choose the same
occupations as previous migrants, but also that they earn a wage premium by doing
so. This suggests that networks may be used as a way to receive better job offers
than would otherwise be available.
While studies such those of Bertrand, Luttmer, and Mullainathan and Patel and
Vella are able to employ careful instrumental variables strategies to achieve clean
identification of network effects, their methods are not well-suited to considering
initial locational decisions. Their methods can identify network effects only from
within-metropolitan area variation in welfare use. In contrast, new immigrants choose
where to locate not only within metropolitan areas, but across them as well, and there
may be selection in these decisions. It is for this reason that I have adopted a selection
on observables strategy, with careful control for pre-migration characteristics.
Another literature related to ethnic enclaves looks not at the causes of their for-
mation, but at the outcomes of their residents. These studies frequently use the initial
placement of refugee immigrants, as assigned by government policy, to address the
issue of immigrant sorting. The work of Edin, Fredriksson, and Åslund (2003) used
this method to look at the impact of living in an ethnic enclave on refugee immigrant
earnings in Sweden. They found not only that immigrants benefit from initial place-
ment in an ethnic enclave, but they found strong evidence of immigrant sorting after
initial placement, particularly among low-skilled refugees. Work by Beaman (2011)
on refugees assigned around the U.S. provides additional insight by suggesting that
network effects may be heterogeneous. Refugees who were assigned to locations with
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a large social network of very recent immigrants showed lower incomes, while refugees
who were assigned to locations with many longstanding network members appear to
benefit from their assignment. These heterogeneous treatment effects support the la-
bor market networks hypothesis, and they also suggest that the persistence of ethnic
enclaves benefits new immigrants. However, these studies cannot show whether net-
work effects are also important for non-refugees, or when locations are endogenously
chosen.
Finally, looking solely at low-skilled agricultural migrants from Mexico, research
by Munshi (2003) finds that migrants with larger networks are more likely to take
higher-paying non-agricultural jobs. Because Munshi looks at repeat migrants, he
is able to include individual fixed effects, which control effectively for selection on
unobservables to cleanly identify network effects. However, it is unclear from this
analysis whether such effects might be similar for more highly-skilled migrants, who
typically come from countries other than Mexico, and who may be searching for very
different types of jobs. It is also unclear whether effects may be similar in largely
metropolitan ethnic enclaves.
Each of these existing studies seems to suggest that job search networks may play
a significant role in location decisions. However, none of these studies directly ad-
dresses the situation of having a job offer at the time of migration. More importantly,
none of these studies is able to address some key questions that may be relevant for
policymaking. For example: Are the effects of arriving with a job heterogeneous
across the skill distribution or across ethnic groups? Furthermore, do migrants with
jobs locate in different metropolitan areas altogether, or in different parts of the same
metropolitan areas? Could highly localized policies such as urban planning policies
that impact the formation of dense enclaves have an impact on immigrant outcomes?
For these questions, the detailed retrospective survey data that I use has considerable
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advantages.
3.3 Theoretical Model
In this section, I present a model that encapsulates the basic decisions made by
potential legal immigrants, and that encompasses both selection in the decision to
migrate and selection in the decision to locate in an ethic enclave. This model is
a variant on the Roy (1951) model of selection, as applied to migration by Borjas
(1987) and others. This model enriches the Borjas model by encompassing two sepa-
rate problems; the pre-migration decision of the potential migrant, and the decision
upon migration of where a migrant should locate. As in the seminal Roy model, the
decisions of individuals are a function of individual country-specific shocks, which
may be correlated.
Let us first begin with the problem of the potential migrant in his/her native
country. In each period, each risk-neutral potential migrant i earns a wage µ0 + 0i,
where µ0 is the average wage for a potential migrant in this country, and 0i is a time-
invariant, country-specific individual wage shock that is distributed with mean 0 and
finite variance σ20.
1 All potential immigrants are assumed to be employed in their
native countries. However, upon migration, an immigrant may be either employed
or unemployed, and he/she chooses a location in the new country in which to reside.
Locations vary by their ethnic density D ∈ [0, Dmax], i.e. the fraction of residents
in that location that are immigrants. An individual immigrant is said to live in an
1In the Borjas model, these country-specific shocks are generally interpreted to be the residual
wage differential net of the effects of observable characteristics, so that µ0 is the mean wage for
individuals conditional on observable characteristics. To simplify notation and to provide the model
with a more intuitive interpretation, I assume that µ0 is the unconditional mean, and therefore that
0i incorporates the effects of education and other observable characteristics, as well as unobserved
heterogeneity in potential migrants. This also implies that the correlation between 0i and 1i is
likely to be positive and relatively close to 1. In practice, 0i and 1i may be assumed to take an
error components form, and the correlation of residual wage differences net of observables may be
positive, negative, or zero.
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ethnic enclave if the ethnic density of his/her location is greater than some level ωD¯,
where D¯ is the average density of that ethnic group in the new country. Once they
have settled, immigrants cannot change their location.2
An employed immigrant earns a net wage in each period µ1 + 1i − γ (D), where
µ1 is the average wage for a migrant, 1i is time-invariant wage shock in the receiving
(new) country, also mean-0 with finite variance σ21, and γ (D) is a commuting cost
that is assumed to be increasing in D, the ethnic density of the location in which the
immigrant resides.3 Assume for simplicity and for later use that γ (0) = 0 and that
γ (·) is twice continuously differentiable. Earnings of unemployed immigrants in each
period are normalized to 0, and they do not depend on D. Immigrants and potential
immigrants have complete information in this model, and there is no uncertainty, so
each migrant knows the mean wage in each country, as well as his/her individual wage
shocks 0i and 1i. Individuals in their native country may choose to migrate to the
new country, and upon migration they choose D, the ethnic density of the location
in which they choose to live.
In this model, both immigrants and non-immigrants may find receive job offers
in the receiving country. However, in each period an immigrant who has already
migrated to the receiving country is more likely to find a job than an immigrant
who has not yet migrated. In this model, job offers arrive by a Poisson process,
where the per-period arrival probability depends on that individual's country-specific
shocks and, for unemployed immigrants, the ethnic density of their location. Thus,
the probability that a non-immigrant finds a job is λ0 (0, 1), because it may depend
on country-specific shocks in both his/her native country and in the new country.
2The basic predictions of this model will hold as long as relocation is costly and/or it is not
instantaneous.
3This assumption simply imposes the requirement that locating in an ethnic enclave is costly for
employed individuals. If the jobs performed by employed immigrants are located outside the ethnic
enclaves themselves, then this assumption will be met.
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The probability that an unemployed immigrant finds a job is λ1 (1, D), because it
may depend on his/her country-specific shock in the new country as well as the ethnic
density of the location in which the immigrant has chosen to reside. If locating in an
ethnic enclave helps a new immigrant to find a job, then λ1 (·) will be increasing in
D.4 I assume also that both λ0 (·) and λ1 (·) are increasing in 1, and that λ1 (·) is
twice continuously differentiable.
Migration for immigrants who are not currently employed costs a fraction c of that
immigrant's utility in his home county, while migration for immigrants who have a
job offer at the time of migration is assumed to be costless.5 Additionally, I will
assume for simplicity that when a potential migrant receives a job offer, that he or
she migrates with certainty. Formally, this requires that the supports of 0i and 1i
are bounded above and below, respectively, and it requires some restrictions on the
relative values of µ0, µ1, 0i and 1i which will also depend on the functions λ0 (·),
λ1 (·), and γ (·). I assume that these restrictions are satisfied.
Define V0i as the value function for a potential migrant i in his/her native country,
V1Ui as the value function for an individual i who has migrated but is unemployed,
and V1Mi as the value function for an individual i who has migrated and is employed.
Then, the following equations characterize the model:
V0i = µ0 + 0i + λ0 (0i, 1i) βV
′
1Mi + (1− λ0 (0i, 1i)) βV ′0i (3.1)
V1Ui = 0 + λ1 (1i, D) βV
′
1Mi + (1− λ1 (1i, D)) βV ′1Ui (3.2)
V1Mi = µ1 + 1i − γ (D) + βV ′1Mi (3.3)
4My model does not explicitly model either the decisions of firms or the informational content
of social network ties, and therefore it does not incorporate the type of asymmetric information
problem that would imply that ∂λ(·)∂D > 0. However, this result can be easily obtained from a model
with a structure similar to that of Montgomery (1991).
5The assumption that migration is costless for individuals with a job at the time of migration
simplifies the notation of the problem, but it does not change the intuition of the results. It is also
consistent with a world in which employers pay for the migration of the foreign workers they hire.
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Since 1i is time-invariant, and since there is no job separation in this model, the
value function for employed immigrants can be rewritten as:
V1Mi =
µ1 + 1i − γ (D)
1− β (3.4)
From (3.4), it is easy to see that immigrants who arrive with a job offer will seek
to minimize their commuting costs γ (D), and since γ (·) is assumed to be increasing
in D, that all immigrants who arrive with job offers will choose D = 0. However,
immigrants who arrive without job offers will choose D based on both the likelihood
that they will find a job, and on the commuting costs that they will incur upon
becoming employed.
Substituting the expression in (3.4) for V1Mi into the equation for unemployed
immigrants, we get that:
V1Ui =
β
1−βλ1 (1i, D) (µ1 + 1i − γ (D))
1− (1− λ1 (1i, D)) β (3.5)
Similar substitution into the equation for non-immigrants implies that:
V0i =
µ0 + 0i
1− (1− λ0 (0i, 1i)) β +
β
1−βλ0 (0i, 1i) (µ1 + 1i − γ (D))
1− (1− λ0 (0i, 1i)) β (3.6)
A non-immigrant chooses to migrate without a job offer if the value of doing so exceeds
the value of remaining in his/her native country, net of his/her migration costs c ·V0i.
Then, from the above, this model implies that migration will occur whenever:
β
1−βλ1 (1i, D) (µ1 + 1i − γ (D))
1− (1− λ1 (1i, D)) β −
(1 + c) (µ0 + 0i)
1− (1− λ0 (0i, 1i)) β
−(1 + c)
β
1−βλ0 (0i, 1i) (µ1 + 1i − γ (D))
1− (1− λ0 (0i, 1i)) β ≥ 0 (3.7)
Empirically, one cannot observe the decisions of individuals who have not chosen to
migrate, because it is not in general possible to observe or identify the value of 1i
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for anyone who has not migrated.6 However, we do know that this constraint will be
satisfied for any immigrant who is unemployed. Therefore, I will refer to (3.7) as the
Migration Constraint.
At the time of migration, a new immigrant who has migrated without a job
offer chooses where to locate. Unlike a new immigrant who migrates with a job
offer, this immigrant is not merely choosing to minimize commuting costs. Instead,
his/her choice of D reflects an inherent trade-off between the probability of finding
employment, and the cost that will be incurred to commute to that employment once
it has been found. That is, the new immigrant solves the following problem:
max
D
β
1−βλ1 (1, D) (µ1 + 1 − γ (D))
1− (1− λ1 (1, D)) β , subject to (3.8)
the Migration Constraint (3.7)
0 ≤ D ≤ Dmax
We can take the first order condition to solve for the optimal choice of D. I will
abuse some notation by dropping all subscripts and arguments (ex. λ ≡ λ1(1, D)). I
will also take advantage of the conditions that β ∈ (0, 1) and that λ ≥ 0. Then, with
some algebra, taking the first order condition yields the following:
µ+ − γ
γ′
=
λ
λD
· 1− β + βλ
1− β (3.9)
where λD is the partial derivative of λ with respect to D.
From the above equations, the following features of the model are clear:
• Locational decisions are not impacted directly by pre-migration characteristics.
This is true by construction. However, it is important to recognize that in
6Heckman and Honoré (1990) demonstrate that under the traditional assumption made in the
Roy model that wage shocks are distributed log-normally, and assuming that the correlation of 0
and 1 is known, it is possible to identify the distribution of 0 for non-migrants. However, the
log-normal distribution is not bounded above, which is a necessary assumption for this model.
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general, since Corr(0, 1) 6= 0, pre-migration characteristics will be correlated
to observable locational outcomes. Additionally, pre-migration characteristics
impact the likelihood of receiving a pre-migration job offer. Therefore, any pre-
migration characteristics that are correlated to post-migration characteristics
may still present endogeneity issues in empirical analysis.
• All of the possible selection behaviors admissible in the Borjas (1987) model are
also admissible in this model. A key insight of Borjas selection model is that
depending on the correlation of country-specific shocks, we may observe that
immigrants are positively or negatively selected from the populations of their
native countries, or that there may be refugee selection of individuals who
are at the bottom of the native country's wage distribution but the top of the
new country's wage distribution. All of these cases are also admissible in this
model.7
• Conditional on migration, the average wage of an immigrant's native country
has no impact on his/her locational decision. This follows naturally from the
problem shown above, and from the assumption that 0 is mean-0. Taken lit-
erally, this implies that empirically, any observed correlation between the mean
wage of a country and the locational decisions of immigrants who did not ar-
rive with a job offer must result from differences in the distribution of 1 across
countries. However, if the model is relaxed to allow for non-commuting benefits
of ethnic density (see below), then it is possible that differences in the extent of
non-commuting benefits across ethnic groups or across pre-migration income
levels may lead to an observable correlation between average pre-migration
wages and average locational decisions.
7In particular, the special case in which λ0(0, 1) = 0 ∀ 0, 1, λ1(1, D) = 0 ∀ 1, D, and γ(D) = 0
collapses neatly into the standard Borjas (1987) model form.
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• Immigrants who arrive with job offers will choose D = 0 regardless of their
characteristics. As discussed above, this is a relatively strong assumption of the
model made by construction. If the function γ(D) is taken more generally to
specify "net costs of living in an area of ethnic density," and if the assumption
of monotonicity is relaxed, then immigrants who arrive with job offers may
choose D > 0. This model also does not account for the locational choices of
firms, which likely make commuting costs non-monotonic in density below some
threshold. However, as long as the non-commuting benefits of ethnic density
are not increasing in 1 quickly relative to the commuting costs of living in an
area of high ethnic density, we should observe that immigrants who arrive with
job offers are less likely to live in an ethnic enclave than immigrants who do not
arrive with job offers.
• Under some conditions, an increase in 1 will lead to a decrease in the equilib-
rium ethnic density chosen for immigrants who migrate without a job offer.
In this chapter, I will focus my attention on the hypothesis that immigrants who
arrive with job offers are less likely to locate in an ethnic enclave than immigrants
who do not, as well as the hypothesis that effects may be heterogeneous in observable
skill.
3.4 Empirical Design
The theoretical model in Section 3.3 demonstrates that the if ethnic enclaves serve
as job search networks for new immigrants, then the existence of these networks
can be observed by observing the locational decisions of new immigrants. A key
testable prediction of the model is that immigrants who migrate without a job offer
are more likely to locate in an ethnic enclave than immigrants who arrive with a job
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offer. Therefore, I seek to test for the existence of job search networks by testing this
prediction.
Consider an individual i of ethnic group k living in geographic area j. Then, I
seek to estimate α1 in a model of the form:
Eijk = Φ (α0 + α1Offeri + α2Xi + δk + ηj + νi) (3.10)
Where Xi are individual characteristics, Eijk is a binary measure of whether migrant
i of group k in area j settles in an ethnic enclave, Offeri is a measure of whether
the immigrant had a job offer at the time of his/her migration, δk and ηj are group
and area fixed effects, and νi is a stochastic error term. Ethnic enclaves are defined
as areas of substantially greater immigrant density than the average density for that
ethnic group.
More formally, define ethnic density as follows:
Densityjk =
Number of people from group k in area j
Total population in area j
Number of people from group k
Total population in country
(3.11)
Then, the discrete dependent variable measure of ethnic density is based on
whether the ethnic density exceeds a multiple ω of the national average ethnic density
for that group:
Ejk = 1
(
Densityjk ≥ ωD¯k
)
(3.12)
with ω = 2 in the baseline estimates. Each of these variables is constructed using
Census geographic data. A more detailed description of the construction of these
variables can be found in the Appendix in Table C.1 and Table C.2.
While a binary definition of ethnic enclaves has some intuitive advantages, there is
some evidence to suggest that using a binary dependent variable specification ignores
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considerable heterogeneity in outcomes. Specifically, there is great heterogeneity in
the extent to which different ethnic groups appear to sort themselves into enclaves
(Toussaint-Comeau, 2008), which implies that the set of locations that meet a binary
threshold Ejk based on a fraction of the national average density may be a more or
less selected subset of locations for different ethnic groups. To address this concern,
I also construct a continuous measure of ethnic density using the inverse hyperbolic
sine transformation.8Define:
Djk = ln
(
Densityjk +
(
Density2jk + 1
)1/2)
(3.13)
Then, I run OLS regressions, fitting the model:
Dijk = α0 + α1Offeri + α2Xi + δk + ηj + νi (3.14)
As shown in Section 3.6, the results of the OLS and probit regressions are broadly
similar. Additionally, as shown in Table 3.4, marginal effects are fairly consistent
across a wide range of binary density thresholds.
3.5 Data
3.5.1 The New Immigrant Survey
The New Immigrant Survey (NIS), administered by by the Princeton University Office
of Population Research, is designed to be a nationally-representative multi-cohort
longitudinal study of new legal immigrants to the United States. The first cohort of
immigrants were sampled using administrative data on new migrants from May to
8MacKinnon and Magee (1990) show that the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation has similar
properties to the logarithmic transformation, except that it is defined at 0. However, my main results
are not substantially affected by using the log of ethnic density instead, as Bertrand, Luttmer, and
Mullainathan (2000) and others have done.
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November of 2003, and a baseline survey was conducted between June 2003 and June
2004. In the initial cohort, 12, 500 adults were sampled, along with 1, 250 children.
Of these, there are 8, 573 completed interviews, for a response rate of 68.6%. Since
the sample is designed to be nationally representative, it includes a sample from each
of the top 85 MSAs, each of the top 38 counties, and a random sample of 10 other
MSAs and 15 other counties. A follow-up survey of the first wave of immigrants has
been conducted and recently released for research use, but data from this follow-up
survey is not used in this analysis.9
Each adult immigrant is asked a series of questions about each job that he/she re-
ports having. This includes questions about about occupation, salary, benefits, hours
worked, etc. However, most critically for this analysis, I code the variable Offeri
based on whether immigrant i responds yes to the question Had you been offered this
job before coming to the United States to live? for any of his/her reported jobs. The
survey also asks questions such as Did you get this job with the help of a relative?
and Do any of your relatives work for this business? I use these measures as addi-
tional covariates in some regression specifications, as they are observable measures of
potentially endogenous pre-existing networks. In the Appendix, Table C.1 provides
some information about the questions that I use to code variables from the NIS.
A key feature of the NIS is that it provides an exceedingly broad retrospective
survey. For example, in addition to data on current employment status, the NIS
asks for detailed data on such things as pre-migration industries and occupations,
pre-migration wages, prior migration history, education, language skills, and social
networks. While the Public Use version of the NIS contains limited geographic infor-
mation, the NIS collected data on immigrants' location at the time of the interview
at the ZIP code level, and I match this data to U.S. Census data at the ZIP code
9See http://nis.princeton.edu/project.html and http://nis.princeton.edu/overview.html for fur-
ther information.
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level to calculate local ethnic density and identify ethnic enclaves.
The key empirical challenge of attempting to do this type of analysis with a rep-
resentative sample of the population is that, in general, new immigrants are neither
exogenously offered jobs, nor are they exogenously located in ethnic enclaves. Yet,
any number of characteristics may be correlated with both of these measures, and
these are a potential source of omitted variable bias. For observable characteristics,
the detailed retrospective data contained in the NIS provides clear advantages, as it
allows me to control for such factors as pre-migration wages. The effects of unob-
servable characteristics, however, remain of concern. Like other theoretical models
of migration behavior, (see, e.g. Borjas, 1987; Borjas and Friedberg, 2009), my theo-
retical model shows that selection on unobservable characteristics is likely to occur.
Yet, the instrumental variables methods in the immigration literature either cannot
account for endogenous sorting across metropolitan areas at the time of migration
(Bertrand, Luttmer, and Mullainathan, 2000), or their validity is limited to a small
subset of the immigrant population (Munshi, 2003).
The selection on observables identification strategy of this chapter, then, rests
on the breadth of the NIS dataset to account for variables that could otherwise be
sources of omitted variable bias. In exchange for this limitation, this chapter provides
potentially broader external validity and more precise geographic variation than pre-
vious research. As shown in Section 3.6, using NIS covariates I am able to control
for pre-existing family networks, occupational/industry sorting, limited measures of
cultural attachment, and differences in leisure preferences that yield differences in pre-
migration hours or salaries. I have also undetertaken an analysis using the method of
propensity score matching, which may be somewhat more robust to selection on un-
observables (Angrist and Pischke, 2008). Further discussion of the potential benefits
of this method, as well as results, follow in Section 3.7.
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3.5.2 Data on Ethnic Density
Although the NIS sample is designed to be nationally representative, it is relatively
small and not suitable for calculating the ethnic density of geographic areas. There-
fore, in this chapter, I use Census Bureau data from the SF-3 sample of the 2000
Decennial Census to measure the ethnic density of each ZIP code. Specifically, I con-
sider ethnic groups based on language spoken at home, which is available in both the
NIS and in Census data. I then define both a continuous measure Djk and a binary
measure Ejk for each location-language pair based as described in Section 3.4. Table
C.2 provides some summary information about the manner in which I define ethnic
group membership and density, while Table C.3 provides a list of language groups
included in the model, along with within-group counts.
3.6 Baseline Results
3.6.1 Initial Analysis
I begin my analysis of the new immigrants by looking at overall characteristics of the
immigrants in the NIS, and in particular by looking for potential differences in the
characteristics of immigrants who arrive with a job offer versus immigrants who do
not arrive with such an offer. Table 3.1 presents summary statistics on a variety of
covariates used in my regression specifications, including means and sample standard
errors. As the table shows, immigrants who arrive with a job offer do in fact differ on
a number of key characteristics. Most noticeably, they are substantially more likely
to be highly educated; nearly 80% of immigrants who arrive with a job offer have at
least a Bachelors degree, while only about 40% of immigrants who arrive without an
offer have that much education.
Immigrants who arrive with jobs are also somewhat less likely to have gotten their
current job with the help of a relative. This may suggest that immigrants who do
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not arrive with a job offer may be more reliant on informal network ties even before
migration than immigrants who arrive with an offer, and therefore their decision to
locate in an enclave may be the result of existing network ties rather than the potential
of an enclave to provide them with new ties. I include this variable, as well as the
variable on whether a relative works at the employer, as covariates in my model. The
inclusion of these covariates may not make my model robust to the impact of pre-
existing network ties connecting non-relatives. However, since the majority of visas
granted to new legal immigrants in the United States are awarded based on some
sort of family-related sponsorship, and yet my regressions do not find evidence that
family relationships impact the locational decision, I argue that the impact of these
networks on the likelihood of having a pre-migration offer is likely to be small.
Table 3.1 also shows summary information on income for the portion of the sample
that reports income. All incomes have been converted by the NIS to 2003 U.S. dollars,
using PPP where applicable. However, this leads to some individuals reporting very
high or very low incomes. Therefore, individuals with incomes below $100 and above
$1,000,000 have been removed from the sample (and they have been removed whenever
income is a covariate elsewhere in my analysis as well).10 Individuals who arrive with
a job offer do have incomes that are considerably higher than those of individuals who
arrive without a job offer, both pre-migration and post-migration. However, notably,
the sample suggests that individuals who arrive with a job offer see, on average, their
incomes increase by approximately 55% upon migration. The increase in income for
individuals who arrive without a job offer, however, is not statistically significant.
In the Appendix, I provide additional tables showing additional frequency statis-
tics on who receives a pre-migration job offer and who does not. In general, the
likelihood of receiving a pre-migration offer is quite heterogeneous across occupations
10All reported incomes have been converted to annual incomes based on reported usual hour/week
and usual weeks/year worked. A small number of immigrants report that they are paid daily or
per-unit; these individuals have been dropped from the analysis of income.
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics for New Immigrants
Offered Job Prior To Move Differences
All Yes No Missing Yes -
No
Yes -
(No ∪
Miss)
General Characteristics
Less Than HS 0.281 0.066 0.241 0.353 -0.176 -0.232
(0.005) (0.010) (0.007) (0.008) (0.018) (0.019)
High School 0.227 0.093 0.244 0.232 -0.151 -0.145
(0.005) (0.012) (0.007) (0.007) (0.018) (0.017)
Some College 0.094 0.053 0.109 0.086 -0.056 -0.044
(0.003) (0.009) (0.005) (0.004) (0.013) (0.012)
Bachelors Degree 0.243 0.485 0.234 0.215 0.251 0.260
(0.005) (0.020) (0.007) (0.006) (0.019) (0.018)
Graduate School 0.152 0.302 0.170 0.113 0.133 0.162
(0.004) (0.018) (0.006) (0.005) (0.017) (0.015)
Years of Schooling 12.698 15.997 13.325 11.581 2.672 3.558
(0.056) (0.149) (0.077) (0.084) (0.202) (0.211)
Years of Schooling in U.S. 0.795 0.361 1.157 0.501 -0.797 -0.469
(0.024) (0.051) (0.041) (0.030) (0.105) (0.092)
Female 0.518 0.376 0.405 0.649 -0.029 -0.153
(0.005) (0.019) (0.008) (0.008) (0.021) (0.021)
Year Born 1964 1967 1967 1960 -1 3
(0.146) (0.347) (0.158) (0.252) (0.418) (0.561)
Helped By Relative To Get Job 0.167 0.139 0.174 0.093 -0.035 -0.032
(0.005) (0.014) (0.006) (0.024) (0.016) (0.016)
Relative Works For Company 0.115 0.096 0.114 0.144 -0.018 -0.022
(0.004) (0.012) (0.005) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014)
Offered Job Prior To Move 0.138
(0.005)
N 8,573 625 3,906 4,042
Salary Information (Where Available)
First Post-Migration Job 22,879 50,365 19,182 17,230 27,618 31,849
(674) (2268) (707) (1722) (2137) (1571)
[3,085] [399] [2,155] [531]
Last Pre-Migration Job 20,418 32,486 18,264 19,485 14,222 13,639
(831) (3264) (1066) (1297) (2686) (2592)
[3,040] [350] [1,404] [1,286]
Current 29,147 59,461 24,763 18,498 25,911 35,202
(756) (3,894) (600) (3,983) (1,736) (1,290)
[3,553] [470] [2,966] [117]
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Counts for salary data in brackets. All salaries are reported
in 2003 U.S. dollars; conversions are made in PPP terms where applicable. Salary averages and
counts exclude individuals with reported annual incomes less than $100 or greater than $1,000,000.
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and industries.
3.6.2 Primary Regression Analysis
Table 3.2: Primary regression results: Assignment based on density
of first non-English language
Binary Enclave Indicator (Probit)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Offer at Migration -0.268** -0.256** -0.254** -0.378*** -0.336*** -0.349***
(0.127) (0.123) (0.125) (0.139) (0.129) (0.127)
Years School -0.0177** -0.0181** -0.0123 -0.0169 0.00264
(0.00868) (0.00808) (0.0195) (0.0213) (0.0232)
Age -0.000722 -0.000809 -0.00373 -0.00462 -0.00703**
(0.00265) (0.00256) (0.00378) (0.00299) (0.00333)
Female -0.0525 -0.0537 -0.0904 -0.107 -0.130
(0.0428) (0.0428) (0.0832) (0.107) (0.109)
Married -0.0194 -0.0200 -0.0965 -0.0793 -0.0766
(0.0755) (0.0717) (0.136) (0.149) (0.162)
Separated 0.0838 0.0831 -0.0352 -0.120 -0.126
(0.0620) (0.0603) (0.269) (0.320) (0.342)
Has Children 0.0421 0.0410 0.0295 0.0340 0.0600
(0.0478) (0.0479) (0.0738) (0.0870) (0.0861)
Got Job Relative 0.00456 -0.00891 -0.0101 -0.0936
(0.0913) (0.110) (0.0998) (0.125)
Relative at Emp. -0.0690 -0.0397 -0.0181 -0.0276
(0.0578) (0.153) (0.137) (0.128)
Log Pre-Migration Salary -0.0269 -0.0232
(0.0266) (0.0309)
Pre-Migration Hours 0.00156 0.000852
(0.00194) (0.00228)
Poor English 0.497***
(0.0918)
Religious 0.184*
(0.0970)
Poor Health -0.101
(0.437)
Occ. & Industry No No No No Yes Yes
Pre-Migration Income Sample No No No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3,389 3,372 3,372 1,219 1,219 1,219
Avg. Marginal Effect -0.0889 -0.0847 -0.0839 -0.124 -0.105 -0.108
(0.0427) (0.0413) (0.0420) (0.0451) (0.0406) (0.0393)
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at MSA × language-group. All regressions include
a full set of MSA and language-group fixed effects. Log salary is measured in U.S. 2003 dollars.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 3.2 and Table 3.3 show my initial regression results using the basic specifi-
cations shown in Equations 3.10 and 3.14, respectively Table 3.2 shows the results of
probit regression of my binary measure Ejk on whether one received a pre-migration
offer, as well as a variety of covariates. For reference, the estimated average marginal
effect of the indicator Offeri is also shown at the bottom of the table. Table 3.3 shows
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Table 3.3: Primary regression results (OLS Specification): Assign-
ment based on density of first non-English language
Continuous Enclave Indicator (OLS)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Offer at Migration -0.241** -0.236** -0.235** -0.276*** -0.204*** -0.211***
(0.0995) (0.0938) (0.0957) (0.0793) (0.0622) (0.0644)
Years School -0.0168*** -0.0171*** -0.0162 -0.0206* -0.00851
(0.00391) (0.00373) (0.0107) (0.0124) (0.0134)
Age 8.66e-05 3.69e-05 0.00182 0.00219 0.000595
(0.00174) (0.00169) (0.00412) (0.00340) (0.00288)
Female -0.00809 -0.00892 -0.0103 -0.0440 -0.0533
(0.0370) (0.0576) (0.0567)
Married 0.00645 0.00602 0.00748 0.0155 0.0196
(0.0579) (0.0574) (0.103) (0.115) (0.118)
Separated 0.0980 0.0970 0.201 0.142 0.144
(0.102) (0.101) (0.205) (0.245) (0.255)
Has Children 0.0784*** 0.0776*** 0.0587 0.0615 0.0725
(0.0243) (0.0248) (0.0593) (0.0672) (0.0664)
Got Job Relative 0.00436 0.0321 0.0404 -0.0105
(0.0617) (0.0674) (0.0747) (0.0776)
Relative at Emp. -0.0478 -0.0833 -0.0971 -0.103
(0.0346) (0.120) (0.116) (0.113)
Log Pre-Migration Salary -0.0408*** -0.0355**
(0.0134) (0.0139)
Pre-Migration Hours -0.00233* -0.00282**
(0.00123) (0.00124)
Poor English 0.327***
(0.0865)
Religious 0.0684
(0.0863)
Poor Health 0.0300
(0.218)
Occ. & Industry No No No No Yes Yes
Pre-Migration Income Sample No No No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3,507 3,487 3,487 1,311 1,311 1,311
R-squared 0.337 0.343 0.343 0.392 0.417 0.427
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at MSA × language-group. All regressions include
a full set of MSA and language-group fixed effects. Log salary is measured in U.S. 2003 dollars.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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OLS regression results on my continuous measure of enclave density Djk, with similar
covariate specifications. For each of these regressions, language group k is assigned
using the first non-English language reported to be spoken at home, though the use of
the other measures described in Table C.2 gives me very similar results. All of these
regressions include a full set of language group and geographic area fixed effects, and
they are two-way clustered at the MSA by language-group level to be robust to corre-
lated shocks within language groups within an MSA. The estimated effect of having
a job offer at the time of migration is consistently negative and significant, implying
that immigrants who have received a job offer are in fact less likely to locate in an
ethnic enclave. Additionally, the estimated magnitude of this effect varies little when
one controls for standard demographic covariates and for measures of family-related
job networks. Notably, if one controls for pre-migration salary, hours, occupation and
industry as shown in columns 5 and 6, the magnitude of the effect does not diminish
at all, and as shown in column 4, this does not appear to be driven by the limited
sample for which pre-migration employment information is available. This suggests
that the apparent effect of a job offer is unlikely to be driven solely by selection on
the skill levels of those that receive a job offer. These regressions suggest that a new
immigrant who arrives with a job offer is roughly 8.9% to 10.8% less likely to locate
in an ethnic enclave than an immigrant who arrives without a job offer.
These regression results also show that there is a strong negative relationship
between one's level of schooling and residence in an enclave, even after controlling for
job offers and other covariates. Additionally, individuals who have children appear
to be significantly more likely to locate in an enclave.11 Individuals who report that
they speak English or understand English at a poor level are considerably more likely
to locate in enclaves. Finally, individuals who report relatively low pre-migration
11This binary measure indicates whether the respondent reports that they live with one or more
of their own children under the age of 18.
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salaries and low pre-migration average hours of work are significantly more likely to
locate in an enclave. These coefficients are all consistent with other explanations
that have been proposed for why immigrants locate in enclaves. In particular, they
suggest that the ability to assimilate, leisure preferences, or other preferences may all
play a substantial role in new immigrants' locational decisions. Yet, the significance
and robustness of the effect of a job offer suggests that job market network effects are
important as well.
Finally, it is noteworthy in my results in Tables 3.2 and 3.3 that my measures
of family-based networks, whether one got a job from his/her relative and whether
one's relative works for the company, do not appear to be significantly related to the
decision to locate in an ethnic enclave once other covariates and the reception of a
pre-migration job offer have been controlled for. Although I am unable to control for
pre-existing non-familial networks as a source of selection on who receives a job offer,
this suggests that unobserved networks may be unlikely to a major source of bias in
these estimates.
The probit regression results shown in Table 3.2 suggest sizeable marginal effects
of having a job offer on the probability of locating in an ethnic enclave, where an
enclave is defined as having a population of that group that is twice the national
average proportion. In Table 3.4, I show the marginal effects from probit regressions
based on a variety of alternative thresholds. The results show that the marginal
effects of a job offer are fairly similar even for comparatively restrictive definitions
of what constitutes an enclave area. Additionally, the reported dependent variable
means make it clear that immigrants are in fact highly geographically concentrated in
the U.S.; more than one third of immigrants in the sample live in ZIP codes that have
at least five times the national average proportion of their language group, and more
than a quarter are in ZIP codes that have ten times the national average proportion
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Table 3.4: Marginal Effects in Probit Regressions with Different En-
clave Thresholds
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Language Density ≥ 1× National Avg.
Marginal Effect -0.0606 -0.0573 -0.0570 -0.0734 -0.0753
(0.0256) (0.0239) (0.0246) (0.0214) (0.0222)
Mean Dep. Var. 0.790 0.790 0.790 0.785 0.785
Language Density ≥ 2× National Avg.
Marginal Effect -0.0889 -0.0847 -0.0839 -0.105 -0.108
(0.0427) (0.0413) (0.0420) (0.0406) (0.0393)
Mean Dep. Var. 0.624 0.623 0.623 0.605 0.605
Language Density ≥ 3× National Avg.
Marginal Effect -0.0852 -0.0833 -0.0819 -0.0763 -0.0803
(0.0338) (0.0321) (0.0331) (0.0313) (0.0298)
Mean Dep. Var. 0.502 0.503 0.503 0.480 0.480
Language Density ≥ 4× National Avg.
Marginal Effect -0.0707 -0.0699 -0.0698 -0.0502 -0.0525
(0.0356) (0.0343) (0.0346) (0.0377) (0.0360)
Mean Dep. Var. 0.418 0.419 0.419 0.408 0.408
Language Density ≥ 5× National Avg.
Marginal Effect -0.0665 -0.0641 -0.0645 -0.0385 -0.0413
(0.0353) (0.0345) (0.0351) (0.0310) (0.0304)
Mean Dep. Var. 0.341 0.342 0.342 0.358 0.358
Language Density ≥ 10× National Avg.
Marginal Effect -0.0455 -0.0428 -0.0433 -0.0486 -0.0527
(0.0338) (0.0280) (0.0276) (0.0353) (0.0344)
Mean Dep. Var. 0.269 0.269 0.269 0.285 0.285
Demographics No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Family/Relatives No No Yes Yes Yes
Occ. & Industry No No No Yes Yes
Pre-Migration Salary/Hours No No No Yes Yes
Social Indicators No No No No Yes
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. All regressions include a full set of state/Census divi-
sion and language-group fixed effects. Demographic controls include age, gender, years of schooling,
and marital/parental status indicators. Family controls include indicators for whether an individual
got their job from a relative or has a relative at their employer. Log Salary is measured in U.S.
2003 dollars. Social indicators include self-reported poor English language ability, poor health, and
religiosity.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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of their group.
Table 3.5: Primary regression (OLS Specification) Based on Within-
MSA Variation Only
Continuous Language Density (OLS)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Offer at Migration -0.110* -0.113* -0.111* -0.101 -0.106
(0.0627) (0.0618) (0.0616) (0.108) (0.109)
Demographics No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Family/Relatives No No Yes Yes Yes
Occ. & Industry No No No Yes Yes
Pre-Migration Salary/Hours No No No Yes Yes
Social Indicators No No No No Yes
Observations 3,507 3,487 3,487 1,311 1,311
R-squared 0.557 0.561 0.561 0.629 0.637
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at MSA × language-group (one-way clustering).
All regressions include a full set of MSA, language-group, and MSA × language-group fixed effects.
Demographic controls include age, gender, years of schooling, and marital/parental status indicators.
Family controls include indicators for whether an individual got their job from a relative or has a
relative at their employer. Log Salary is measured in U.S. 2003 dollars. Social indicators include
self-reported poor English language ability, poor health, and religiosity.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Although the theoretical model shown in Section 3.3 describes the locational
choice using a single ethnic density measure, in the real world, locational decisions are
slightly more complicated. In practice, one can think of an immigrant's decision of
where to locate as having two main components: In which metropolitan area should
I locate? and Where within this metropolitan area should I locate? These choices
are made simultaneously. However, if individuals choose where to migrate based on
labor market networks, then one should be able to empirically identify that individ-
uals with a job offer locate in less ethnically-dense neighborhoods, even within the
same metropolitan area. Table 3.5 repeats the baseline OLS regressions, but instead
of including a full set of language group fixed effects plus MSA effects, this analysis
includes a fixed effect for each language-group × MSA combination. Thus, these re-
gressions are identified from only the within-MSA variation in which neighborhoods
individuals choose. These results are clustered one-way at the MSA × language-group
level.
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As Table 3.5 shows, even looking within metropolitan areas, individuals who ar-
rived in the U.S. with a job offer locate in less ethnically dense areas. However, the
magnitude of these estimates is also smaller than the corresponding baseline esti-
mates in Table 3.3, because some portion of the effect of a job offer is the result of
those who arrive with a job offer choosing to live in different metropolitan areas alto-
gether from those who arrive without an offer. The coefficients on all other covariates
are also broadly similar to the baseline regressions. Overall, this provides additional
supportive evidence that labor market effects are a significant factor in immigrants'
locational decisions.
Table 3.6: Regression with Heterogeneous Effects Based on Schooling
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Binary Enclave Indicator (Probit)
Offer at Migration -0.275** -0.279** -0.277** -0.413*** -0.417***
(0.116) (0.113) (0.115) (0.135) (0.143)
Offer × School (Demeaned) 0.0125 0.0121 0.0123 0.0386 0.0343
(0.0197) (0.0198) (0.0189) (0.0338) (0.0341)
Years School (Lang. Group Demeaned) -0.0186** -0.0187** -0.0191*** -0.0235 -0.00343
(0.00750) (0.00778) (0.00738) (0.0261) (0.0281)
Observations 3,381 3,372 3,372 1,219 1,219
Avg. Marginal Effect -0.0870 -0.0884 -0.0876 -0.110 -0.112
(0.0403) (0.0395) (0.0401) (0.0391) (0.0387)
Panel B: Continuous Language Density (OLS)
Offer at Migration -0.224** -0.233** -0.232** -0.234** -0.234**
(0.105) (0.102) (0.103) (0.0950) (0.0963)
Offer × School (Demeaned) -0.000946 -0.00138 -0.00138 0.0146 0.0115
(0.0189) (0.0188) (0.0181) (0.0261) (0.0264)
Years School (Lang. Group Demeaned) -0.0171*** -0.0167*** -0.0170*** -0.0230* -0.0104
(0.00363) (0.00382) (0.00384) (0.0124) (0.0136)
Observations 3,498 3,487 3,487 1,311 1,311
R-squared 0.342 0.343 0.343 0.418 0.427
Demographics No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Family/Relatives No No Yes Yes Yes
Occ. & Industry No No No Yes Yes
Pre-Migration Salary/Hours No No No Yes Yes
Social Indicators No No No No Yes
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at MSA × language-group. All regressions include a
full set of MSA and language-group fixed effects. Demographic controls include age, gender, years of
schooling, and marital/parental status indicators. Family controls include indicators for whether an
individual got their job from a relative or has a relative at their employer. Log Salary is measured in
U.S. 2003 dollars. Social indicators include self-reported poor English language ability, poor health,
and religiosity.Years of Schooling is actual years of schooling less the mean for each individual's
language group.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Next, we will consider the possibility of heterogeneous effects in migration. The
theoretical model suggests that individuals who have a high observable type in the
receiving country will be less likely to locate in an ethnic enclave because they receive
job offers at a relatively higher rate regardless of their location. While the baseline
regression results show that more educated individuals are less likely to locate in
an enclave, they do not allow for the possibility of heterogeneous effects. Table 3.6
repeats the baseline specification using both the binary enclave indicator and the con-
tinuous measure of ethnic density, but it includes an interaction between the reception
of a pre-migration job offer and an individual's years of schooling.12 As discussed in
Section 3.3, under some plausible assumptions, the effect of a job offer on the location
decision will be smaller for individuals with more education, because high-skilled im-
migrants who arrive without a job offer will receive an offer more quickly on average
than low-skilled immigrants who arrive without a job offer. However, my empirical re-
sults do not appear to support this prediction. The interaction effect of an additional
year of schooling is not statistically significant, which suggests that heterogeneity is
not present.13 Yet, when this interaction effect is included, my estimate of the average
marginal effect of having an offer on an immigrant with an average level of education
is virtually unchanged; an immigrant who receives a job offer before migrating is
roughly 8.7% to 11.2% less likely to locate in an ethnic enclave.
12Here, each individual's years of schooling is subtracted from the mean for his/her language
group. Results are similar whether one uses this measure, a raw measure of years of schooling, or
a set of discrete indicators for different levels of educational attainment.
13In other regressions which are not shown here, I have tested for heterogeneous effects using
interactions with English-language ability, as well using interactions with the full set household
characteristics included in the baseline regressions. I find no significant evidence of heterogeneous
effects along any of these dimensions.
162
3.7 Robustness Checks
The results shown in Tables 3.2 and 3.3 are highly suggestive, but there are a number
of potential concerns with the interpretation of these results. For one, immigrants
who arrive to the United States legally and who already have a job offer at the time
of migration are likely to have arrived through an employer-sponsored visa. The
process by which one receives this visa is different than the process for other visa
classifications because employers typically have to show that an immigrant provides
particular skills that are in demand and not that are otherwise available to the firm.
In fact, the majority of immigrants who receive new legal resident status receive it
due to family-sponsored preferences or because they are the direct relatives of existing
U.S. citizens. (2011 Yearbook of Immigration Statistics 2012) To the extent that these
employer-sponsored individuals may be different from non-sponsored individuals in
unobservable ways (such as unobserved differences in underlying preferences), they
may bias our estimates of labor market effects.
Table 3.7: Frequencies of Offer At Migration vs. Employee Sponsor-
ship in the NIS
Employee Sponsorship
Had at Migration No Yes
# % of Row # % of Row Total
No 2,668 68.3% 1,238 31.7% 3,906
Yes 89 14.2% 536 85.8% 625
Total 2,757 60.8% 1,774 39.2% 4,531
Source: New Immigrant Survey.
One potential solution to this issue would be to run regressions on a sample
consisting of only those individuals who were not employer-sponsored. Then, the
effect of a job offer would reflect the impact of a job offer only for those who are not
observably. However, as Table 3.7 shows, the NIS is too small to have much power in
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conducting such an analysis. Over 85% of individuals who arrived in the U.S. with
a job offer are sponsored by their employers, and only 89 individuals in the sample
had an offer at migration but were not employer sponsored. Accordingly, the baseline
results are insignificant when run on this subsample.
Table 3.8: Regression with Interaction Based on Employer Sponsor-
ship (Probit)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Binary Enclave Indicator (Probit)
Employer Sponsored -0.0819 -0.0722 -0.114* -0.295*** -0.258**
(0.0519) (0.0514) (0.0683) (0.109) (0.123)
Years School -0.0162** -0.0176** -0.0177 0.00111
(0.00757) (0.00866) (0.0217) (0.0233)
Age -0.00139 -0.000818 -0.00458* -0.00673**
(0.000906) (0.00267) (0.00264) (0.00303)
Female -0.0599 -0.0612 -0.131 -0.154
(0.0555) (0.0439) (0.114) (0.117)
Married -0.0195 -0.00684 -0.0932 -0.0894
(0.0448) (0.0705) (0.145) (0.158)
Separated 0.0191 0.119 -0.105 -0.106
(0.0392) (0.0788) (0.321) (0.345)
Has Children 0.0465*** 0.0333 0.0312 0.0526
(0.0164) (0.0474) (0.0903) (0.0907)
Got Job Relative 0.00254 -0.0425 -0.129
(0.0849) (0.0968) (0.123)
Relative at Emp. -0.0855* -0.0490 -0.0492
(0.0505) (0.135) (0.125)
Log Pre-Migration Salary -0.0276 -0.0234
(0.0250) (0.0292)
Pre-Migration Hours 0.000606 -0.000100
(0.00199) (0.00239)
Occ. & Industry No No No Yes Yes
Demographics No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Family/Relatives No No Yes Yes Yes
Pre-Migration Salary/Hours No No No Yes Yes
Social Indicators No No No No Yes
Observations 6,388 6,349 3,413 1,231 1,231
Avg. Marginal Effect -0.0264 -0.0232 -0.0369 -0.0911 -0.0784
(0.0168) (0.0167) (0.0227) (0.0334) (0.0375)
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at state/Census division × language-group. All
regressions include a full set of state/Census division and language-group fixed effects. Demographic
controls include age, gender, years of schooling, and marital/parental status indicators. Family
controls include indicators for whether an individual got their job from a relative or has a relative at
their employer. Log Salary is measured in U.S. 2003 dollars. Social indicators include self-reported
poor English language ability, poor health, and religiosity.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
An alternative strategy, which I show in Table 3.8, is to re-run the baseline regres-
sions with an indicator for employer sponsorship instead of an indicator for receiving
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a job offer. These results are very similar to the baseline regression results. In par-
ticular, the effects on other covariates change little relative to the baseline analysis,
which we might expect if employer sponsorship is highly correlated with these other
covariates. Thus, while it remains possible that employer-sponsored individuals are
systematically different from non-sponsored individuals, there is no strong evidence
to suggest that these individuals are a source of bias in the baseline estimates.
3.7.1 Propensity Score Analysis
As discussed above, the types of individuals who receive job offers are on average
more highly educated and with higher incomes than individuals who do not receive
offers. Large differences in average observable covariates may complicate the usual
concerns about endogeneity in regression results. For example, when the true effects
of observable covariates on an outcome are nonlinear, then the endogeneity bias from
omitted variables that are correlated with these covariates will be magnified.
The method of propensity score matching is a close relative of traditional regres-
sion analysis that may be beneficial in situations where these concerns exist. More
properly, OLS can be understood as a matching estimator with a particular weighting
scheme (Angrist and Pischke, 2008). In essence, propensity score matching creates
a unique set of control observations for each treatment observation (treatment being
defined in this case as the receipt of a job offer before migration). This puts the
highest weight in analysis on individuals with the highest probability of treatment.
Ordinary Least Squares, in contrast, puts the highest weight on individuals with the
highest variance in regressors.
Some analysis, especially in the literature on job training programs, has suggested
that the method of propensity score matching may be beneficial in situations where
the broader population differs from the treatment group (Dehejia and Wahba, 2002).
In the job training case, endogeneity bias arises from the fact that individuals seeks
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job training are disproportionately likely to have received an unobservable negative
income shock in the recent past. In my model, the potential for endogeneity arises
from the possibility that pre-migration immigrant networks are simply less strong for
the types of immigrants who tend to receive pre-migration job offers, or that immi-
grants who receive pre-migration job offers have systematically different preferences
from those who do not. Thus, in this subsection I undertake a preliminary application
of propensity score matching estimators to identify the average treatment effect of
receiving a job offer prior to migration on the decision to locate in an ethnic enclave.
A key requirement of propensity score matching methods is that there be common
support over the distributions of covariates. If the assumption of common support is
violated, then the set of suitable control observations for each treatment observation
will be small or nonexistent, causing these observations to be dropped from the anal-
ysis. Figure 3·1 and Figure 3·2 provide kernel density estimates of the pre-migration
salaries and total current salaries of individuals who received a pre-migration offer
and those who did not. Figure 3·3 provide a dual bar chart showing the density of the
distribution of years of schooling for individuals who received a pre-migration offer
and those who did not. As expected from the results in Table 3.1, the distributions of
these variables are not identical, and individuals who received a pre-migration offer
have more schooling and higher salaries on average. However, it appears from these
graphs that the assumption of common support is generally met.
Figures 3·4 and 3·5 show histograms of the propensity scores produced by my
initial probit regressions of receiving a pre-migration job offer or having an employer
sponsored visa on the covariates reported in Table 3.2, as well as the square of the
continuous variables years of school, age, and pre-migration income.14 Again, it
does appear that the assumption of common support is met, but the distribution
14The inclusion of these polynomial terms is suggested by Angrist and Pischke (2008) and employed
by Dehejia and Wahba (2002).
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Figure 3·1: Kernel Density Estimation of Pre-Migration Salary
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Kernel density plot using an Epanechnikov kernel with bandwidth of $1,000.  Excludes
individuals earning less than $5,000 or more than $200,000.
Figure 3·2: Kernel Density Estimation of Current Salary
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individuals earning less than $5,000 or more than $200,000.
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Figure 3·3: Distribution of Years of Schooling
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Excludes individuals reporting more than 30 years of school.
of propensity scores for individuals who did not receive a job offer is comparatively
skewed to the less in both cases and is relatively less dense at high propensity scores.
While this does suggest that the method of propensity score matching may lead to
improved estimates in this case, it also suggests that the power of propensity score
estimates may be relatively low.
Table 3.9 shows the results of propensity score matching methodology, using an
Epanechnikov kernel matching method with default bandwidth assumptions. Because
the standard errors produced by propensity score estimates make strong assumptions
about homoskedasticity, I provide bootstrapped standard errors for these propensity
score estimates. In general, my preliminary propensity score estimates are reasonably
similar in magnitude to the estimates of average marginal effects in my initial probit
168
Figure 3·4: Comparison of Propensity Scores for Pre-Migration Job
Offer
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Figure 3·5: Comparison of Propensity Scores for Employer Sponsor-
ship
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Table 3.9: Estimated Avg. Treatment Effects Using Propensity Score
Analysis
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Offer At Migration Employer Sponsored
Outcome Measure: Binary Continuous Binary Continuous
Avg. Treatment Effect -0.0251 -0.209 -0.112*** -0.202**
(0.0746) (0.145) (0.0363) (0.0877)
Observations 1,150 1,102 1,343 1,261
Notes: Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses. Estimates of the average treatment effect of
having a job offer at migration or being employer sponsored are computed using the Epanechnikov
kernel with default bandwidth. Propensity scores are computed via probit regression including all
covariates presented in column (5) of the primary regression specification table, as well as the square
of each continuous variable. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
and OLS regressions, and in my regressions based with an employer sponsorship
interaction. However, the standard errors of these estimates are larger, and so these
results are in general no longer statistically significant at standard levels of confidence.
Once I have access to more disaggregated geographic data, I expect that further
analysis will provide me with additional insights.
Finally, I consider as a robustness check the suggestion of Angrist and Pischke
(2008) that the initial probit scores used in propensity score matching may be used
to limit the sample considered by more traditional regression methods. They suggest
that when selection is a concern, that trimming from the sample individuals with
very high or very low propensity scores may improve OLS estimates, and they show
this phenomenon using an example from the literature on job training programs.
Accordingly, Table 3.10 replicates my primary regression specifications, but excluding
those individuals with a propensity score less than 0.1 or greater than 0.9, similar
to what Angrist and Pischke did. The estimates that I produce using this method
are generally quite similar to those produced using the baseline standard probit and
OLS regressions. Even though the sample size is much smaller in these sample-
trimmed regressions, they continue to show that individuals who received a job offer
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Table 3.10: Regressions With Trimmed Sample Excluding Individuals
with Low and High Propensity Scores
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Binary Enclave Indicator (Probit)
Offer at Migration -0.309** -0.317** -0.317** -0.373*** -0.382***
(0.151) (0.146) (0.144) (0.129) (0.120)
Observations 589 589 589 574 574
Avg. Marginal Effect -0.0940 -0.0951 -0.0950 -0.100 -0.0999
(0.0439) (0.0414) (0.0405) (0.0327) (0.0292)
Panel B: Continuous Language Density (OLS)
Offer at Migration -0.236*** -0.235*** -0.233*** -0.154*** -0.159**
(0.0886) (0.0804) (0.0819) (0.0586) (0.0629)
Observations 601 601 601 601 601
R-squared 0.391 0.401 0.403 0.460 0.472
Demographics No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Family/Relatives No No Yes Yes Yes
Pre-Migration Salary/Hours No No No Yes Yes
Social Indicators No No No No Yes
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. All regressions include a full set of state/Census divi-
sion and language-group fixed effects. Demographic controls include age, gender, years of schooling,
and marital/parental status indicators. Family controls include indicators for whether an individual
got their job from a relative or has a relative at their employer. Log Salary is measured in U.S.
2003 dollars. Social indicators include self-reported poor English language ability, poor health, and
religiosity. Excludes individuals with a propensity score from probit estimation of less than 0.1 or
greater than 0.9, using the same propensity scoring method as in Table 3.9.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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are roughly 10% less likely to locate in an ethnic enclave, and that this result is
statistically significant.
3.8 Conclusion
In order to improve our understanding of ethnic enclaves, we need to understand why
they form, and how and why some individuals elect to locate in them upon migration,
while others do not. However, isolating the factors that influence the locational
decision of new immigrants poses multiple empirical challenges. Living in an ethnic
enclave may provide new immigrants not only with improved job search prospects,
but also a wide range of social and economic benefits.15 Furthermore, it is reasonable
to expect that many of these benefits may accrue to immigrants regardless of whether
they are employed or unemployed, and it is also plausible that some of these benefits
may be correlated with the the likelihood of receiving a job offer in the first place. Yet,
new immigrants are not randomly assigned to jobs, nor are they typically randomly
assigned treatment along any other dimensions that we might expect to strongly
influence their locational decisions. But, as I show in this chapter, individuals who
arrive in the U.S. with a job offer already in hand have different characteristics from
those who arrive without an offer. Absent cleaner sources of exogenous variation, the
best we may hope for is to control carefully for these differences.
Still, by taking advantage of the detailed data and the representative sample of
the New Immigrant Survey, this chapter shows that immigrants who arrive with a job
offer are considerably less likely to locate in an ethnic enclave area, even after carefully
controlling for a wide range of observable pre-migration characteristics. These results
are also robust to numerous alternative specifications, and they are relatively free of
concerns related to reverse causality. In keeping with the theoretical predictions of
15See, e.g., Bertrand, Luttmer, and Mullainathan (2000) and Patel and Vella (2012).
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my model, this provides strong evidence that immigrants do locate in ethnic enclaves
for reasons related to job search, and that this affects locational decisions both within
and across metropolitan areas.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, regression analysis also provides suggestive evidence that
several other factors influence the locational decision of migrants. Individuals who
report that they speak English poorly or who have relatively low levels of education are
more likely to locate in enclaves. So are individuals who had relatively low salaries or
who worked relatively few hours pre-migration, given their occupation and industry.
These findings support the notions that immigrants sort themselves into enclaves
in part based on their personal preferences, their productive capacity, and/or their
ability to assimilate.
Finally, this chapter also suggests additional avenues for research. In particular,
I somewhat surprisingly find no significant evidence of heterogeneous effects of a
job offer on locational choices. That is, the reduced likelihood of enclave residence
associated with a job offer is the same whether an individual is highly educated or
has little education. While I cannot rule out the role of sample size limitations, this
suggests that the probability of job offers to immigrants may have little relationship
to their own education. It also suggests that the patterns of negative selection into
enclave residence are unlikely to be driven by the existence of job search networks
alone. Both of these observations warrant further inquiry.
Contemporary immigration policy debates, particularly in the United States, re-
main heavily focused on issues related to the selection of immigrants. Proposed policy
changes, such as restrictions on family reunification visas and moves toward points-
based systems that reward pre-existing employment, might not only alter the set of
immigrants who migrate. They may also have a particular influence on the demand
for and the quality of the job search networks that immigrants exploit. And, as this
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chapter suggests, these policy changes may alter the locational decisions of migrants
as well, with ramifications for the geographic distribution of immigrant groups that
could persist far into the future. Isolating the mechanisms associated with locational
choice remains a significant empirical challenge, but with additional research, there
may be much more to learn about the role of policy and networks both in immigrants'
economic outcomes and in broader patterns of regional economic activity.
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Appendix A
Chapter 1 Appendices
A.1 Description of the PNAD Household Survey Data
The Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicilios (PNAD) is an annual survey of
Brazilian households that is conducted in all non-Census years. It asks questions of
household inhabitants regarding a wide range of topics, including detailed information
on current employment. For the purposes of this paper, I seek to understand the
impact that labor market informality has on the competitiveness of formal sector
labor markets. Therefore, I use the PNAD data to construct an occupation by state
measure of labor market formality as follows.
By definition, a formal sector worker is in possession of a carteira de trabalho
assinada for their primary employment. Therefore, I define individuals in PNAD
who report that they possess a carteira as formalized. Because my analysis focuses
on private sector employment, I exclude government and military employees. I also
exclude individuals who report did not report that they possess a carteira, but who
report that they were self-employed or an employer themselves. For the purposes of
Figure 1·4, public sector and self-employed workers are classified as neither formal
nor informal.
Like many public use microdata, the PNAD data report households at a relatively
coarse geographic level to inhibit identification of individuals. In this case, data are
reported at the state level, which I am able to map to the Brazilian micro-region level.
In keeping with the notion that labor market decisions are heavily both local and
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occupation-specific, I also seek to exploit variation in occupation-specific conditions,
and so I allow this measure of variation to vary at the state by occupation level. Unlike
the RAIS data, which report occupational codes using the Brazil-specific Classificaçao
Brasileira de Ocupaçoes (CBO) classification, the PNADmicrodata report occupation
information using the internationally standard ISCO-88 classification system. I map
two-digit ISCO-88 codes to Brazilian CBO codes using a concordance constructed
by Muendler et al. (2004). Since this does not provide a one-to-one occupational
mapping, where multiple ISCO codes map to a single CBO code, I weight the data by
the proportions of respondents in the PNAD data who report each ISCO occupation.
Finally, because it is likely that changes in the degree of formalization over time
are reflective, I use only initial degree of labor market formality in heterogeneous
effects regressions, incorporating data from the 1992, 1993, and 1995 PNAD surveys
to reduce noise arising from the small sample sizes in occupation groups.1
Therefore, my final measure of labor market formality is:
Formalitys,o =
Nformal,s,o
Ns,o
(A.1)
where Nformal,s,o is the number of formal-sector workers in state s and occupation
o in 1992-1995, and Ns,o is total reported employment in that same occupation and
state at that time.
A.2 Additional Figures and Results
1There was no PNAD survey conducted in 1994 because the Brazilian Census was conducted in
that year.
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Figure A·1: Unadjusted Age Wage Profile in New Worker Sample,
All Years
Notes: From the RAIS new worker sample, 1995-2014.
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Figure A·2: Tenure Wage Profiles, Indexed by New Local Worker
Average Occupational Wage
Notes: From the RAIS work history sample, 1995-2014. Mean wage and in-
terquartile range are indexed, where 100 is the mean wage for new (< 1 year
of tenure) workers of the same occupation in the same Brazilian micro-region in
that year.
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Figure A·3: Probability of Voluntary and Non-voluntary Separation
by Years of Tenure
Notes: From the RAIS work history sample, 1995-2014. Voluntary and Non-
Voluntary separation are as categorized in Table A.1
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Table A.1: Job Separation Codes Reported in RAIS, 1995-2014
# Label Translation % of Separations
Voluntary Separations
20 desl com jc resigned with just cause 0.23%
21 desl sem jc resigned without just cause 20.11%
31 trans s/onus transfer with cost to worker 5.36%
71 apos ts sres retirement - length of service without
contract termination
0.17%
78 apos id sres retirement - age without contract termi-
nation
0.01%
80 apos esp sre retirement - special without contract
termination
0.01%
All Voluntary Separations 25.88%
Non-Voluntary Separations
10 dem com jc terminated with just cause 1.52%
11 dem sem jc terminated without just cause 52.78%
12 term contr end of contract 18.03%
30 trans c/onus transfer with cost to firm 0.71%
40 mud. regime change of labor regime 0.06%
50 reforma military reform - paid reserves 0.06%
60 falecimento demise, death 0.33%
62 falec ac trb death - at work accident 0.01%
63 falec ac tip death - at work accident corp 0.00%
64 falec d prof death - work related illness 0.00%
70 apos ts cres retirement - length of service with con-
tract termination
0.28%
72 apos id cres retirement - age with contract termina-
tion
0.04%
73 apos in acid retirement - disability from work acci-
dent
0.02%
74 apos in doen retirement - disability from work illness 0.02%
75 apos compuls retirement - mandatory 0.04%
76 apos in outr retirement - other disability 0.05%
79 apos esp cre retirement - special with contract termi-
nation
0.01%
All Non-Voluntary Separations 73.97%
Unknown/Other
-1, 22, 32-34, 90 Unknown/Other/No description avail-
able
0.14%
Notes: Percentages are calculated from all reported job separation events in RAIS, 1995-2014.
English code translations from Lavetti and Schmutte (2016).
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Table A.2: OLS Estimates of the Establishment Size Wage Premium
in Brazil
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Log Earnings Log Earnings Log Earnings Log Earnings
Log Estab. Size 0.0690*** 0.00270 0.0512*** 0.0722***
(0.00471) (0.00289) (0.00235) (0.00333)
Observations 12,092,453 12,017,918 10,793,031 12,065,801
Adjusted R-squared 0.341 0.629 0.815 0.580
Estab. FEs No Yes No No
Individual FEs No No Yes No
Occ-Micro-Year FEs No No No Yes
Num. Clusters 397,556 323,021 358,852 396,372
Notes: Each result is from a regression of individual log December wages on establishment size, with
columns 2-4 including one dimension of fixed effects as specified. All other controls are as in Table
1.2. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by establishment. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table A.3: First-Stage Regressions for Baseline Wage-Setting IV
Strategies
(1) (2) (3) (4)
IV: Other
Occs
IV: Other
Estabs.
IV: Other
Es-
tabs./Occs.
IV: Other
Occs.
Other Input Growth .3941232 .2571539 .1031151 .6412474
(.0059599) (.0111438) (.0102324) (.0089956)
Individual FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Establishment FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Occ-Micro-Year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
K-P F Stat 4,373 532.5 101.6 5,082
Notes: Dependent variable in all regressions is DHS index of own-establishment own-occupation
employment growth. In column 1, "Other Input Growth" is DHS index of other occupations within
the same establishment, in columns 2 and 4 it is the same occupation within the same establish-
ment, and in column 3 it is other occupations within the same establishment, corresponding to
columns 2, 3, 4 and 6 of Table 1.2. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by establishment.
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Table A.4: New Worker Wage Regressions Over Shorter Periods
All Establishments Multi-Region, Multi-Estab. Firms
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS IV: Other Occs. IV: Other
Estabs.
IV: Other
Occs./Estabs.
Panel A: 1995-2001
Occ. Growth 0.00326*** 0.00844 0.0435*** 0.124*
(0.000612) (0.00542) (0.0147) (0.0696)
Observations 2,098,000 1,944,169 434,638 625,932
Adjusted R-squared 0.894
K-P F Stat 439.3 39.99 10.75
Panel B: 2002-2008
Occ. Growth 0.00448*** 0.0183*** 0.0162 0.0670
(0.000654) (0.00316) (0.00993) (0.0424)
Observations 3,167,182 2,979,514 769,224 1,005,043
Adjusted R-squared 0.894
K-P F Stat 210 810.6 13.50
Panel C: 2008-2014
Occ. Growth 0.00596*** 0.0185*** 0.00397 0.0634***
(0.000592) (0.00164) (0.00461) (0.0136)
Observations 4,408,500 4,201,445 1,177,606 1,470,986
Adjusted R-squared 0.885
K-P F Stat 264.9 660.6 49.51
Estab. FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Occ-Micro-Year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: All regression specifications shown are as in the baseline regressions of Table 1.2, but
with the panel period restricted to the seven-year interval shown. Standard errors reported in
parentheses are two-way clustered by firm and micro-region. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A.5: New Worker Wage Regressions Excluding Fixed Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS IV: Other Occs. IV: Other
Estabs.
IV: Other
Occs./Estabs.
Panel A: Excluding Individual FEs
Occ. Growth 0.00215*** 0.0237*** 0.00265 0.0758**
(0.000549) (0.00255) (0.00419) (0.0323)
Observations 11,067,007 10,505,513 3,041,058 3,860,114
Adjusted R-squared 0.734
K-P F Stat 223.2 662.6 67.04
Panel B: Excluding Establishment FEs
Occ. Growth 0.00166 0.00901*** -0.00576 -0.0213
(0.00107) (0.00333) (0.00507) (0.0232)
Observations 9,895,100 9,329,615 2,470,999 3,209,726
Adjusted R-squared 0.829
K-P F Stat 379.2 736.9 165
Panel C: Excluding Local Labor Market FEs
Occ. Growth 0.00851*** 0.0143*** 0.0204*** 0.0643**
(0.000516) (0.00306) (0.00375) (0.0289)
Observations 9,875,692 9,324,578 2,475,797 3,218,512
Adjusted R-squared 0.858
K-P F Stat 373.2 513.2 70.03
Notes: All regression specifications shown are as in the baseline regressions of Table 1.2, but with
one category of fixed effects excluded from the regression specifications in each panel. Standard
errors reported in parentheses are two-way clustered by firm and micro-region. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Chapter 2 Appendices
B.1 Proof of Proposition 2
Assume that there exists a profit maximizing equilibrium in which there exists an
interval of tasks S = [s, s¯] over which two employees, i and i′, are each involved in
production.
By profit maximization, it also follows that the marginal product of each worker's
time must be the same at each point in the interval. That is:
∂Y (s)
Ti (s)
=
∂Y (s)
Ti′ (s)
for all s in the overlapping interval. Since the ordering of tasks in production is
arbitrary, the assumption that S is compact is of no consequence here.
Additionally, assume without loss of generality that employee i is engaged in task-
specific human capital investment along this interval. Then, from equal marginal
product of time, it follows that there exists an  > 0 such that by partitioning S at the
point s + , allocating all production performed by i′ to i in [s, s + ], and allocating
all production performed by i to i′ in [s + , s¯], the overall level of production is
maintained, and both employees' time constraints are satisfied.
However, from (2.7), it follows that the marginal product of time of worker i will
be increased by this reallocation, implying that i can produce more output. And,
since the marginal product of time of worker i′ cannot decrease as a result of this
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reollocation, the overlapping initial allocation cannot be an optimum.
B.2 Proof of Proposition 3
Suppose that employee i produces intermediate goods s and s′. Then it follows from
Proposition 2 and from profit maximization that:
∂Yi (s)
∂Ti (s)
=
∂Yi (s
′)
∂Ti (s′)
which from (2.7) is shown to be true only if Ti (s) = Ti (s′). The constraint that η <
1
1+θ
is a sufficient condition to ensure that this equal time allocation maximizes profit,
otherwise tasks may be sufficiently substitutable that there exists no equilibrium in
which workers perform a finite measure of tasks.
To see the second result, observe that since all workers who specialize are identical
(and since firms cannot wage discriminate based on information about worker-specific
preferences that they cannot observe), any within-firm equilibrium must involve all
workers receiving equal compensation, and therefore by cost minimization they must
have identical marginal product. Since, by assumption, firms must allocate workers
over the entire unit interval of production tasks, this can only be true if |si| = 1n∗f .
B.3 Additional Tables
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Table B.1: Baseline Regressions: Using O*NET Categorization
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log Log Log Log Log Log
Earnings Earnings Earnings Earnings Earnings Earnings
Mean Cognitive Skills 0.429*** 0.203*** 0.0774** 0.0768*** 0.0662*** 0.0818***
(0.0337) (0.0206) (0.0301) (0.0204) (0.0186) (0.0152)
Mean Production Skills 0.172* 0.198*** 0.0831** 0.0838*** 0.0943*** 0.0563***
(0.0906) (0.0491) (0.0392) (0.0227) (0.0204) (0.0172)
Gini Cognitive Skills -0.0263 -0.0273 0.0119 0.00965 0.0155 0.0241**
(0.0455) (0.0286) (0.0234) (0.0166) (0.0166) (0.0122)
Gini Production Skills 0.122* 0.0821** 0.0563* 0.0577*** 0.0617*** 0.0415***
(0.0715) (0.0365) (0.0319) (0.0215) (0.0209) (0.0160)
Individual Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Occupational Controls None None Two-digit Two-digit Two-digit Two-digit
Employer Controls None None None Subsector Sub.+Controls Estab. FEs
Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered by CBO occupation. From a 100% sample of eligible
worker-year observations from RAIS. Mean skill in each group is measured as the average of skill within 6
broad O*NET categories, weighted equally. Gini of Cognitive skill is measured as the Gini of skill across the
same broad O*NET categories. Gini of Production Skills is in Table 2.7 because all Production skills are
within the Technical category of O*NET skills. All specifications include year controls. Individual controls
include linear and quadratic terms in age, potential experience, and job tenure, four educational indicators,
and nationality indicators. Unreported establishment controls include log establishment size and proportions
of workers in each of five occupation categories eight age groups and four educational categories excluding the
individual. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table B.2: Baseline Regressions: Alternative Skill Measures
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log Log Log Log Log Log
Earnings Earnings Earnings Earnings Earnings Earnings
Theil Index
Mean Cognitive Skills 0.411*** 0.188*** 0.0636** 0.0580*** 0.0586*** 0.0670***
(0.0423) (0.0238) (0.0323) (0.0208) (0.0188) (0.0151)
Mean Production Skills 0.173** 0.192*** 0.0632** 0.0708*** 0.0776*** 0.0454***
(0.0703) (0.0388) (0.0320) (0.0161) (0.0159) (0.0134)
Theil Cognitive Skills -0.0510 -0.0365 0.0157 0.0406** 0.0469*** 0.0400***
(0.0361) (0.0227) (0.0247) (0.0171) (0.0169) (0.0139)
Theil Production Skills 0.0966* 0.0616** 0.0291 0.0348*** 0.0361*** 0.0242***
(0.0526) (0.0265) (0.0192) (0.0121) (0.0113) (0.00833)
Theil Between Groups -0.00396 -0.0125 -0.0275 -0.0376** -0.0261 -0.0289**
(0.0350) (0.0242) (0.0237) (0.0169) (0.0163) (0.0139)
Observations 59,803,061 59,696,420 59,696,420 59,696,420 59,200,644 59,696,420
Adjusted R-squared 0.317 0.524 0.575 0.659 0.684 0.820
Standard Deviation of Skills
Mean Cognitive Skills 0.459*** 0.222*** 0.0604* 0.0485** 0.0311 0.0478**
(0.0355) (0.0214) (0.0345) (0.0233) (0.0223) (0.0189)
Mean Production Skills 0.105** 0.148*** 0.0656*** 0.0516*** 0.0546*** 0.0272**
(0.0507) (0.0260) (0.0234) (0.0157) (0.0136) (0.0122)
SD Cognitive Skills -0.0216 -0.00614 0.0178 0.0239* 0.0285** 0.0241**
(0.0389) (0.0234) (0.0198) (0.0140) (0.0133) (0.0112)
SD Production Skills 0.0177 0.0216 0.0463*** 0.0278*** 0.0248*** 0.0142*
(0.0300) (0.0167) (0.0155) (0.0104) (0.00954) (0.00777)
Observations 59,803,061 59,696,420 59,696,420 59,696,420 59,200,644 59,696,420
Adjusted R-squared 0.312 0.522 0.576 0.659 0.684 0.820
Individual Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Occupational Controls None None Two-digit Two-digit Two-digit Two-digit
Employer Controls None None None Subsector Sub.+Controls Estab. FEs
Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered by CBO occupation. From a 100% sample of eligible
worker-year observations from RAIS. All specifications include year controls. Individual controls include linear
and quadratic terms in age, potential experience, and job tenure, four educational indicators, and nationality
indicators. Unreported establishment controls include log establishment size and proportions of workers in
each of five occupation categories eight age groups and four educational categories excluding the individual.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table C.1: Description of Key Variables in the New Immigrant Survey
Variable NIS Questions Response Coding
Had At Migration "Had you been offered this job
before coming to the United
States to live?"
1 if yes for any current job
Got Job Relative "Did you get this job with the
help of a relative of yours or
your husband/wife?"
1 if yes for any current job
Relative At Emp. "Do any of your, or your hus-
band/wife's relatives work for
this business"
1 if yes for any current job
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Table C.2: Description of Enclave Measures Using U.S. Census and
NIS Data
Key Definitions
List of Languages (NIS) "What languages do you currently speak at home?"
Binary threshold 2× National Avg. % Spoken
Continuous measure ln
 Local % Spoken
Nat'l Avg. % Spoken
+
((
Local % Spoken
Nat'l Avg. % Spoken
)2
+ 1
)1/2
Methods of Individual Group Assigment
Measure used Method of group assignment
Results shown
First Lang. The first non-English language reported to be spoken by each immi-
grant (results reported).
Robustness checks (available on request)
Lang. Density The reported language with the highest local percentage density rela-
tive to its national average
Abs. Lang. Density The reported language with the highest local percentage density
Notes: All enclaves are defined at the ZIP code level using data from the 2000 Census, SF-3
Sample, available at http://factfinder2.census.gov/.
Table C.3: New Immigrant Survey Language Groups
Group ID Language Number of Speakers as First Language
2 Spanish 2,312
3 Portuguese 51
4 Russian 284
5 French 83
6 Arabic 226
7 Chinese 501
8 Tagalog 257
9 Vietnamese 181
10 Korean 126
11 Bengali 57
12 Hindi 107
13 Polish 173
14 Amharic 162
15 Creole 111
16 Other European 410
17 Other Non-European 586
18 Other Spoken in Philippines 75
19 Other Spoken in India 541
20 Other 2
Notes: Counts are as provided by NIS in response to the question "What languages do you
currently speak at home?". English is excluded from analysis.
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Table C.4: Key Variables By Education Group
Offered Job Prior
To Move
Helped By Rela-
tive To Get Job
Relative Works
For Company
Less Than HS 0.038 0.267 0.186
(0.006) (0.014) (0.012)
[923] [940] [1,060]
High School 0.096 0.272 0.140
(0.018) (0.026) (0.019)
[281] [287] [321]
Some College 0.072 0.157 0.093
(0.012) (0.017) (0.013)
[447] [458] [486]
Bachelors Degree 0.249 0.105 0.077
(0.012) (0.009) (0.007)
[1,215] [1,263] [1,359]
Graduate School 0.222 0.051 0.053
(0.014) (0.007) (0.007)
[851] [895] [944]
Unknown/No Answer 0.048 0.242 0.157
(0.007) (0.015) (0.012)
[814] [839] [903]
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Counts in brackets.
Table C.5: Frequency of Pre-Migration Offers by Occupational Group
Received Pre-Migration Offer
Occupation Yes No Missing Total
OFFICE AND ADMIN. SUPPORT 4.0% 12.3% 13.5% 12.1%
SALES AND RELATED 7.1% 11.4% 13.1% 11.8%
EXEC., ADMIN. AND MANAGERIAL 11.5% 9.3% 10.8% 10.2%
TEACHERS 4.7% 7.0% 8.9% 7.6%
SETTER, OPERATORS, AND TENDERS 3.3% 7.5% 7.1% 7.0%
MATH. AND COMPUTER SCIENTISTS 16.9% 6.8% 2.0% 5.6%
HEALTH DIAG. AND TREAT. PRACTIT. 18.8% 3.5% 4.7% 5.4%
TRANSP. AND MAT. MOVING 1.3% 4.5% 3.9% 4.0%
MANAGEMENT RELATED 2.9% 3.3% 4.6% 3.8%
CONSTRUCTION TR. AND EXTRACTION 0.9% 4.8% 3.2% 3.7%
ENGINEERS, ARCHITECTS, SURVEYORS 6.4% 3.1% 2.7% 3.2%
FARMING, FISHING, FORESTRY 0.4% 3.6% 3.4% 3.2%
FOOD PREPARATIONS AND SERVING 4.9% 3.3% 2.3% 3.0%
INSTALLATION, MAINTENANCE, AND REPAIR 1.1% 3.5% 2.7% 3.0%
Total (including omitted) 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Percentage Reporting Pre-Migration Occupation 72.2% 60.5% 55.9% 59.2%
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Table C.6: Frequency of Pre-Migration Offers by Industry Group
Received Pre-Migration Offer
Occupation Yes No Missing Total
EDUC., HEALTH, SOCIAL SVCS. 25.9% 14.0% 17.9% 16.8%
MANUFACTURING 12.6% 13.2% 13.0% 13.1%
PROFESSIONAL AND RELATED SVCS. 22.4% 11.6% 9.1% 11.4%
RETAIL TRADE 4.9% 10.4% 10.5% 10.0%
ENTERT., ACCOM., AND FOOD SVCS. 6.9% 7.7% 5.8% 6.8%
AGRICULTURE, FORESTRY, FISHERIES 0.7% 6.8% 7.3% 6.5%
OTHER SERVICES 5.1% 5.6% 6.1% 5.8%
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 1.6% 4.9% 6.5% 5.3%
CONSTRUCTION 2.0% 6.4% 4.7% 5.3%
FINANCE, INSURANCE, REAL ESTATE 4.7% 4.5% 4.5% 4.5%
TRANSPORT. AND WAREHOUSING 2.0% 4.2% 4.3% 4.1%
WHOLESALE TRADE 3.5% 3.2% 4.0% 3.6%
INFO. AND COMMUNICATION 4.2% 2.7% 2.3% 2.7%
UNCODABLE 2.4% 2.7% 2.6% 2.6%
UTILITIES 0.2% 0.8% 0.5% 0.6%
MINING 0.4% 0.5% 0.5% 0.5%
ARMED FORCES 0.4% 0.5% 0.3% 0.4%
NOT IN LABOR FORCE 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 0.1%
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Percentage Reporting Pre-Migration Industry 72.2% 60.5% 55.9% 59.2%
Table C.7: Frequency of Pre-Migration Offers by Social Indicators
Received Pre-Migration Offer
Yes No Missing Total
English is Poor 0.198 0.415 0.585 0.480
(0.016) (0.008) (0.008) (0.005)
Poor Health 0.010 0.025 0.051 0.036
(0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Regular Religious Attendance 0.598 0.620 0.603 0.611
(0.020) (0.008) (0.008) (0.005)
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